Nagorno-Karabakh in the shadow of Russian influence

Elkhan Nuriyev

Tuesday, July 12, 2011


Last year I met with a Russian official at the international conference in Moscow. During our long and controversial discussion on the problem of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement, he argued that any attempt by Armenian leadership to try to change the status quo in a positive sense will result in the similar developments that previously took place in 1997, when former President Levon Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign and/or in 1999 when several local top officials were shot dead by terrorists in the national parliament.

I was not surprised to hear such a convincing opinion from a Russian colleague just as well as I was not surprised to learn news about a new failure of the opposing parties to reach a breakthrough in the peace talks recently held in Kazan. In reality, the external factor has always taken a special place in the conflict settlement process. Many agree that there are outside strategic concerns behind the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Clearly, an influential group of principal powers (in which Russia, the U.S. and the EU dominate) play the key role in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, when it comes to the issue of conflict resolution. In recent years Russia has taken a proactive stance in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, thus trying to convince the West that the Kremlin has quite a big potential to impose a diplomatic solution on the parties or at least to be a credible mediator.

Indeed Moscow has succeeded in strengthening ties with both Yerevan and Baku, with the West progressively losing ground to increasing Russian economic, military and political advancement – military agreement with Armenia and growing energy ties with Azerbaijan. Moscow really tries to create a new balance of relations in the Armenia-Russia-Azerbaijan triangle, and all the latest diplomatic steps by the Kremlin were aimed at maintaining a geopolitical equilibrium in the conflict-torn region. By doing so, Russia has enhanced its positions in the South Caucasus and one of the main resources of Russia’s successful foreign policy is more a result of other geopolitical players’ failure or at least the systemized weakening of their stances.

In fact, the Obama administration’s short-sighted policy has seriously weakened the U.S. strategic objectives in the South Caucasus. The failure of Washington to craft any coherent vision on how the entire region fits into a broader U.S. strategy shows that America’s role has increasingly been defined through the prism of Russia. The lack of a meaningful response to challenge the protracted conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh not only highlights the low level of U.S. engagement in this troubled region, but also questions America’s inability to be an impartial player in the OSCE Minsk Group. Likewise, the EU lacks a visionary and principled approach in its reactive neighborhood policy toward the conflict resolution. Brussels has practically no role in the conflict settlement and therefore does not have the necessary tools to intervene in the peace process, offering only confidence-building activities. Such a situation strongly limits the EU influence and dramatically hinders Brussels’ capacity to formulate policy toward simmering secessionist conflicts. As a result, the lack of a common and integrated strategy will possibly lead, already in the near future, to a withdrawal of the West from the South Caucasus, thereby leaving ground to a more assertive foreign policy of Russia.

In turn Russia is seen as essentially having a monopoly of peacemaking process in Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict settlement, a role which the OSCE has effectively forsaken. By orchestrating the negotiations, the Kremlin seeks to enhance Russia’s “sphere of influence building”, thus disintegrating Euro-Atlantic security arrangements in the region. The failure of the OSCE and the weakness of the EU do not only demonstrate to be aphasic in front of the regional crisis, but also show their incapacity to build groups of interest in competition with Russian ones.

Meanwhile, Moscow’s mediating mission has given rise to the intensive speculation as to whether Russia is presently interested in a definitive solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More precisely, the question that needs to be answered is: Does Russia want a soonest resolution of the conflict?

It is very unlikely that Russian-led peace talks will effectively bring a solution in the near future. It is rather possible that Moscow will exploit the peace process to regain more economic, military and political power. In order to obtain a progressive shift of the region into its own orbit of influence, Russia has nothing to do but keep the status quo in the South Caucasus. Given these circumstances, Russia is simply interested in maintaining the “managed instability” in the region.

Nevertheless, Russia’s role in finding an ultimate solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis is very critical. Without doubt, the Kremlin holds the key to the Armenian-Azerbaijani quandary. Russia does have a golden opportunity for ending this protracted territorial conflict and helping reconcile the two nations. However, Moscow seems to await a suitable period of time: when a new, beneficial geopolitical situation that fits fully well into Russian strategic interests is finally formed in the post-Soviet Southern Tier.

Until this happens, the game goes on and its final part is still ahead. The Western democracies are surely not powerless to foster a change of Russian behavior in Europe’s backyard. The US and the EU must understand that they can lose all influence in this strategically important area. Moreover, the Western players will risk losing a major geopolitical game if they continue to pursue a “Russia first” policy and calmly watch how Russian economic, military and political influence looms in the shadow of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

*Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev is Alexander von Humboldt Research Professor of Political Science (Germany) and the author of “The South Caucasus at the Crossroads”. (LIT, Berlin)

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=nagorno-karabakh-in-the-shadow-of-russian-influence-2011-07-12

Nabucco chances grow as Europe’s atomic future dims


MICHAEL KAHN / SYLVIA WESTALL
PRAGUE/VIENNA - Reuters
Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Until the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant disaster in Japan, the Nabucco pipeline project was struggling with rising costs and political uncertainties. Now, as Europeans shun nuclear energy, EU plans to link the Caspian and Austria have gained new appeal


Challenged by cheaper rivals and lingering supply questions, the up-and-down Nabucco pipeline project may have a new lease on life following Germany’s decision to switch off nuclear power.

Nabucco’s backers in May said it would open two years later than planned and cost more than its target of 7.9 billion euros ($11.4 billion). The link aims to ease Europe’s reliance on Russian gas by delivering supplies through a new southern route.

Several setbacks this year mainly due to talks with gas producers have deepened doubts about the project, which has been under discussion since 2002 and has not signed any supply deals.

But Germany’s decision to kill atomic power by 2022 in the wake of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster and progress in talks with supplier Azerbaijan have revived Nabucco.

Analysts say it has become more attractive to countries wanting to avoid atomic power or heavy reliance on high-polluting coal. “The new German energy strategy will be a push for Nabucco,” said Claudia Kemfert, an energy analyst at the Berlin-based DIW institute. “It seemed almost dead but the nuclear decision has revived it.”

She said it was the most obvious way for Europe to reduce dependence on Russian gas and that it was important for Germany, which in the meantime may be forced to boost its share of Russian gas supply through Gazprom’s Nord Stream pipeline.

Will Pearson, an analyst at Eurasia Group in London, said Italy’s recent referendum, in which an overwhelming majority of voters chose to ban nuclear energy for decades, underscores the positive prospects for a southern corridor pipeline.

“Italy, along with Germany, will be a leading advocate of moving forward with the decision-making process in the aftermath of Fukushima,” Pearson said.

The aim to bypass Russia

Nabucco plans to bring up to 31 billion cubic metres of gas annually from the Caspian region to an Austrian hub, bypassing Russia and altering the balance of regional power supplies. It aims to start transporting gas from 2017. Backed by the European Union, its partners include Germany’s RWE, Turkey’s Botaş, Austria’s OMV, Hungarian MOL, Romania’s Transgaz and Bulgarian Bulgargaz.

EU Energy Commisioner Guenther Oettinger has said Germany will lose 23 percent of its electricity production when its nuclear power plants go off line. This translates into a 6 percent gap in the EU’s electricity supply, he said.

But while Europe may want more gas from outside Russia as energy demand rises, talks with suppliers have dragged on as their governments weigh advances from several competing plans. A January joint statement between the EU and Azerbaijan requiring the provision of a 20 bcm per year dedicated export pipeline from Baku to Europe could be key.

“There is certainly more than enough Azeri gas to get the full pipeline started,” said Jennifer Coolidge of CMX Caspian and Gulf Consultants.

“The significant development is Azerbaijan and the EU’s requirement for a new dedicated pipeline across the Caucasus and Turkey.”

This may put Nabucco ahead of other smaller European projects such as the Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy and the Trans Atlantic Pipeline, which are also competing for Azeri gas.

Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field is being developed by BP and Statoil as well as Azeri state energy firm SOCAR and some others. It is estimated to contain 1.2 trillion cubic metres of gas. Production began in 2006, and the second phase is expected to begin by 2017.

Azerbaijan has been in talks with more than 20 firms and consortiums looking to buy gas from Shah Deniz II and has said it wanted to conclude negotiations this year.

State energy giant Gazprom signed a deal with SOCAR in September 2010 to buy 2 billion cubic meters of gas in 2011 and even more from 2012.

© 2011 Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=nabucco-chances-grow-as-europe8217s-atomic-future-dims-2011-06-21

Fossil fuels are far deadlier than nuclear power 23 March 2011 by Phil McKenna
Magazine issue 2805. Subscribe and save
For similar stories, visit the Energy and Fuels and The Nuclear Age Topic Guides


IN THE wake of the nuclear crisis in Japan, Germany has temporarily shut down seven of its reactors and China, which is building more nuclear power plants than the rest of the world combined, has suspended approval for all new facilities. But this reaction may be more motivated by politics than by fear of a catastrophic death toll. It may be little consolation to those living around Fukushima, but nuclear power kills far fewer people than other energy sources, according to a review by the International Energy Agency (IAE).

"There is no question," says Joseph Romm, an energy expert at the Center for American Progress in Washington DC. "Nothing is worse than fossil fuels for killing people."

A 2002 review by the IAE put together existing studies to compare fatalities per unit of power produced for several leading energy sources. The agency examined the life cycle of each fuel from extraction to post-use and included deaths from accidents as well as long-term exposure to emissions or radiation. Nuclear came out best, and coal was the deadliest energy source.

The explanation lies in the large number of deaths caused by pollution. "It's the whole life cycle that leads to a trail of injuries, illness and death," says Paul Epstein, associate director of the Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard Medical School. Fine particles from coal power plants kill an estimated 13,200 people each year in the US alone, according to the Boston-based Clean Air Task Force (The Toll from Coal, 2010). Additional fatalities come from mining and transporting coal, and other forms of pollution associated with coal. In contrast, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN estimate that the death toll from cancer following the 1986 meltdown at Chernobyl will reach around 9000.

In fact, the numbers show that catastrophic events are not the leading cause of deaths associated with nuclear power. More than half of all deaths stem from uranium mining, says the IEA. But even when this is included, the overall toll remains significantly lower than for all other fuel sources.

So why do people fixate on nuclear power? "From coal we have a steady progression of deaths year after year that are invisible to us, things like heart attacks, whereas a large-scale nuclear release is a catastrophic event that we are rightly scared about," says James Hammitt of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis in Boston.

Yet again, popular perceptions are wrong. When, in 1975, about 30 dams in central China failed in short succession due to severe flooding, an estimated 230,000 people died. Include the toll from this single event, and fatalities from hydropower far exceed the number of deaths from all other energy sources

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20928053.600-fossil-fuels-are-far-deadlier-than-nuclear-power.html?full=true&print=true

Risk expert: Why radiation fears are often exaggerated 24 March 2011 by Alison George
Magazine issue 2805. Subscribe and save
For similar stories, visit the Interviews and The Nuclear Age Topic Guides

David Spiegelhalter is Winton Professor of the Public Understanding of Risk at the University of Cambridge. He studies risk and uncertainty in the lives of individuals and society, and helps run the Understanding Uncertainty website (Image: Kate Bull)
Fear of radiation from Japan's stricken nuclear power plant must not blind us to the risks attached to the alternatives, says David Spiegelhalter

What is it about nuclear energy that makes people particularly fearful?
There has been a lot of research on this. Nuclear radiation ticks all the boxes for increasing the fear factor. It is invisible, an unknowable quantity. People don't feel in control of it, and they don't understand it. They feel it is imposed upon them and that it is unnatural. It has the dread quality of causing cancer and birth defects.

Nuclear power has been staggeringly safe, but that doesn't stop people being anxious about it, just as airplanes and trains are an amazingly safe way to travel but people still worry far more about plane crashes than car crashes.

People are calling the release of radiation from the Fukushima nuclear power station in Japan a "catastrophe". Is this justified?
This is indeed a really serious event, but it has to be put in the context of the earthquake and tsunami which led to it - and which has been the direct cause of massive suffering, which is still continuing. Obviously there are threats from the nuclear power station, but they are limited and they are quantifiable. It's not a Chernobyl. Though the 1986 explosion at Chernobyl was a terrible event for many people, the lasting effects were nothing like as bad as expected.

Many governments are suspending their nuclear power projects in response to the events in Japan. Is it sensible to make these decisions in the aftermath of a disaster?
This is a tricky one. The Fukushima power station was hit by an unimaginable force. One is always surprised by these events, but one of the things you learn when you study risk is that surprising things happen. We have to expect the unexpected.

Of course, political decisions are made on the basis of how people feel. That's a politician's job perhaps, not just to respond to objective measurements of risk but to what people want. But it's good to try and keep a perspective on what the risks are for all viable alternatives, including the risk of relying on unsavoury regimes for our sources of energy.

Does this mean that fear itself is part of the problem?
One of the biggest risks from radiation is the psychological damage it causes. After events like the 1979 partial meltdown at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, and the Chernobyl accident, there was substantial psychological trauma, even among people who were not affected, because there is such a fear of radiation and its long-term consequences.

Would you be happy to live next to a nuclear power station?
I have been trying to think how I would feel if I were in Japan right now. Would I be rushing out of Tokyo or not? I would love to say that I would be a plucky Brit and sit there with my stiff upper lip. But it is very difficult to know how you would react, especially as people respond to the feelings of those around them. But yes, I would be happy to live next to a nuclear power station, if only they weren't such big ugly things.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20928053.600-fossil-fuels-are-far-deadlier-than-nuclear-power.html

Tehran alarm grows at Russia's defectionBy Kaveh L Afrasiabi

7 Oct 2010

"Russia's long-term interests will not be served by participating in the US games."
- Ramin Mehmanparast, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman.

The indications are that Moscow has now joined the United States' "strategic game" against Iran. As Tehran's preoccupation grows over this unsettling issue about its northern neighbor and sole nuclear partner, rumors are circulating that authorities have interrogated several Russian technicians at the Russian-built Bushehr power plant over their possible involvement with the recent cyber-attack that infected staff computers at the facility.

The Bushehr plant was due to open this month, but due to



technical difficulties, a "small leak" according to officials and not the cyber-attack as initially reported, operations are now slated to begin early next year. The mystery of the origins of the powerful cyber-attack against Iran continues, and there are strong suspicions in Iran of a joint US-Israeli operation, though some in the West now place the blame on Russia. [1]

Amid this, Tehran is grappling with the challenge of maintaining healthy relations with Moscow despite growing worrying signs that the Kremlin leadership has "caved in" to US and Israeli pressure, according to Iran's top military officials.

"Unfortunately we are faced with two Russias now instead of one, and one is friendly - the other is not. As a result, they keep taking away with one hand what they offer with the other," an Iranian analyst at a Tehran think-tank tells the author.

Some Tehran analysts attribute the recent "green light" given by Washington for Russia's World Trade Organization entry to a behind-the-scenes bargain whereby Moscow is handsomely rewarded for its cooperation with the West against Iran. The Israeli press has been reporting a "secret US-Russia deal".

The Russian government adamantly denies any such bargain, and its envoy at the UN General Assembly last week threaded the fine line of exhorting Iran to enhance its nuclear transparency while lambasting the "unilateral sanctions" against Iran by US, Europe and others.

That is small comfort to Tehran; such diplomatic nuances on the part of Russian diplomats can barely compensate for Tehran's realistic fear that Russia may have been lost to the West. Fueling that fear are President Dmitry Medvedev's recent decision to ban any commercial sale to Iran related to uranium mining in Russia and, more important, a ban on the sale of the sophisticated S-300 air defense system, irrespective of Iran's dire reaction and warning that it will sue Moscow for breach of its contractual obligations.

Russia, citing the UN sanctions, is now trying to cheat Iran of 90% of the US$800 million contract on the missile system by repaying only 10% under the lame excuse of force majeure - a clever "cheating game" according to some Iranian parliamentarians. That simply adds to Iranian anger that nowadays is directed first and foremost against Washington, reflected in President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's remark over the weekend that he wished US leaders would be "buried", a dramatic turnaround to the more deferential comments during the initial phase of his recent US visit.

In the US, on the other hand, there is a genuine satisfaction of a "smart Iran strategy" that is working, not only with the Russians but also, perhaps, with regional supporters of Iran such as Turkey and Syria. Turkish President Abdullah Gul made a surprising statement expressing concern about Iran's nuclear intentions, even as he has urged stronger trade ties with Tehran, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last month met with Walid al-Moallem, her Syrian counterpart.

With Lebanon's internal tensions intensifying and Ahmadinejad's planned Beirut visit approaching, Syria may be trying to be a moderating influence on Tehran at a critical time when retaliation rather than moderation is on the minds of the Iranian leadership. According to a Tehran analyst, as the Iranian government must sooner or later send a stern signal to its enemies, the right place to show some of its teeth may be Lebanon, where the pro-Iran Hezbollah has toyed with the idea of a military takeover.

There is no foreign policy consensus, however, and a number of other Tehran pundits counsel a course of action geared to safekeeping Iran's network of regional support, especially Syria and Turkey, both of whom are being worked on intensely by Western governments to distance themselves from Tehran as part of efforts to "isolate" the "nuclearizing Iran". From Tehran's point of view, on the other hand, the nuclear issue is an "excuse" to weaken an independent regional power that has resisted Western hegemony since the outset of the Islamic Republic.

With respect to Russia, the harsh feelings in Tehran about a "sell-out" to the US may soon translate into a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy action in Russia's "backyard", the Central Asia-Caucasus. Iran is getting cosy with Georgia and conceiving a role in alternative pipeline projects that compete with Russia's pipeline system to Europe. In the Caspian region, Iran's hitherto amicable relations may turn for the worse if Tehran continues to receive disturbing information that Russia's intention is to undermine Iranian power in order to appease its American friends.

In turn, this is bound to negatively affect Iran's cooperation with Russia through the regional grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where it enjoys the status of an observer. Such a multilateral setback may be offset by increased ties with Beijing, which is somewhat insulated from the "diplomatic holes" in Russia's foreign policy. Such weakness is aptly exploited by the West, which hopes to enlist Russia as a junior partner in the strategic game with China, in light of recent Russia-India cooperation that is worrying Beijing, and thus clouding the future of the SCO. At the moment, however, many Chinese firms have adopted a "wait and see" attitude instead of implementing the terms of numerous contracts signed with Iran, adding to Tehran's sense of urgency over its foreign economic policy objectives.

"Russia has been duped by the Americans and their tactical maneuvers, and they fail to see the long-term strategic loss if they persist in their playing in the US game against Iran," says a Tehran University political science professor on the condition of anonymity, adding that the Russians are being "short-sighted" and sacrificing vested interests with Iran for "a pittance from the West". And yet, it is doubtful that this necessarily corresponds with Kremlin's own "risk and opportunity assessment" that includes worries about Iran's nuclear program.

What is clear is that no matter what inputs in Russia's "foreign policy black box" motivate its current bandwagoning against Iran, relations between Russia and Iran are deteriorating and require immediate resuscitation, especially by Moscow. Without action, Tehran's misgivings about Russia's position on the political faultlines dividing Iran and the West will inevitably grow, thus damaging their overall economic and strategic relations.


www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LJ07Ak03.html

NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Missile Defence

Inclusion of missile defence into new strategy will be a defining step.
Comment by Avnish Patel, Departmental Exec Officer and Research Analyst at RUSI

08:53 GMT, November 3, 2010 As the Lisbon Summit approaches, momentum is gathering on the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the prospect of making missile defence one of its core missions. Whilst the United States and NATO are close to reaching a consensus on missile defence, Russia and Turkey’s concerns with hosting a radar site still need to be addressed more fully.

The adoption of the new Strategic Concept at the NATO Lisbon Summit in late November will mark the first update of NATO’s long-term strategy since 1999. Strategic clarity will be based on defining NATO’s new roles and responsibilities, rolling out new military capacities and identifying where political reform is needed.

NATO’s ambition to make missile defence a core mission within the new Concept is beginning to gain traction. If this materialised, European alliance members would integrate their individual capabilities into the proposed system endorsed by the Obama Administration, namely the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). Within this context, the latest UK policy statement, as espoused in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), provides a positively vague declaration regarding an appropriate UK contribution.[1]

There has been consternation in the US over the level of European defence spending, as seen in the recent public expressions of concern at the UK SDSR by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Whilst it is assumed that the US will carry the bulk of the financial burden, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has stated that territorial missile defence would cost NATO less than 200m Euros over ten years.[2] A leaked briefing by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group has also recommended that NATO should consider the creation of a commonly funded pool of interceptors that would potentially offset any discrepancy between US missile defence capabilities and European NATO members.[3]

The PAA reflects the US Administration’s austerity on existing programmes; it is envisaged that it will consist of tested and operationally effective systems, be responsive to the current threat, cost effective and adaptable to evolving threats and capabilities. There is a certain emollient nature to this policy, aiming to sooth Russian prickliness that had arisen out of the Bush Administration’s previous, contentious plan to field ten long-range interceptors in Poland and a radar base in the Czech Republic. The newly envisaged extensive and flexible architecture is due to be built in stages between now and 2020, with the first phase being the placement of sea-based Aegis naval assets around Europe. Romania and Poland are due to host SM-3 land-based missiles in future phases by 2015 and 2018 respectively.

To help tie up the first phase of the PAA architecture, fellow NATO member Turkey has been approached to host high-powered X-band radar on its territory, but a number of issues need to be resolved prior to the Lisbon Summit (when NATO members vote whether to add missile defence to the Strategic Concept). Due to the consensual nature of NATO, in that any proposed system has to meet the approval of all twenty-eight members, Turkish concerns and the assurances it seeks have to be taken seriously. Firstly, Turkey is in a precarious position: given its NATO membership and long-held EU aspirations, it will want to placate its Western allies without alienating its northern and eastern neighbours. Indeed, Turkey would want missile defence packaged within the Strategic Concept without naming any specific country as a missile threat.

The Group of Experts, convened by the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to help develop the new Strategic Concept, explicitly states: ‘Defending against the threat of a possible ballistic missile attack from Iran has given birth to what has become, for NATO, an essential military mission. “ [4] Turkey is wary of antagonising Iran, it would rather maintain the ‘zero problems’ policy with neighbours, as envisaged by the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. Burgeoning trade and energy links, as well as Turkey’s interlocutory role in Iran’s dispute over its nuclear programme would also be jeopardised.

Secondly, any proposal would have to ensure that Turkey is fully protected under the system’s security umbrella and that it would have considerable input in setting the rules of engagement with regards to the command and control structure at operational level. Thirdly, Turkey has requested instant access to data on missile threats and assurances that this will not be available to non-NATO members such as Israel. Relations between Turkey and Israel have suffered recently, following the Israel Gaza offensive in 2008-09 and the fallout over the Mavi Marmara incident when eight Turks were killed in May 2010. US diplomatic elbow-twisting has also come into play with hints that the US Congress is threatening to adopt a resolution condemning the Armenian Genocide of 1915, an issue that Turkey has long lobbied against successfully.

The picture suggests a situation not as simple as Turkey having to choose between the NATO Alliance (and ultimately the US) and it’s regional aspirations and ties with its neighbours. In terms of realpolitik, Turkey could offer cooperation on missile defence in return for leverage on its EU membership aspirations, especially with regards to those most resistant, such as Germany. For a comprehensive and effective European missile defence architecture, Turkey, as a key component, must be made to feel a valued partner. The NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has consistently stated that Russian collaboration on European territorial missile defence offers the greatest potential for enhancing NATO-Russia cooperation and is a political must. This is in tune with the Obama Administration’s theme of ‘resetting’ relations with Russia, but also paradoxically reveals that even after the Cold War, the former Soviet Union is a key driving force for maintaining NATO’s relevance.

Within the context of a growing consensus on 21st Century security threats, Russia would act as a catalyst in other areas, such as reducing nuclear and conventional weapons, trafficking, counter-terrorism and stabilising Afghanistan where NATO is seeking Russian assistance in providing helicopters and training pilots and police.[5] Initial Russian scepticism has been tempered recently, with positive signs emanating from the tripartite Deauville Summit (October 18-19), where French, German and Russian Heads of State met to discuss future military and economic cooperation between the EU, NATO and Russia. President Dmitry Medvedev has also announced that he will attend the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the Lisbon Summit. This is certainly a diplomatic coup, but it does not immediately signal a seismic shift on missile defence from a Russian perspective that some might suggest.

Along with strategic cooperation there has to be realistic expectations of reciprocal transparency. Initial cooperation will be limited, reflecting certain caveats and the need for incremental steps that are mutually beneficial. Russia will want to maintain its strategic independence and room for manoeuvre; most importantly it will need further guarantees that such a system will not undercut its own deterrent and strategic nuclear forces. Russia is also keen to reach a consensus on defining and identifying common threats, of which the most pressing for NATO and the US is a growing ballistic threat from Iran.

Even though Turkey has requested that specific threats not be addressed in the Strategic Concept. Russia recently cancelled the delivery of S-300 long range surface-to-air missile systems to Iran, stating that this would violate UN sanctions, which have been imposed due to concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. Russia has also stated that it would require equal footing in a proposed system, the parameters of such a co-ordinated system, including funding, however, would need to be comprehensively clarified following an endorsement at Lisbon. Negotiating and implementing a mutually beneficial missile defence system may require an element of quid pro quo, as Russia continues to frustrate NATO at other junctures. One such example is Russia’s apparent insistence on troop limits in states that joined NATO since 1991, such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Further considerations would also need to be given to facilitating industrial collaboration opportunities with Russian defence companies.

The diplomatic groundwork is continuing to be laid by the NATO Secretary General; his rhetoric, however, will have to be matched in the adoption of the new NATO Strategic Concept in Lisbon. Assuaging sceptical Alliance members, such as Turkey, and bringing Russia into closer co-operation will require deft political and diplomatic footwork. Whilst the US, Russia and Europeans in NATO interpretatively differ over existing and potential threats, Roberto Zadra has highlighted that perceptions of an existing BMD threat does not have to be the key central decision to develop a missile defence capability. Furthermore, Zadra points out: “it would suffice to say that there is the ‘potential’ that such a threat might eventually materialise in order to conclude that missile defence would be useful as an insurance policy for the future”.[6]

The Strategic Concept should be bullish in its intentions regarding the Alliance’s future aims and the inclusion of missile defence will be a defining step. It will help negotiate the longer-term considerations of economic viability, political will, military interoperability and strategic consequences.


The Twelfth RUSI Missile Defence Conference on 15-16 June 2011 will discuss the above issues and will feature authoritative presentations from senior military representatives, policymakers, industry and analysts, with the objective of addressing the key issues, policies and capabilities surrounding European missile defence.


----
By Avnish Patel


*Avnish Patel is the Departmental Executive Officer and Research Analyst for the Military Sciences Department at RUSI.

The views expressed here are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of the RUSI or defpro.com


References:
[1] ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’, p. 29. http://goo.gl/IjkRD
[2] NATO Press Release - ‘Afghanistan, NATO Reform and Missile Defence on Defence Ministers’ Agenda, 7 June 2010. http://goo.gl/Bx82Z
[3] “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement - Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Security Concept for NATO”, p. 11 (17 May 2010). http://goo.gl/7IpVv [4] “NATO Advisory Group Floats Proposals for Shared Interceptor Pool”, Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 16, No. 21; October 20. 2010 (p.1,8). (www.InsideDefense.com)
[5] ‘The NATO and Russia Embrace’ by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, The Moscow Times, 25 October 2010.
[6] Roberto Zadra, ‘NATO, Russia and Missile Defence’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 155, No. 5, Oct/Nov 2010, p. 14).


http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/685/

Russia hails improvement in Armenia-Turkey relations

MOSCOW, September 1 (RIA Novosti) - Moscow welcomes Armenia and Turkey's intention to normalize bilateral relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday.

Turkey and Armenia reached an agreement on Monday to start "internal political consultations" on re-establishing diplomatic relations and opening their borders. The negotiations were mediated by Switzerland.

"We hope that an improvement in relations between the two neighbors will revitalize bilateral trade and economic contacts and will have a positive impact on the socio-economic situation of both states," the ministry said in a statement posted on its website.

It added that a better relationship between Armenia and Turkey "will help normalize the situation in the region and strengthen peace and security."

The two countries agreed to a "roadmap" to normalize their relations this April.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called on Tuesday for an early settlement to the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh, a mountainous region in Azerbaijan with a largely Armenian population.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090901/155990584.html

Caucasus to bridge between Turkey, Russia

Dr. Burcu Gültekin Punsmann

Monday, January 25, 2010


Turks and Russians have never had such amicable contacts, never intermingled and cooperated so closely. The historical reconciliation process between Turkey and Russia should generate the same degree of enthusiasm as the French-German reconciliation process.

The main actors of the advanced many-faceted partnership promoted by the Russian and Turkish governments are indeed civilians, namely businessmen and tourists. The increasing interdependence and interactions are rapidly eliminating many of the remaining traces of enmity. The recent announcement that both countries can agree on a visa-free regime by the spring is very good news.

Prime Minister Erdoğan depicted, during his visit to Moscow on Jan. 12 and 13, the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation as exemplary. The deals reached during Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Ankara in August raised the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation to a strategic level. Turkey allowed Russia's Gazprom to use its sector of the Black Sea for the South Stream pipeline to pump Russian and Central Asian gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. And Russia agreed to join a consortium to build the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean supporting Turkey's drive to become a regional hub for gas and oil transit.

Efforts underway aimed at strengthening transportation across the Black Sea between the two countries. Turkey and Russia are planning to build a logistics center in Krasnodar, located 1,500 kilometers south of Moscow and close to the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Temruk, Taman, Kavkaz, Gelendzhik and Tuapse. Turkey, which seeks to export to Russia and other countries in the Black Sea and Caucasus region more efficiently, began feasibility studies in 2008. The center is expected to be a key base reaching all countries around the Black Sea in addition to Russia. Some 98 percent of cargo from Russia to Turkey is carried to Black Sea ports via railways.

Russia and Turkey are being linked across the Black Sea, whereas the Caucasus has become a barrier between them. The situation arisen from the conflicts of the South Caucasus are indeed less than optimal from a Turkish and Russian perspectives. The communications links through the Caucasus are severed. A major part of the infrastructure connecting the Caucasus to eastern Anatolia and Turkey’s Black Sea region – valuable legacy from the Russian empire – is not operational. Kars lost its traditional function of the key to the Trans-Caucasus. Sochi cannot be Russia’s southern gate and access to Vladikavkaz is dependent on the Upper Lars crossing at Kazbegi.

The Black Sea-Caucasus region had historically suffered from being a grey area of confrontation in the managed rivalry between Turkey and Russia. The current Turkish-Russian rapprochement should affect positively the region. Is there a possibility to transfer the model of economic bilateral cooperation between Russia and Turkey that verges on interdependence to the shared neighborhood, the Caucasus?

Turkish-Russian relations have been steadily developing throughout the 90s while, on a parallel track, Moscow and Ankara have been extremely cautious to prevent a spill over of tension emanating from the Caucasus into their bilateral relations.

Although neither Turkey nor Russia have any vital interest in the South Caucasus, they are not given the option to forget about the region. The Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia signed Nov. 16, 2001 by the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey, Igor Ivanov and Ismail Cem, in New York during the U.N. General Assembly, created new room for cooperation. In the post 9/11 context, both countries expressed thereby their determination to carry their relations to a level of enhanced constructive partnership, extending to Eurasia and being based on “the shared belief that dialogue and cooperation in Eurasia will positively contribute to bring about peaceful, just and lasting political solutions to disputes in the region.” In accordance with the Eurasia Action Plan, a Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group and a Caucasus Task Force were established, bringing together high-level officials from the Russian and Turkish ministries of foreign affairs.

The cost of the return of war to the South Caucasus in August 2008 has been very high for the entire region. The initiative for a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,” or CSCP, was made public Aug. 13, 2008 by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Moscow. Announced by Turkey in a context of increasing polarization and harsh rhetoric, the CSCP maintained the channels of communication and dialogue open with Russia and has been a good tactical move to overcome tensions between Georgia and Russia. Furthermore, it helped Turkey to develop at least at the discourse level a pro-active policy in the Caucasus. Despite the fact that Russia dislikes encroachments into its spheres of influence, it recognized the commonality of interests with Turkey and welcomed the initiative by adopting a pragmatic approach and accepting political dynamism on behalf of Turkey in the Caucasus. The Caucasus Platform initiative has brought about a new development: for the first time, good Turkish-Russian understanding was being openly used to resolve problems in the common geographic neighborhood. Contrary to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, or BSEC, that has always avoided such issues, it was stated that the CSCP would be orientated toward problem solving.

The CSCP revealed a Turkish-Russian shared desire to change the regional context characterized by the state of neither peace nor war. The explicit linkage between regional stability and conflict resolution came as an innovation. The Caucasus platform aims at developing a functional method of finding solutions to the problems within the region and is based on the acknowledgement that tensions stem from a profound lack of confidence among states of the region. Furthermore it is a step forward in developing a sense of regional accountability and ownership from insiders. Russia has the potential to become a more active peace broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey can contribute more actively to the settlement of the conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians.

The new momentum in the process of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has been a major source of legitimacy for the CSCP, which 1.5 years after its announcement has still not been precisely formulated. At this stage, the interruption of the Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations will dissipate the international attention focused on the region and decrease the chances to reach in a foreseeable future an agreement on the conflict over Karabakh. Russia expressed openly its support for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. The opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, the last closed one of Europe, will bring new opportunities for Turkish and Russian business sectors active on the Armenian side of the border in infrastructure projects.

Prime Minister Vladimer Putin stated during his talks with Prime Minister Erdoğan in Moscow that “the sooner the two countries ratify the protocols, the better for the region it will be” and that “Russia, like no other country, is interested in the normalization of relations in the region among all the countries, our neighbors.”

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of the underlying root causes of insecurity in the region. The term of “frozen conflict.” The term has been depicted as misleading and potentially dangerous: actually the dispute is in a state of constant dynamic change. With roughly 60,000 Armenian and Azerbaijani troops separated by a 175-km self-regulating ceasefire line (Line of Contact), the situation is inherently unstable. For the time being, the Line of Contact is occasionally monitored by a very small team of five OSCE observers, which means that the sides will always have the possibility to blame each other for any serious violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.

There is a pressing need to try to change the status quo in a predictable and controllable manner. It seems there is a possibility that Russian President Dimitry Medvedev will host Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serge Sarkisian at a trilateral meeting in Moscow in late January. A joint declaration of the sides’ full consent over the updated version of the Madrid Principles is expected.

The resumption of the flight connection between Moscow and Tbilisi and the announcement of the reopening in March of the Verkhny Lars crossing between Russia and Georgia have been welcomed by Turkey. Turkey can play a major role in overcoming the isolation of Abkhazia and help to open up north-south transit routes between Turkey and Russia.

There is a pressing need to transfer the unique economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey – a cooperation that verges on interdependence – to the South Caucasus. Foreign investments are still being often associated with ownership, control and territorial gain. There is a need to promote pragmatically oriented approaches based on self-interest and business initiatives, and to stress the importance of competition, rather than confrontation and domination. In this regard, Turkey and Russia can set the example. The two traditional foes found a political common ground. Economics and private sector actors have been the driving force in this rapprochement.

The Caucasus has the potential to become a land bridge between Turkey and Russia. Being perceived as a buffer zone has proved very harmful. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan can be at the heart of an economically attractive region enlarged to southern Russia (Rostov and Krasnodar territories) and to eastern Turkey (East Anatolia and the eastern Black Sea regions).

* Dr. Burcu Gültekin Punsmann is a Foreign Policy Analyst, TEPAV.

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=thinking-about-the-caucasus-as-a-land-bridge-between-turkey-and-russia-2010-01-25

Turkey: Ankara-Washington Differences Could Disrupt NATO Missile Shield Plans

Nicholas Birch [1]Turkey [2]Geopolitics [3]NATO [4]



October 25, 2010 - 2:14pm
Turkey’s misgivings about NATO plans to build ballistic missile interceptor system are clouding relations between Ankara and its Western allies.

The shield, a reworking of the Star Wars program developed during the Reagan era in the United States, has been described by its chief proponent, the United States, as a means to thwart potential missile strikes carried out by 'rogue' states. It would cover North America, Europe and Israel.

Turkish concerns about the plan center on the way its NATO partners are explicitly describing the shield with Iran in mind. The United States and Iran have long been at odds over Tehran’s nuclear program. Ankara is no more eager than is Washington to see its neighbor and rival for regional hegemony [5] build nuclear weapons. But recent years have seen a vast improvement in both trade and political relations among Tehran, Ankara and other countries in the Middle East. Turkey does not want to put those improving ties at risk [6] by being seen as taking NATO’s side.

It remains unclear whether Turkey is expected to play an active role in the shield scheme. Speaking in Washington on October 17, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates dismissed media speculation that Turkey was being asked to host early warning radar systems.

Even with no active role, Ankara could play the role of spoiler. NATO decisions are adopted by unanimous vote, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has signaled that he wants a decision by November 19, when Alliance heads of state meet in Lisbon.

Hakan Albayrak, a columnist for the pro-government daily Yeni Safak, said that a cornerstone of the Turkish leadership’s foreign policy is diplomatic independence in Middle Eastern affairs. He added that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears unwilling to sacrifice that room for maneuver in exchange for the missile-defense umbrella. "Sacrificing the Iranian friendship to NATO," he said, "would mean an end to the independent foreign policy Turkey has followed in recent years, and the respect that that has earned it in the Islamic world."

Turkish ambivalence about Iran came to a head this June, when it was the only NATO member to vote against stiffer United Nations sanctions.

The Turkish veto stoked anti-Turkish feeling in the US Congress. Displeasure with Ankara has been growing since Turkey's relations with Israel took a dive in late 2008, and came close to collapse when Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish civilians [7] in international waters last May.

With mid-term congressional elections due in the United States on November 2, Turkish fence-sitting on the NATO scheme risks exacerbating bilateral tension, senior administration figures have warned.

Kadri Gursel, a foreign policy analyst with Milliyet, a secular daily staunchly critical of the Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), said Ankara and Washington have genuinely different perspectives on several key foreign policy points. He added that reducing those differences to the AKP's "Islamic foreign policy" is simplistic. "If a secular government had been in power today, Turkey would have been just as unwilling to have anti-missile radar on its territory," he maintained.

For Gursel, the real source of the "centrifugal effect" on Turkey's relations with the West was the end of the Cold War.

At a press conference he gave in Brussels in mid-October, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made a similar point. "We do not want international conditions which would lead to Cold War-style polarization to develop," he said. "We do not want Turkey to be seen, as it was during the Cold War, as ... a front-line country."

"We do not have a perception of threat from any of our neighbors, and we are not of the opinion that our neighbors constitute a threat to NATO," Davutoglu continued.

The timing of Davutoglu's comments was telling. He was speaking on the sidelines of a meeting of foreign ministers aimed at preparing the agenda for the November 19 NATO summit. The gathering is expected to map the Alliance’s strategy for the coming decade.

Perhaps more than the anti-missile shield, it is this new Strategic Concept that worries the Turkish government.

In a set of strategic recommendations published this May, NATO experts headed by former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that "defending against the threat of a possible ballistic missile attack from Iran has given birth to what has become, for NATO, an essential military mission."

Permitted to join NATO in 1952 after two rebuffs, Turkey played a frontline role in the Cold War, noted Bulent Aliriza, head of the Turkey Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Since the end of the Cold War, everybody has been fudging the fact that the common threat holding the Alliance together - the Soviet Union - had disappeared," Aliriza says. "Today's reorganization brings into question the nature of the Alliance."

Following Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul mid-October statement that he welcomed the missile system as long as it was developed "within the NATO context" and designed to counter "the full range of ballistic missile threats," most Turkish analysts believe that careful wording should be enough to bring Ankara onside by November 19.

But Aliriza hinted that existing differences between Turkey and its NATO allies, especially the United States, cannot be papered over forever, and at some point in the not too distant future, honest and difficult discussions need to take place. "Turkey has century-long links with Europe and the Middle East," he said. "With the United States it has nothing but a cold-eyed relationship. The time has come for both countries to sit down seriously and talk about what it is that they agree on."

Editor's note: Nicolas Birch specializes in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East.
Nicholas BirchTurkeyGeopoliticsNATO
2010 © Eurasianet

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