Turkey And The Middle East: An Updated Assessment

Barry Rubin January 20, 2008

In a sense, no country has tried harder to get out ofthe Middle East than Turkey--by way of achievingmembership in the European Union--yet Turkey does havean important role to play in the region. At the sametime, though, this situation is complicated bydivergences over Turkey's identity, interests, andinternal politics. Turkish interests and perceptionsTurkey is still very much the product of theremarkable reforms launched by Kemal Ataturk in the1920s. He sought a Western-oriented, secular,modernizing state which avoided foreign adventures orterritorial claims. The Turkey he sought was oneunited around Turkish peoplehood, a unitary and highlycentralized state.While some of Ataturk's legacy is very much underchallenge today, Turks cannot for one moment forgetthe impact of his policies. In addition, even when thecountry is diverging from Ataturk's vision, thesedevelopments are often the result of the relativesuccess of the system he established.For example, Turkey's relative stability and economicdevelopment, following the liberalizing economicreforms of the 1970s and 1980s, raised up a new middleclass in central Anatolia which was more religious andtraditional- minded. Then, too, the role of the armyas the ultimate protector of the republic was acreation of Ataturk which has frequently acted as aninsurance policy against the failure of electoralpolitics.From the late 1940s into the 1990s, Turkey's strategicpriorities were fairly consistent. Seeing the primarythreat as emanating from the USSR and Soviet bloc,Turkey emphasized its alliance with the West(symbolized by its NATO membership) and especiallywith the United States. It was thus opposed to radicalArab regimes which were allied with Moscow.The other key aspect of Turkish policy was theconflict with Greece over the Aegean Sea borders,Cyprus, and other issues. Since both countries werepart of the Western alliance, however, this frictionwas usually restrained.With the Cold War's end in the 1990s, however, Turkishleaders were very much aware that they needed to finda new orientation. The Soviet Union and its blocdisappeared, removing the threat from the north.Instead, ethnically Turkish states emerged with whichTurkey could have good relations. But Turks also knewthey had to figure out how to reconfigure theiralliance with the West in a situation where Turkeymight be considered less of an asset.The earlier part of this process involved the virtualend of the conflict with Greece. There was also animportant Middle Eastern component. The new threat wasdefined as emanating from radical neighbors like Iran,Iraq, and Syria.While already underway, the rapprochement with Israelwas also intensified by this rethinking. Bothcountries were non-Arab, Western-oriented democracieswhich had the same enemies in the region.This approach also coincided with the Kurdishquestion. The radical PKK, which was carrying on abloody terrorist war against Turkey, was a client ofSyria. Turkey, too, had to be very much concerned withthe internal situation in Iraq, with its Kurdishmajority in the north. Equally, Iran's support forIslamism, a threat to Turkey's secularist republic,made it seem almost as much an enemy in Ankara as itwas perceived as being in Jerusalem.The armed forces, which respected Israel's militaryachievements as well as seeking to buy itstechnological know-how, were a particularly avidadvocate for the alliance. Yet there were alsoimpressive economic factors. For Turkey, Israel was avery good market and trade between the two countriessoared. A telling symbol is the resemblance betweenIsrael's new international airport with itscounterpart in Istanbul--both were built by the sameTurkish company.The Coming of the Ak RegimeWith the formation of a government by the Justice andDevelopment (widely known by the first two letters ofits Turkish name, as the Ak) party in 2002, Turkeyentered a new era. A key, and unanswerable, questionhere is whether this is a short-term change or afundamental shift in the country's direction.The Ak party emerged out of the frustration andrethinking by younger members in the country'straditionally radical Islamist party. Out of a blendbetween sincerity and pragmatic calculation, theconclusion was reached that any such group could onlyhave an appeal if it moved toward the center and shedits more explicitly Islamist intentions.Thus, the new party's leaders identified the Ak as acenter-to-right, conservative, traditional valuesgrouping that strongly favored EU membership. In the2002 election, it won 34 percent of the vote and, dueto the vagaries of Turkish election law, gainedtwo-thirds of the seats in parliament. The party'sreign has been deemed so successful that it raisedthat figure to 48 percent in the 2007 elections.The success of the party was not due exclusively- -oreven largely--to its Islamist orientation. Two otherkey factors included the demonstrable incompetence andfragmentation of the opposition, the country'seconomic slump and the Ak government's success inovercoming it. Also worth mentioning is that the partyappealed to Kurds, offering them a solution throughcommon Muslim identity rather than Kurdishnationalism.A deeper current was the long rivalry between centerand periphery that has characterized Turkish societyand politics. The more Westernized and modernized westof the country had dominated the Anatolian heartland,just as the centralized government bureaucracy ranroughshod over the private sector. With thedevelopment and growing wealth of the interior, plusmassive immigration to cities, the Ak represented achallenge to the old order.And once the Ak proved that it was not being run bywild-eyed Islamists, a growing respect for the partybecame fashionable even in highly secular andWesternized circles.How should one assess the Ak? It cannot be put eitherinto an Islamist or a moderate box. Both elements arepresent. There are many elements in the party,including the current president, Abdullah Gul, whichwould like to see an Islamist Turkey. There areothers, probably including Prime Minister Recep TayyipErdogan, who seem sincere about following a morecentrist path. An additional element, however, is thelong-term effect of the Ak regime in moving Turkey inan Islamist direction. How long the party will be inpower is going to be a critical factor here.The Effect on Turkish Foreign PolicyThis domestic upheaval had less effect on Turkishforeign policy than one might have expected. Ofcritical importance is the fact that the newleadership very much wanted to prove that it was notextremist. Thus, the party was very avid on strivingfor EU membership. This was popular with its importantconstituency among newly rising manufacturers, who sawmembership as being in their personal interest. Inaddition, many of the reforms pressed for by the EU,notably those weakening the power of the army andstatist bureaucracy, were also welcomed by the Ak.Relations with Israel were also relatively insulated.For one thing, the army wanted them to continue on awarm level, and letting this happen was a relativelycheap way to avoid friction with the military and useas proof that the Ak was not an Islamist party, not tomention the trade benefits. There is tremendoushostility toward Israel in the Ak regime, stokedfurther by a harshly anti-Israel media, but thepolicymakers follow their interests, not theirpreferences.More change, however, happened regarding Turkey'srelations with other Middle Eastern countries and theUnited States, though some of this was due todevelopments in the region. After Turkey successfullyintimidated Syria away from supporting the PKK,relations with Damascus eased considerably. OnceSaddam Hussein was overthrown, Iraq was no longer athreat in the same way. The mutual Islamic/Islamistorientation between Turkey and Iran also brought themtogether.With the United States, relations underwent a seriouscrisis. The background of this was the Islamicorientation of the Ak government and its 180-degreeturnaround regarding attitude toward Middle Easternradical movements and states. But the foreground wasthe Iraq issue.Not everything was preordained. Turkey did come closeto supporting the offensive against Saddam Hussein in2003. But nationalist, Islamic, and anti-Americanfactors came together ultimately to escalate hostilitytoward Washington. Specifically, Turkey feltthreatened by the relative anarchy in Iraq coupledwith the rise of Kurdish power there. The old fear ofa Kurdish state across the border underminingsoutheastern Turkey's ethnic Kurdish population is amajor strategic and psychological factor in Turkey.The fact that the U.S. presence did not crack downenough on the PKK presence in northern Iraq was aspecial irritant.The United States has been restrained in its treatmentof Turkey and the Ak government, so much so as to drawcomplaints from the opposition and even claims thatWashington wants the Ak in power. Tensions have easedof late. Still, it should be a matter of concern thatTurkey's current rulers feel more comfortable withIran than the United States.Turkey and Middle East DiplomacyWhile Turkey can play a constructive role in theregion, one myth should be put to rest. Turkey is not,in any meaningful way, a model for Arabic-speakingcountries. For historical, nationalistic, and otherreasons, Arabs do not look to Turkey. This was truefor the Ataturk system and it is equally so for the"moderate Muslim" regime of the present.As a state and regional power, however, Turkey can behelpful. This aspect was symbolized in November 2007when Israeli President Shimon Peres and PalestinianAuthority leader Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkishparliament. The duo also signed an agreement withTurkey for two industrial zones in the West Bank.Turkey wants to play a part on Arab-Israelipeacemaking for several reasons. One of them isprestige and showing the value of good relations withTurkey; another is to burnish the Ak's moderatecredentials. The idea that more stability in theregion is good for Turkey, along with strongsympathies for the Palestinians, are additionalfactors pushing in this direction.Yet there are also limits to what can be accomplished.Turkey's regime does not want to go so far as toantagonize its new friends, Syria and Iran. And the Akparty's Palestinian sympathies run as much or more toHamas than to the forces of Abbas. In terms ofproviding a channel for secret communications, anassistor of economic development, and a peacesupporter to balance the rejectionists in the Arabworld, however, Turkey has some real value.An indirect advantage of a Turkish role is tostrengthen Europe-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey links. Whilethe Ak regime should be treated with caution, it isalso important to keep it from going too far in thedirection of the region's radical forces. It is betterto have Turkey's government in the middle--taking someresponsibility for easing the conflict; needing tomaintain good relations with Israel--than for it to becheering on Tehran, Damascus, Hizballah, and Hamas whowant to sabotage any progress.An even more complex, but in some ways even moreurgent, diplomatic role for Turkey is toward Iraq. Incontrast to Iraq's other neighbors, who seek solutionsantipathetic to Western interests, Turkey does want astable, moderate Iraq. Its specific demands are thatthere be no independent Kurdish state, thatanti-Turkish terrorists are not allowed to operate innorthern Iraq, and that the ethnic Turkish populationthere be treated fairly. These are demands that couldbe met.The relative stability of northern Iraq, compared tothe violent disorder in the rest of the country, hasdepended on Turkish cooperation, especiallyfacilitating cross-border commerce. Turkey's role inIraq can either be a tremendous problem or anindispensable asset depending on how it is handled.And this is the dual bottom line of Turkey's MiddleEast role. It should be used to move forward apositive agenda in dealing with regional issues. And,at the same time, dong so could help ensure thatTurkey itself remain more moderate and oriented towardthe West as is possible under its current government. Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research inInternational Affairs (GLORIA) Center,Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book,The Truth about Syria was published byPalgrave-Macmillan in May 2007. Prof. Rubin's columnscan be read online at: http://www.gloriace nter.org/index.asp? pname=submenus/ articles/ index.asp. The Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA)CenterInterdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya P.O. Box 167 Herzliya, 46150 IsraelEmail: info@gloriacenter. org Phone: +972-9-960-2736Fax: +972-9-956-8605To unsubscribe click here © 2008 All rights reserved