Nagorno-Karabakh in the shadow of Russian influence

Elkhan Nuriyev

Tuesday, July 12, 2011


Last year I met with a Russian official at the international conference in Moscow. During our long and controversial discussion on the problem of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement, he argued that any attempt by Armenian leadership to try to change the status quo in a positive sense will result in the similar developments that previously took place in 1997, when former President Levon Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign and/or in 1999 when several local top officials were shot dead by terrorists in the national parliament.

I was not surprised to hear such a convincing opinion from a Russian colleague just as well as I was not surprised to learn news about a new failure of the opposing parties to reach a breakthrough in the peace talks recently held in Kazan. In reality, the external factor has always taken a special place in the conflict settlement process. Many agree that there are outside strategic concerns behind the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Clearly, an influential group of principal powers (in which Russia, the U.S. and the EU dominate) play the key role in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, when it comes to the issue of conflict resolution. In recent years Russia has taken a proactive stance in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, thus trying to convince the West that the Kremlin has quite a big potential to impose a diplomatic solution on the parties or at least to be a credible mediator.

Indeed Moscow has succeeded in strengthening ties with both Yerevan and Baku, with the West progressively losing ground to increasing Russian economic, military and political advancement – military agreement with Armenia and growing energy ties with Azerbaijan. Moscow really tries to create a new balance of relations in the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle, and all the latest diplomatic steps by the Kremlin were aimed at maintaining a geopolitical equilibrium in the conflict-torn region. By doing so, Russia has enhanced its positions in the South Caucasus and one of the main resources of Russia’s successful foreign policy is more a result of other geopolitical players’ failure or at least the systemized weakening of their stances.

In fact, the Obama administration’s short-sighted policy has seriously weakened the U.S. strategic objectives in the South Caucasus. The failure of Washington to craft any coherent vision on how the entire region fits into a broader U.S. strategy shows that America’s role has increasingly been defined through the prism of Russia. The lack of a meaningful response to challenge the protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh not only highlights the low level of U.S. engagement in this troubled region, but also questions America’s inability to be an impartial player in the OSCE Minsk Group. Likewise, the EU lacks a visionary and principled approach in its reactive neighborhood policy toward the conflict resolution. Brussels has practically no role in the conflict settlement and therefore does not have the necessary tools to intervene in the peace process, offering only confidence-building activities. Such a situation strongly limits the EU influence and dramatically hinders Brussels’ capacity to formulate policy toward simmering secessionist conflicts. As a result, the lack of a common and integrated strategy will possibly lead, already in the near future, to a withdrawal of the West from the South Caucasus, thereby leaving ground to a more assertive foreign policy of Russia.

In turn Russia is seen as essentially having a monopoly of peacemaking process in Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement, a role which the OSCE has effectively forsaken. By orchestrating the negotiations, the Kremlin seeks to enhance Russia’s “sphere of influence building”, thus disintegrating Euro-Atlantic security arrangements in the region. The failure of the OSCE and the weakness of the EU do not only demonstrate to be aphasic in front of the regional crisis, but also show their incapacity to build groups of interest in competition with Russian ones.

Meanwhile, Moscow’s mediating mission has given rise to the intensive speculation as to whether Russia is presently interested in a definitive solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More precisely, the question that needs to be answered is: Does Russia want a soonest resolution of the conflict?

It is very unlikely that Russian-led peace talks will effectively bring a solution in the near future. It is rather possible that Moscow will exploit the peace process to regain more economic, military and political power. In order to obtain a progressive shift of the region into its own orbit of influence, Russia has nothing to do but keep the status quo in the South Caucasus. Given these circumstances, Russia is simply interested in maintaining the “managed instability” in the region.

Nevertheless, Russia’s role in finding an ultimate solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is very critical. Without doubt, the Kremlin holds the key to the Armenian-Azerbaijani quandary. Russia does have a golden opportunity for ending this protracted territorial conflict and helping reconcile the two nations. However, Moscow seems to await a suitable period of time: when a new, beneficial geopolitical situation that fits fully well into Russian strategic interests is finally formed in the post-Soviet Southern Tier.

Until this happens, the game goes on and its final part is still ahead. The Western democracies are surely not powerless to foster a change of Russian behavior in Europe’s backyard. The US and the EU must understand that they can lose all influence in this strategically important area. Moreover, the Western players will risk losing a major geopolitical game if they continue to pursue a “Russia first” policy and calmly watch how Russian economic, military and political influence looms in the shadow of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

*Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev is Alexander von Humboldt Research Professor of Political Science (Germany) and the author of “The South Caucasus at the Crossroads”. (LIT, Berlin)

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
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