emreiseri

Monday, December 31, 2007


Cemaatçi Neo-Liberalizm: AKP’nin İktisat Politikaları
Koray Çalışkan
Birgün, 14 Eylül 2007

AKP iktisadi bir mucize yarattığını düşünüyor. Verdikleri rakamlara bakarsak haklı gibi görünüyorlar. AKP döneminde milli gelir 180 milyar dolardan, 411 milyara; kişi başına milli gelir 2.598 dolardan, 5.560 dolara yükseldi. Bu arada enflasyon %30’dan %9’a indi. Hatta nüfus 73 milyon değil de 70 milyon olarak çıkarsa, kişi başına düşen GSMH 7,000 dolara yaslanacaktır. Aşağıdaki tabloda görülen 2002 sonrası artış AKP’nin iktisadi takdirnamesi olarak sunuluyor.


Ancak dış borç stoğuna baktığımızda da benzer bir artış grafiğiyle karşılaşıyoruz. Milli gelir artıyor, ancak borçlarımız ondan daha hızla artıyor. İstatistik hokus pokusunu bir yana bırakalım. Meseleyi kısaca anlatalım. Ülke içinde dönen paranın ölçütü olan GSMH hesapları borcu da işin içine kattığı için asli bir zenginlik değeri değildir. Zira bir kriz anında bu borç katlanacağından bir anda sistem ayağımızın altından kayabilir.




Aslında bu gelir artışı nominal, yani lafta bir artış. Zira YTL’nin aşırı değerlenmesini hesaba kattığımızda işlerin aslında göründüğü gibi olmadığını anlıyoruz. Krizden hemen önce dolar 1.70’di şimdi 1.20 olacak mı diye tartışıyoruz. Kriz 2002’den hemen önce geldi. Milli gelirin dörtte biri yalnızca faiz giderlerine gitti, bir milyon kişi işsiz kaldı, birikimleri TL’de olanlar kısa bir süre içinde yarı yarıya yoksullaştı. Kemal Derviş’in finans açıklarını yamamasıyla bu durum bir parça kontrol altına alındı.
Milli gelirin lafta artmasının bir diğer nedeni de dünya gıda fiyatlarının son beş yılda %25 artması. Yoksul ülkelerde aile gelirinin büyük bir bölümü gıdaya gider. Bu oran Türkiye’de %28’dir. Enflasyon yoksul için daha ezici olur. Bunun üzerine gerçek işsizlik oranının %19’da sabitlenmesini ekleyin. Cari açığın 30 kat, merkezi yönetim borcunun iki kat, dış ticaret açığının 3 kat artmasını ekleyin. Yani öyle abartılacak bir iktisadi başarı yok ortada. Dünyada sıcak para bu kadar ucuzken, iktisadi mucizeler peydahlamak kolay.

AKP ASLEN NE YAPIYOR?

AKP’nin iktisat politikalarını iki kelimeyle özetleyebiliriz: Cemaatçi Neoliberalizm. Kapitalist modernlik cemaat ilişkilerini çözüp, bireylerin çekirdek aileler ve hukuk üzerinden topluma entegrasyonunu öngörmüştü. Oysa Neoliberalizm’in küresel başarısı, yoksullaşan kitlelerin cemaatler üzerinden örgütlenerek hak talep etmelerine ve geç modern cemaatlerin, önceki formlarına nazaran daha güçlenmesine neden oldu. Yoksulllar dibe vurdukça birbirlerine ve Neoliberal denizde boğulmamak için kendine yardım eden herkese tutundular.

YENİ NEOLİBERALLER

AKP Neoliberalizmi yeni bir boyuta taşıyor. Türkiye’de uygulanan iktisat politikalarının içeriğine AKP’nin çok az katkısı var. Ana prensipler zaten stand-by anlaşmalarıyla belirlenmiş durumda. IMF ve başka özel finans kuruluşlarından gelen sıcak para akışının durması tekstil gibi, dünya azıcık titrese devrilecek sektörlere bağımlılığımız nedeniyle büyük bir kriz demek. Bu nedenle AKP’nin iktisat politikaları partinin kendi seçimi değil. Niyet mektuplarını okuyan herkes bilir ki, stand-by’ın devamı, esnek olmayan bir radikal piyasaperest duruşun inşası anlamına geliyor. Bu politikaların uzun vadede büyüme yaratmadığı artık Dünya Bankası ve IMF uzmanlarının bile kabul ettiği bir gerçek. Daha acı bir gerçek var: Bundan sonra stand-by anlaşması imzalanmasa bile stand-by sürecinin yarattığı yapılar içinde kalacağımız için, aynı koşullar devam edecek.
AKP’nin uyguladığı iktisat politikalarını bu yazıdan önceki dört yazı derinlemesine inceledi. Abdullah Aysu “Türkiye’de Tarım Politikaları ve AKP: Görünmez Elin Parmak İzleri” başlıklı yazısında AKP’nin kır siyasetinin ana hatlarını çizdi. Hukuksal olarak tam anlamıyla neoliberal bir tarım rejimindeyiz artık. Üreticilerin tüccarlar önünde tamamen örgütsüzleştirildiği, hukuken bu kurumsal dağınıklığın garantiye alındığı, şirketleşen tarımın küçük üreticiyi ortadan kaldırmaya devam ettiği artık daha açık. Aysu’nun yazısı tüyler ürpertici bir uyarıyla bitiyor: “Tüm bu gelişmeler insanlık tarihinde bir ilke imza atıyor. Tüm canlıların yaşamlarını sürdürmelerini sağlayan tarım, canlılar için risk oluşturmaya başlıyor.”
Çiftçilerin hayat koşullarını ortadan kaldıran AKP bunun nedenin iktisaden gelişmeye bağlıyor. Ancak tarımsal istihdamın daralması, endüstriyel ve servis istihdamını artırmıyor. Alper Duman’ın gösterdiği üzere 2007’de işsiz sayısını azaltmaya başlamak için gereken sanayi yatırımı GSYH’nın %28’i olması gerekiyor. Oysa şu anda veriler %21’de. Yani işsizliğe çözüm bulunabilmiş değil. AKP’nin işsizliğe bulduğu çözüm tek kelimeyle komik: Herkes patron ya da tüccar olsa, işsizlik kalkar. Aferin. Robotların mı emeğini sömüreceksiniz o zaman?
Bu politikalarda kısa vadede bir değişiklik olabilir mi? Yanıt Cemil Ertem’in yazısında gizli. Para politikası değişmeden mümkün değil. Oysa para politikası da IMF ve Avrupa Merkez Bankası’nın politikalarının tanımladığı parametreler dahilinde oynayabiliyor. TCMB bu nedenle para politikası üzerinden sistemin neoliberal sigortası olarak çalışıyor. Yani iktisadi bağımsızlığın temeli olan para politikası dünya piyasalarıyla eşgüdüm halinde işleyen bir iktisat politikasının uygulayıcısı oluyor. Yeter ki nedeni içeride olan bir kriz yaşanmasın.

ÜCRETLİLERE NE OLACAK?

Bu tip bir iktisat politikasının tek bir sonucu var. Ücretlilerin daha da yoksullaştığı, reel gelirlerinin düştüğü bir bağlam yaratması. Vahşi reform sürecinin etkilerini çalışan sınıflar üzerinde azaltabilecek üç ana mekanizma var.

1) “Babam Sağolsun” ya da kuşaklar arası kaynak transferi:

Bir arkadaşımızın kızı Ankara’dan İstanbul’a staj yapmaya gelecekti. Çalışacağı şirkette öyle günlük kıyafetlerle çalışmak mümkün değil. İyi giyineceksin, üstüne başına dikkat edeceksin. Sefertasıyla öğle yemeği taşıyamazsın, mecburen arkadaşlarınla yemeğe çıkacaksın. Malum, adı staj olan sömürü sürecinde maaş falan da hak getire. Annesi söyleniyordu, bir ara “Allah’tan durumumuz iyi de kızımızı çalıştırabiliyoruz!”
1960larda işe başlayan orta sınıf, sosyal devletin iyi kötü işlemesi sayesinde yalnızca ücretli olduğu halde bir ölçüde birikim yapabildi. Bir ev aldı, bir yazlık , yaptı, arsa aldı vs. Şu anda orta sınıfın böyle bir düş gerçekleştirmesi kolay değil. Devlet memuru olduğunuz düşünün, 1,000 YTL maaşlı bir öğretmen neresinden ne biriktirecek de çocuklarına bir şey bırakacak? Yeni kuşak anne babasının birikimiyle ayakta duruyor zaten. Koca koca insanlar, ailelerinden maddi yardımlar alarak ay sonunu getiriyor. Önceki kuşak aile ilişkileri üzerinden Neoliberalizmden darbe yemiş yeni kuşağa destek çıkıyor.

2) Özelleştirmeler:

AKP hükümeti gerek yerel yönetimler gerekse hükümet kanalıyla hızlı bir özelleştirme hamlesine girişmiş durumda. Özelleştirmeden kaynaklanan gelirler üzerinden iktisadi finansman yaratan hükümet tabiri yerindeyse memleketi satıyor. Ancak bu gelirlerin çok küçük bir kısmı özelleştirilen işletmelerin kaynaklarını yaratmış emekçilere gidiyor.
İktisatçılar yıllardır gösteriyorlar ki yönetimde başarının anahtarı mülkiyetin kimde olduğu değil, nasıl bir idare prensibi kullandığınızdır. Kamu ya da özel işletmelerin iktisadi performanslarının nedeni sahiplerinin kim olduğu değil, nasıl işletildikleridir.
Ancak AKP’nin başka yolu yok. Emekçi düşmanı böyle bir iktisat politikası verdiği açıkları özelleştirmelerle kapatıyor. Böylece emekçilerin maaşlarının iyice yok olmasını engelliyor. Bunun sürdürülebilir bir strateji olmadığını bilmek için bilim insanı olmaya gerek yok. Atalarımız güzel demiş: Hazıra dağ dayanmaz. İktidara geldiği 2002 yılından beri AKP hükümeti özelleştirme gelirlerini (gider mi desek?) olağanüstü artırdı.

Bu ikinci mekanizma “babam sağolsun” mekanizmasına benziyor. Bir önceki kuşağın şimdiki kuşağa yardım etmesi gibi, bir önceki kuşağın kurduğu iştirakler bu kuşağı yönetenlerin neoliberal söküklerini dikmek için satılıyor. “oib.gov.tr” adresine bir girin, menüden kamu teşekkülü seçin.

3) Sosyal Devlet Yerine Hayırsever Devlet

Yoksulluğu ortadan kaldırmak, kaldıramıyorsa yoksulları asgari geçim standardının altına düşürmemek sosyal devletin yükümlülüğüdür. Neoliberal reform sürecinin emekçiler üzerindeki kötü etkilerini azaltmanın bir yolu da sosyal devlet mekanizmalarını harekete geçirmek. Oysa özelleştirmeler sosyal devletin çalışmasını mümkün kılan mekanizmaları kamunun elinden çıkartıyor. Böylece giderek küçülen sosyal devletin yeri piyasa mekanizmasıyla doluyor. Sonuç kitleselleşen yoksulluk.
Aziz Çelik “AKP’nin 'Muhafazakâr' Sosyal Politikası: Hak Yerine Yardım, Yükümlülük Yerine Hayırseverlik” başlıklı yazısıyla bu süreci iki gün önce derinlemesine inceledi. AKP’ye göre sosyal politika bir hak anlayışına değil yardım anlayışına dayalı bir dayanışma ilişkisi. Bir taraftan neoliberal iktisat politikalarıyla yoksulluk koşullarını hazırlayan AKP, diğer taraftan sosyal politikayı ortadan kaldırarak yoksulun beka dayanaklarını da aşındırıyor.
Bu koşullarda yoksullar yine de AKP'ye oy veriyor. Bunu nasıl açıklayacağız? Çelik’in yanıtı basit: “AKP sosyal politikayı bir kamusal yükümlülük olarak zayıflatırken piyasa mağdurlarını, yoksulları ve en alttakileri “ferahlatacak” yeni yan mekanizmalar devreye soktu.” Yani, yoksul yaratan AKP, bir çeşit siyasi “erke dönergeci” çalıştırarak, yoksula hayır da dağıtıyor. Kâh belediye ihalelerini yoksula AKP adına yardımda bulunan şirketlere veriyor, kâh vakıflar ve dernekler kanalıyla yoksulun elinden tutuyor, kâh fonlar üzerinden yoksulları destekliyor. Kontrol altında tutulan enflasyon sayesinde de yoksulların gelirlerinin düşmesi engelleniyor. Kendine bağımlı bir yoksun cemat yaratan AKP, bu cemaatin içerisinde birbirine destek olan gruplar dinamiğini ayakta tuttuğu sürece iktidarda demektir. Bir sonraki seçimde AKP %65 alırsa şaşırmayalım. Cemaatçi Neoliberalizm budur. Emekçiyi güçsüzleştir, sosyal devleti buda, sosyal politikayı sınırla ve çalışanı cemaat içinde disipline et. Bu döngüden çıkmanın yolu var mı?
Her ne kadar cemaat örgütleriyle neoliberal sefaletin acıları azaltılsa da sonuç felaket olacak. Neoliberal politikaların daha kararlılıkla uygulandığı Mısır’da IMF ve DB reformlarının ülkeyi geliştirmediği hatta gerilettiği bizzat bu reformaları inşa eden uzmanların bir bölümü tarafından da artık kabul ediliyor.[1]
Mevcut konjonktürde pasaportsuz sermaye, milli misak arasında tanımladığı milli iktisatları avucunun içine almış durumda. Adam Smith’in bahsettiği görünmez elin avucunun içindeyiz. Bu ellerden kurtulmanın yolu, solun çözmesi gereken esas bilmecedir. Umarım yakında bir yazı dizisi de alternatif iktisadi yönelimler üzerine çıkar.


[1] Richard H. Adams, "Interrogating Development - Evaluating the Process of Development in Egypt, 1980-97," International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 2 (2000).

The Role of Political Islam
Inventing the Enemy
by Dave Stratman

http://www.axisoflogic.com/ and newdemocracyworld.org., 26 July 2004
www.globalresearch.ca 28 July 2004
The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/STR407B.html
It used to be said during the Cold War that, "If the Communist threat did not exist, the US would have to invent it." The threat of nuclear war and the notion of a Communist (or capitalist) under every bed provided American and Soviet ruling elites excellent means to frighten and control their own citizens, justify enormous arms expenditures, and legitimize power projection abroad in the name of saving the world from Communism (or capitalism).
The same thing can be said now with a good deal more accuracy of political Islam, which the US ruling class has been courting and nurturing since it first allied in 1947 with the House of Saud. The line of strategic relationships between the US and political Islam runs through Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and now Iraq. If the US did not actually invent modern political Islam, for over half a century it has encouraged it, promoted it, funded it, trained it, armed it, and furnished it with a political rationale for its existence.
US ruling circles and reactionary forces acting in the name of Islam are in a co-dependent relationship: they need each other and work together covertly, even while they publicly attack each other in word and deed. This relationship is part of grand strategy, in which US rulers are playing for the highest of stakes: their continued control over the American people, as well as elite domination of the world. Ruling elites in Muslim nations use political Islam and the threat from the US to control their own people with an iron fist concealed in a glove of religious fervor.
THE PERFECT ENEMY
Political Islam perfectly suits the needs of America's rulers for an enemy. The lands of the Middle East and Central Asia occupied by Muslims are the most strategically important regions of the world, sitting astride the world's largest reserves of oil and gas; the US could never justify attacking these nations without first convincing Americans that Muslims need either to be attacked -- because they are dangerous terrorists -- or liberated. Seeing Islam as the enemy also supports Israel's role as an outpost of Western colonialism in the Middle East; according to this script, Christians and Jews supposedly share a common Judeo-Christian heritage which is meant to exclude Muslims, and we are encouraged to support a Jewish state based on savage ethnic cleansing against Islamic fanatics.
The greatest benefits to America's rulers of political Islam as the enemy, however, are ideological: religious demagogues like Osama bin Laden and Iranian mullahs channel the poor and oppressed of the Muslim world into politically reactionary rather than revolutionary formations and legitimize the power of elites acting in the name of Islam; at the same time, they make the ugly face of contemporary capitalism look by way of contrast almost desirable to non-Muslims and many Muslims, in much the same way that Soviet Communism did. US rulers would like the world to perceive the choice before it in effect to be between an admittedly decadent capitalist civilization with unlimited freedom to do your own thing and a pre-modern theocratic state.
Political Islam derives much of its effectiveness from the failure of communism as a revolutionary ideology. That failure left widespread despair in the Middle East and around the globe and an ideological void which militant Islam, assisted by the US, has rushed to fill.
A HISTORY OF COLLABORATION: IRAN
The US= s favored antidote to revolutionary ideology among desperate workers and farmers in the turbulent Middle East, Central Asia, and Muslim Africa, especially since 1979, has been the idea that God's will as expressed in the Koran requires people to submit to 'holy' dictatorships. That pivotal year marked the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the most powerful US client except Israel, and also the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In both cases the US turned to Islamic fundamentalism to achieve its strategic goals.
The Iranian revolution was capable of establishing a secular, anti-capitalist revolutionary democracy and sweeping the Middle East. Instead TIME= s 1979 Man of the Year, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the mullahs successfully channeled the mass popular movement into a right-wing theocracy, using nationalism and religion to crush the revolution and consolidate the class nature of Iranian society.
There has been a strong collaborative relationship between the theocratic rulers of Iran and US rulers ever since. In November, 1979 Iranians took over the US Embassy in Tehran, taking 50 Americans hostage. Focusing on the Great Satan allowed the Ayatollah Khomeini to put up a show of radicalism to satisfy his followers while he liquidated tens of thousands of worker and student revolutionaries in the spring and summer of 1980. In October, 1980 emissaries of the Republican Party met secretly with the Ayatollah's regime and persuaded it not to release the hostages until the election was over, thus guaranteeing the defeat of Jimmy Carter. From 1983 through 1988 the Reagan Administration, in collaboration with Israel, sold arms to the Khomeini regime in Iran and sent the proceeds to CIA-supported Contras fighting the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, in defiance of Congress.
AFGHANISTAN
In 1979 the US began another remarkably ambitious collaboration with Islamic fundamentalists after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. With Jimmy Carter's express approval, under CIA direction, and with massive funding from the US and Saudi Arabia, the US undertook to recruit, train, and arm over 100,000 mujahadeen -- Islamic freedom fighters, as President Reagan styled them -- from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, to make war against the Soviet invaders. The US funded madrassas -- Islamic religious schools -- in Pakistan and Afghanistan to promote political Islam and it set up camps to train the mujahadeen in guerrilla tactics and terrorism. A key CIA asset in the struggle was a man of the fundamentalist Wahhabi Islam sect from Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden. The US-backed Islamic fundamentalist movement was successful. In 1989 it drove the USSR from Afghanistan in ignominious defeat, a loss from which the USSR never recovered. On September 27, 1996 the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla organization backed by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, took control of the Afghan capital, Kabul.
BOSNIA AND KOSOVO
In the mid-90s, with explicit approval of the Clinton Administration and the assistance of the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and Osama bin Laden, the US channeled Iranian arms, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iranian intelligence agents, and thousands of mujahadeen from around the Islamic world to the Muslim government in Sarajevo during the fighting in Bosnia, greatly enhancing Iranian and fundamentalist influence in the region. The US, working closely with Osama bin Laden, then supplied the Kosovo Liberation Army with funding, arms, and Muslim fighters. Prof. Michel Chussodovsky of the University of Ottawa sums up the alliance between the US and Islamic militants: A major war supposedly against international terrorism has been launched, yet the evidence amply confirms that agencies of the US government have since the Cold War harbored the Islamic Militant Network as part of Washington's foreign policy agenda. (http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO110A.html )
PAKISTAN
The US has covertly championed Islamic power in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under a succession of leaders, most recently ex-General Musharraf, who led a military coup against the elected government in 1999 and proclaimed himself president. US military forces and the CIA have maintained particularly strong ties with the Pakistani military and with ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service, which played a major role in directing Islamic mujahadeen against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s and continues to have strong ties with the Taliban. The military and the ISI threw crucial support to the six-party Alliance of Islamic parties, the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), enabling it to triumph in the October, 2003 Pakistani elections. Ahmed Rashid writes:
[T]he Islamicists see their moment to turn Pakistan into a theocratic state. The MMA are banking on their support within the army and the intelligence services. They have gone out of their way to revile Musharraf as a stooge of the Americans, while praising the army's commitment to Islam. Emboldened by its successes, the MMA has also declared that it will demand that the government impose Sharia law throughout the country....[US policies] will only hasten Pakistan's turn towards Islamic fundamentalism as the MMA gets stronger and more strident in its demands. (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1766&page=1 )
IRAQ
This desire to bolster militant Islam may explain why US military forces have been producing with every atrocity new guerilla fighters with which to frighten the American people and to make the war on terror and threat of terrorism more convincing. Anonymous, a CIA analyst for 22-years who has just published Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, writes that the United States has "waged two failed half-wars and, in doing so, left Afghanistan and Iraq seething with anti-U.S. sentiment, fertile grounds for the expansion of al-Qaeda and kindred groups." He adds that "There is nothing that bin Laden could have hoped for more than the American invasion and occupation of Iraq."
Before the first Gulf war, Iraq had been a secular state, with the highest standard of living in the Middle East. Health care was free, as was education up through secondary school. Iraq had a high degree of equality between the sexes, with laws against gender discrimination; there were more female than male university students. (http://www.michaelparenti.org/DefyingSanctions.html ) After two wars and 12 years of U.N. sanctions, with its infrastructure in rubble, millions of its people malnourished, and 70% unemployed, the living standards of Iraqis have gone dramatically backwards. Iraqis have been subject to savage US attacks on civilians and widespread torture and humiliation of a sort calculated to make even those Iraqis most initially supportive of the removal of Saddam Hussein see America as an enemy.
The US has succeeded in consolidating the Iraqi resistance--the only future leadership with any legitimacy in popular eyes--increasingly under militant Islamic leadership, virtually guaranteeing an Islamic future for once secular Iraq. The US strategy of encouraging Islamic fundamentalism may explain what otherwise seem like incomprehensible blunders in the war on Iraq, not to mention the invasion itself.
For example, the US apparently deliberately provoked the Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq in April, 2004 and thrust radical Islamic leader, Moqtada Sadr, into the position of being a national hero to Iraqis. Sadr is a Shi'ite Muslim, the same sect as that of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. In April, 2004, when Israel assassinated Shaikh Ahmed Yassin, Sadr's newspaper gave the story prominent coverage and promised to act as a wing of Hamas in Iraq. The US promptly shut down Sadr's paper, arrested thirteen of his top aides, and, through an Iraqi court, issued a warrant for Sadr's arrest for murder. Though Sadr had a militia of his own, the Mahdi Army, it had never acted violently towards any Americans. Juan Cole, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan, asked,
How did the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] get to the point where it has turned even Iraqi Shi'ites, who were initially grateful for the removal of Saddam Hussein, against the United States? Where it risks fighting dual Sunni Arab and Shi'ite insurgencies simultaneously, at a time when US troops are rotating on a massive scale and hoping to downsize their forces in country? Someone in the CPA sat down and thought up ways to stir them up by closing their newspaper and issuing 28 arrest warrants....This is either gross incompetence or was done with dark ulterior motives that can scarcely be guessed at. (http://www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=2246 )
Naomi Klein, reporting from Baghdad, reacted with wonderment at the US deliberately provoking a Shi'ite uprising. In an article titled The U.S. Is Sabotaging Stability in Iraq, she wrote:
Mr. al-Sadr is the younger, more radical rival of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, portrayed by his adoring supporters as a kind of cross between Ayatollah Khomeini and Che Guevara. He blames the U.S. for attacks on civilians, compares U.S. occupation chief Paul Bremer to Saddam Hussein, aligns himself with Hamas and Hezbollah and has called for a jihad against the controversial interim constitution. His Iraq might look a lot like Iran. (Globe and Mail, Canada, 4/5/04)
Klein calls the U.S. provoking of an uprising in Shi'ite southern Iraq mystifying, and reckons that the CPA is trying to create chaos in the south to make the handover of power impossible. More likely, however, is that the U.S. is trying to create what Professor Cole calls a Shi'ite International, as demonstrations erupted throughout the Shi'ite world, including Lebanon, Bahrain, Iran and Pakistan, against continued U.S. fighting in Karbala, a key holy city for Shi'ite Muslims....Bush is in the process of turning the Shi'ite world decisively against the U.S. (http://www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=2642 )
After claiming that it would defeat Sadr and wanted him dead or alive, the US backed down and negotiated with him. One of the concessions was that Sadr would order his militia fighters to return to their homes; meanwhile Sadr announced his intentions to form a political party and run in the elections scheduled for January, 2005. (http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/world/8939749.htm?1c ) This arrangement, one analyst put it, would signal that the United States has just christened the newest Islamic theocracy in the World. (http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/duarte/2004/0710.html )
The pattern we see developing in Iraq is familiar. The US covertly encourages militant Islamic opposition movements throughout the Muslim world. This means that US-backed Islamic movements often find themselves in opposition to US-backed governments. When Islamic forces eventually become powerful enough to take over, then secular allies can be dispensed with. This was the pattern in Iran, and it is the developing pattern in Pakistan and Iraq, both of which will likely become theocracies on the Iran model. In Iraq, given the former power and prestige of the secular and socialist Ba=athist Party, it has taken an invasion and brutal occupation to remove the secular leader and develop Islamic forces; still the model is the same.
I should point out that the US is not alone in funding Islamic militants. Israel funded and promoted the Islamic terrorist group Hamas in the 1970s and 1980s and may still. Israel funded Hamas to undercut the popularity of the secular PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and the Palestinian cause, which it has done very effectively with suicide attacks on Jewish civilians in Israel. (http://www.upi.com/print.cfm?StoryID=18062002-051845-8272r. )
ORGANIZING PERMANENT WAR
US rulers need to create a frightening, ubiquitous, and apparently powerful enemy against which to wage endless war. They seem to be succeeding. We will likely soon see a Muslim world populated by Islamic theocracies in Iran, Iraq, and nuclear-armed Pakistan. These theocracies will impose harsh controls on their own people, crushing dissent in the name of religion, at the same time as they will be invoked by the US and Israel as terrorist threats to world peace. The US government has been laying the groundwork for a turbulent future of war and terrorism.
I do not mean to imply here that all has gone according to plan for the US or that the US government is all-powerful in foreign affairs. On the contrary, US actions, especially in the war on Iraq, have been at enormous political cost. Millions of people in the Middle East, perhaps billions worldwide now see the US war-maker state for what it is. Millions of Americans now understand the ruthless nature of their government more clearly than ever, and many now see the need for the overthrow of the war-makers.
At the same time, arranging for a future of endless war is not a sign of the rulers= strength but of weakness. War has always been a method of controlling restive populations, but it is the most extreme method, high in its political costs and unpredictable in its outcome. The rulers of the US and the Muslim nations -- and indeed of world capitalism -- are being forced towards a future of endless war out of their fear of revolution, as billions of the world's people lose faith in capitalism and seek an alternative. America's most powerful elites are rolling the dice and hoping that fear of militant Islam and possible terrorism will make Americans line up dutifully behind their leaders and get them to accept life in an ever more unequal, undemocratic society without complaint or struggle.
US and Islamic rulers hope to set Americans and Muslims against each other, inflame irrational hatreds, and blind people to their real enemies, the ruling elites of their own societies. Ordinary Iraqi and Pakistani and American workers have more in common with each other than they have with the ruling rich of their societies. To be effective the antiwar, anti-Empire movements in every country must have strong internationalist values and seek to build ties between workers of the US and Muslim and other countries. The answer to division is solidarity. The answer to communism and capitalism is truly democratic revolution. The answer to imperialist war is to turn the guns around and overthrow the war-makers.


Dave Stratman is the author of We CAN Change The World: The Real Meaning Of Everyday Life and editor of newdemocracyworld.org. He can be reached at newdem@aol.com .

Political Islam in the Service of Imperialism

Samir Amin
All the currents that claim adherence to political Islam proclaim the “specificity of Islam.” According to them, Islam knows nothing of the separation between politics and religion, something supposedly distinctive of Christianity. It would accomplish nothing to remind them, as I have done, that their remarks reproduce, almost word for word, what European reactionaries at the beginning of the nineteenth century (such as Bonald and de Maistre) said to condemn the rupture that the Enlightenment and the French Revolution had produced in the history of the Christian West!
On the basis of this position, every current of political Islam chooses to conduct its struggle on the terrain of culture—but “culture” reduced in actual fact to the conventional affirmation of belonging to a particular religion. In reality, the militants of political Islam are not truly interested in discussing the dogmas that form religion. The ritual assertion of membership in the community is their exclusive preoccupation. Such a vision of the reality of the modern world is not only distressing because of the immense emptiness of thought that it conceals, but it also justifies imperialism’s strategy of substituting a so-called conflict of cultures for the one between imperialist centers and dominated peripheries. The exclusive emphasis on culture allows political Islam to eliminate from every sphere of life the real social confrontations between the popular classes and the globalized capitalist system that oppresses and exploits them. The militants of political Islam have no real presence in the areas where actual social conflicts take place and their leaders repeat incessantly that such conflicts are unimportant. Islamists are only present in these areas to open schools and health clinics. But these are nothing but works of charity and means for indoctrination. They are not means of support for the struggles of the popular classes against the system responsible for their poverty.
On the terrain of the real social issues, political Islam aligns itself with the camp of dependent capitalism and dominant imperialism. It defends the principle of the sacred character of property and legitimizes inequality and all the requirements of capitalist reproduction. The support by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament for the recent reactionary laws that reinforce the rights of property owners to the detriment of the rights of tenant farmers (the majority of the small peasantry) is but one example among hundreds of others. There is no example of even one reactionary law promoted in any Muslim state to which the Islamist movements are opposed. Moreover, such laws are promulgated with the agreement of the leaders of the imperialist system. Political Islam is not anti-imperialist, even if its militants think otherwise! It is an invaluable ally for imperialism and the latter knows it. It is easy to understand, then, that political Islam has always counted in its ranks the ruling classes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Moreover, these classes were among its most active promoters from the very beginning. The local comprador bourgeoisies, the nouveaux riches, beneficiaries of current imperialist globalization, generously support political Islam. The latter has renounced an anti-imperialist perspective and substituted for it an “anti-Western” (almost “anti-Christian”) position, which obviously only leads the societies concerned into an impasse and hence does not form an obstacle to the deployment of imperialist control over the world system.
Political Islam is not only reactionary on certain questions (notably concerning the status of women) and perhaps even responsible for fanatic excesses directed against non-Muslim citizens (such as the Copts in Egypt)—it is fundamentally reactionary and therefore obviously cannot participate in the progress of peoples’ liberation.
Three major arguments are nevertheless advanced to encourage social movements as a whole to enter into dialogue with the movements of political Islam. The first is that political Islam mobilizes numerous popular masses, which cannot be ignored or scorned. Numerous images certainly reinforce this claim. Still, one should keep a cool head and properly assess the mobilizations in question. The electoral “successes” that have been organized are put into perspective as soon as they are subjected to more rigorous analyses. I mention here, for example, the huge proportion of abstentions—more than 75 percent!—in the Egyptian elections. The power of the Islamist street is, in large part, simply the reverse side of the weaknesses of the organized left, which is absent from the spheres in which current social conflicts are occurring.
Even if it were agreed that political Islam actually mobilizes significant numbers, does that justify concluding that the left must seek to include political Islamic organizations in alliances for political or social action? If political Islam successfully mobilizes large numbers of people, that is simply a fact, and any effective political strategy must include this fact in its considerations, proposals, and options. But seeking alliances is not necessarily the best means to deal with this challenge. It should be pointed out that the organizations of political Islam—the Muslim Brotherhood in particular—are not seeking such an alliance, indeed even reject it. If, by chance, some unfortunate leftist organizations come to believe that political Islamic organizations have accepted them, the first decision the latter would make, after having succeeded in coming to power, would be to liquidate their burdensome ally with extreme violence, as was the case in Iran with the Mujahideen and the Fidayeen Khalq.
The second reason put forward by the partisans of “dialogue” is that political Islam, even if it is reactionary in terms of social proposals, is “anti-imperialist.” I have heard it said that the criterion for this that I propose (unreserved support for struggles carried out for social progress) is “economistic” and neglects the political dimensions of the challenge that confronts the peoples of the South. I do not believe that this critique is valid given what I have said about the democratic and national dimensions of the desirable responses for handling this challenge. I also agree that in their response to the challenge that confronts the peoples of the South, the forces in action are not necessarily consistent in their manner of dealing with its social and political dimensions. It is, thus, possible to imagine a political Islam that is anti-imperialist, though regressive on the social plane. Iran, Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and certain resistance movements in Iraq immediately come to mind. I will discuss these particular situations later. What I contend is that political Islam as a whole is quite simply not anti-imperialist but is altogether lined up behind the dominant powers on the world scale.
The third argument calls the attention of the left to the necessity of combating Islamophobia. Any left worthy of the name cannot ignore the question des banlieues, that is, the treatment of the popular classes of immigrant origin in the metropolises of contemporary developed capitalism. Analysis of this challenge and the responses provided by various groups (the interested parties themselves, the European electoral left, the radical left) lies outside the focus of this text. I will content myself with expressing my viewpoint in principle: the progressive response cannot be based on the institutionalization of communitarianism,* which is essentially and necessarily always associated with inequality, and ultimately originates in a racist culture. A specific ideological product of the reactionary political culture of the United States, communitarianism (already triumphant in Great Britain) is beginning to pollute political life on the European continent. Islamophobia, systematically promoted by important sections of the political elite and the media, is part of a strategy for managing community diversity for capital’s benefit, because this supposed respect for diversity is, in fact, only the means to deepen divisions within the popular classes.* A political theory based on “collective cultural identities” as central to understanding dynamic social reality.—Ed.
The question of the so-called problem neighborhoods (banlieues) is specific and confusing it with the question of imperialism (i.e., the imperialist management of the relations between the dominant imperialist centers and the dominated peripheries), as is sometimes done, will contribute nothing to making progress on each of these completely distinct terrains. This confusion is part of the reactionary toolbox and reinforces Islamphobia, which, in turn, makes it possible to legitimize both the offensive against the popular classes in the imperialist centers and the offensive against the peoples of the peripheries concerned. This confusion and Islamophobia, in turn, provide a valuable service to reactionary political Islam, giving credibility to its anti-Western discourse. I say, then, that the two reactionary ideological campaigns promoted, respectively, by the racist right in the West and by political Islam mutually support each other, just as they support communitarian practices.
Modernity, Democracy, Secularism, and Islam
The image that the Arab and Islamic regions give of themselves today is that of societies in which religion (Islam) is at the forefront in all areas of social and political life, to the point that it appears strange to imagine that it could be different. The majority of foreign observers (political leaders and the media) conclude that modernity, perhaps even democracy, will have to adapt to the strong presence of Islam, de facto precluding secularism. Either this reconciliation is possible and it will be necessary to support it, or it is not and it will be necessary to deal with this region of the world as it is. I do not at all share this so-called realist vision. The future—in the long view of a globalized socialism—is, for the peoples of this region as for others, democracy and secularism. This future is possible in these regions as elsewhere, but nothing is guaranteed and certain, anywhere.
Modernity is a rupture in world history, initiated in Europe during the sixteenth century. Modernity proclaims that human beings are responsible for their own history, individually and collectively, and consequently breaks with the dominant pre-modern ideologies. Modernity, then, makes democracy possible, just as it demands secularism, in the sense of separation of the religious and the political. Formulated by the eighteenth century Enlightenment, implemented by the French Revolution, the complex association of modernity, democracy, and secularism, its advances and retreats, has been shaping the contemporary world ever since. But modernity by itself is not only a cultural revolution. It derives its meaning only through the close relation that it has with the birth and subsequent growth of capitalism. This relation has conditioned the historic limits of “really existing” modernity. The concrete forms of modernity, democracy, and secularism found today must, then, be considered as products of the concrete history of the growth of capitalism. They are shaped by the specific conditions in which the domination of capital is expressed—the historical compromises that define the social contents of hegemonic blocs (what I call the historical course of political cultures).
This condensed presentation of my understanding of the historical materialist method is evoked here simply to situate the diverse ways of combining capitalist modernity, democracy, and secularism in their theoretical context.
The Enlightenment and the French Revolution put forward a model of radical secularism. Atheist or agnostic, deist or believer (in this case Christian), the individual is free to choose, the state knows nothing about it. On the European continent—and in France beginning with the Restoration—the retreats and compromises which combined the power of the bourgeoisie with that of the dominant classes of the pre-modern systems were the basis for attenuated forms of secularism, understood as tolerance, without excluding the social role of the churches from the political system. As for the United States, its particular historical path resulted in the forming of a fundamentally reactionary political culture, in which genuine secularism is practically unknown. Religion here is a recognized social actor and secularism is confused with the multiplicity of official religions (any religion—or even sect—is official).
There is an obvious link between the degree of radical secularism upheld and the degree of support for shaping society in accord with the central theme of modernity. The left, be it radical or even moderate, which believes in the effectiveness of politics to orient social evolution in chosen directions, defends strong concepts of secularism. The conservative right claims that things should be allowed to evolve on their own whether the question is economic, political, or social. As to economy the choice in favor of the “market” is obviously favorable to capital. In politics low-intensity democracy becomes the rule, alternation is substituted for alternative. And in society, in this context, politics has no need for active secularism—“communities” compensate for the deficiencies of the state. The market and representative democracy make history and they should be allowed to do so. In the current moment of the left’s retreat, this conservative version of social thought is widely dominant, in formulations that run the gamut from those of Touraine to those of Negri. The reactionary political culture of the United States goes even further in negating the responsibility of political action. The repeated assertion that God inspires the “American” nation, and the massive adherence to this “belief,” reduce the very concept of secularism to nothing. To say that God makes history is, in fact, to allow the market alone to do it.
From this point of view, where are the peoples of the Middle East region situated? The image of bearded men bowed low and groups of veiled women give rise to hasty conclusions about the intensity of religious adherence among individuals. Western “culturalist” friends who call for respect for the diversity of beliefs rarely find out about the procedures implemented by the authorities to present an image that is convenient for them. There are certainly those who are “crazy for God” (fous de Dieu). Are they proportionally more numerous than the Spanish Catholics who march on Easter? Or the vast crowds who listen to televangelists in the United States?
In any case, the region has not always projected this image of itself. Beyond the differences from country to country, a large region can be identified that runs from Morocco to Afghanistan, including all the Arab peoples (with the exception of those in the Arabian peninsula), the Turks, Iranians, Afghans, and peoples of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, in which the possibilities for the development of secularism are far from negligible. The situation is different among other neighboring peoples, the Arabs of the peninsula or the Pakistanis.
In this larger region, political traditions have been strongly marked by the radical currents of modernity: the ideas of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the communism of the Third International were present in the minds of everyone and were much more important than the parliamentarianism of Westminster, for example. These dominant currents inspired the major models for political transformation implemented by the ruling classes, which could be described, in some of their aspects, as forms of enlightened despotism.
This was certainly the case in the Egypt of Mohammed Ali or Khedive Ismail. Kemalism in Turkey and modernization in Iran were similar. The national populism of more recent stages of history belongs to the same family of modernist political projects. The variants of the model were numerous (the Algerian National Liberation Front, Tunisian Bourguibism, Egyptian Nasserism, the Baathism of Syria and Iraq), but the direction of movement was analogous. Apparently extreme experiences—the so-called communist regimes in Afghanistan and South Yemen—were really not very different. All these regimes accomplished much and, for this reason, had very wide popular support. This is why, even though they were not truly democratic, they opened the way to a possible development in this direction. In certain circumstances, such as those in Egypt from 1920 to 1950, an experiment in electoral democracy was attempted, supported by the moderate anti-imperialist center (the Wafd party), opposed by the dominant imperialist power (Great Britain) and its local allies (the monarchy). Secularism, implemented in moderate versions, to be sure, was not “refused” by the people. On the contrary, it was religious people who were regarded as obscurantists by general public opinion, and most of them were.The modernist experiments, from enlightened despotism to radical national populism, were not products of chance. Powerful movements that were dominant in the middle classes created them. In this way, these classes expressed their will to be viewed as fully-fledged partners in modern globalization. These projects, which can be described as national bourgeois, were modernist, secularizing and potential carriers of democratic developments. But precisely because these projects conflicted with the interests of dominant imperialism, the latter fought them relentlessly and systematically mobilized declining obscurantist forces for this purpose.
The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is well known. It was literally created in the 1920s by the British and the monarchy to block the path of the democratic and secular Wafd. Their mass return from their Saudi refuge after Nasser’s death, organized by the CIA and Sadat, is also well known. We are all acquainted with the history of the Taliban, formed by the CIA in Pakistan to fight the “communists” who had opened the schools to everyone, boys and girls. It is even well known that the Israelis supported Hamas at the beginning in order to weaken the secular and democratic currents of the Palestinian resistance.
Political Islam would have had much more difficulty in moving out from the borders of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan without the continual, powerful, and resolute support of the United States. Saudi Arabian society had not even begun its move out of tradition when petroleum was discovered under its soil. The alliance between imperialism and the traditional ruling class, sealed immediately, was concluded between the two partners and gave a new lease on life to Wahabi political Islam. On their side, the British succeeded in breaking Indian unity by persuading the Muslim leaders to create their own state, trapped in political Islam at its very birth. It should be noted that the theory by which this curiosity was legitimated—attributed to Mawdudi—had been completely drawn up beforehand by the English Orientalists in His Majesty’s service.**The origin of the force of today’s political Islam in Iran does not show the same historical connection with imperialist manipulation, for reasons discussed in the next section.—Ed.
It is, thus, easy to understand the initiative taken by the United States to break the united front of Asian and African states set up at Bandung (1955) by creating an “Islamic Conference,” immediately promoted (from 1957) by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Political Islam penetrated into the region by this means.
The least of the conclusions that should be drawn from the observations made here is that political Islam is not the spontaneous result of the assertion of authentic religious convictions by the peoples concerned. Political Islam was constructed by the systematic action of imperialism, supported, of course, by obscurantist reactionary forces and subservient comprador classes. That this state of affairs is also the responsibility of left forces that neither saw nor knew how to deal with the challenge remains indisputable.
Questions Relative to the Front Line Countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Iran)
The project of the United States, supported to varying degrees by their subaltern allies in Europe and Japan, is to establish military control over the entire planet. With this prospect in mind, the Middle East was chosen as the “first strike” region for four reasons: (1) it holds the most abundant petroleum resources in the world and its direct control by the armed forces of the United States would give Washington a privileged position, placing its allies—Europe and Japan—and possible rivals (China) in an uncomfortable position of dependence for their energy supplies; (2) it is located at the crossroads of the Old World and makes it easier to put in place a permanent military threat against China, India, and Russia; (3) the region is experiencing a moment of weakness and confusion that allows the aggressor to be assured of an easy victory, at least for the moment; and (4) Israel’s presence in the region, Washington’s unconditional ally.
This aggression has placed the countries and nations located on the front line (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Iran) in the particular situation of being destroyed (the first three) or threatened with destruction (Iran).
Afghanistan
Afghanistan experienced the best period in its modern history during the so-called communist republic. This was a regime of modernist enlightened despotism that opened up the educational system to children of both sexes. It was an enemy of obscurantism and, for this reason, had decisive support within the society. The agrarian reform that it had undertaken was, for the most part, a group of measures intended to reduce the tyrannical powers of tribal leaders. The support—at least tacitly—of the majority of the peasantry guaranteed the probable success of this well-begun change. The propaganda conveyed by the Western media as well as by political Islam presented this experiment as communist and atheist totalitarianism rejected by the Afghan people. In reality, the regime was far from being unpopular, much like Ataturk in his time.
The fact that the leaders of this experiment, in both of the major factions (Khalq and Parcham), were self-described as communists is not surprising. The model of the progress accomplished by the neighboring peoples of Soviet Central Asia (despite everything that has been said on the subject and despite the autocratic practices of the system) in comparison with the ongoing social disasters of British imperialist management in other neighboring countries (India and Pakistan included) had the effect, here as in many other countries of the region, of encouraging patriots to assess the full extent of the obstacle formed by imperialism to any attempt at modernization. The invitation extended by one faction to the Soviets to intervene in order to rid themselves of the others certainly had a negative effect and mortgaged the possibilities of the modernist national populist project.
The United States in particular and its allies of the Triad in general have always been tenacious opponents of the Afghan modernizers, communists or not. It is they who mobilized the obscurantist forces of Pakistan-style political Islam (the Taliban) and the warlords (the tribal leaders successfully neutralized by the so-called communist regime), and they who trained and armed them. Even after the Soviet retreat, the Najibullah government demonstrated the capability for resistance. It probably would have gained the upper hand but for the Pakistani military offensive that came to the support of the Taliban, and then the offensive of the reconstituted forces of the warlords, which increased the chaos.
Afghanistan was devastated by the intervention of the United States and its allies and agents, the Islamists in particular. Afghanistan cannot be reconstructed under their authority, barely disguised behind a clown without roots in the country, who was parachuted there by the Texas transnational by whom he was employed. The supposed “democracy,” in the name of which Washington, NATO, and the UN, called to the rescue, claim to justify the continuation of their presence (in fact, occupation), was a lie from the very beginning and has become a huge farce.
There is only one solution to the Afghan problem: all foreign forces should leave the country and all powers should be forced to refrain from financing and arming their allies. To those who are well-intended and express their fear that the Afghan people will then tolerate the dictatorship of the Taliban (or the warlords), I would respond that the foreign presence has been up until now and remains the best support for this dictatorship! The Afghan people had been moving in another direction—potentially the best possible—at a time when the West was forced to take less interest in its affairs. To the enlightened despotism of “communists,” the civilized West has always preferred obscurantist despotism, infinitely less dangerous for its interests!
Iraq
The armed diplomacy of the United States had the objective of literally destroying Iraq well before pretexts were actually given to it to do so on two different occasions: the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and then after September 11, 2001—exploited for this purpose by Bush with Goebbels-style cynicism and lies (“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it”). The reason for this objective is simple and has nothing to do with the discourse calling for the liberation of the Iraqi people from the bloody dictatorship (real enough) of Saddam Hussein. Iraq possesses a large part of the best petroleum resources of the planet. But, what is more, Iraq had succeeded in training scientific and technical cadres that were capable, through their critical mass, of supporting a coherent and substantial national project. This danger had to be eliminated by a preventive war that the United States gave itself the right to carry out when and where it decided, without the least respect for international law.
Beyond this obvious observation, several serious questions should be examined: (1) How could Washington’s plan appear—even for a brief historical moment—to be such a dazzling success so easily? (2) What new situation has been created and confronts the Iraqi nation today? (3) What responses are the various elements of the Iraqi population giving to this challenge? and (4) What solutions can the democratic and progressive Iraqi, Arab, and international forces promote?
Saddam Hussein’s defeat was predictable. Faced with an enemy whose main advantage lies in its capability to effect genocide with impunity by aerial bombardment (the use of nuclear weapons is to come), the people have only one possible effective response: carry out resistance on their invaded territory. Saddam’s regime was devoted to eliminating every means of defense within reach of its people through the systematic destruction of any organization and every political party (beginning with the Communist Party) that had made the history of modern Iraq, including the Baath itself, which had been one of the major actors in this history. It is not surprising in these conditions that the Iraqi people allowed their country to be invaded without a struggle, nor even that some behaviors (such as apparent participation in elections organized by the invader or the outburst of fratricidal fighting among Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs) seemed to be signs of a possible acceptance of defeat (on which Washington had based its calculations). But what is worthy of note is that the resistance on the ground grows stronger every day (despite all of the serious weaknesses displayed by the various resistance forces), that it has already made it impossible to establish a regime of lackeys capable of maintaining the appearance of order; in a way, that it has already demonstrated the failure of Washington’s project.
A new situation has, nevertheless, been created by the foreign military occupation. The Iraqi nation is truly threatened. Washington is incapable of maintaining its control over the country (so as to pillage its petroleum resources, which is its number one objective) through the intermediary of a seeming national government. The only way it can continue its project, then, is to break the country apart. The division of the country into at least three states (Kurd, Sunni Arab, and Shia Arab) was, perhaps from the very beginning, Washington’s objective, in alignment with Israel (the archives will reveal the truth of that in the future). Today, the “civil war” is the card that Washington plays to legitimize the continuation of its occupation. Clearly, permanent occupation was—and remains—the objective: it is the only means by which Washington can guarantee its control of the petroleum resources. Certainly, no credence can be given to Washington’s declarations of intent, such as “we will leave the country as soon as order has been restored.” It should be remembered that the British never said of their occupation of Egypt, beginning in 1882, that it was anything other than provisional (it lasted until 1956!). Meanwhile, of course, the United States destroys the country, its schools, factories, and scientific capacities, a little more each day, using all means, including the most criminal.
The responses given by the Iraqi people to the challenge—so far, at least—do not appear to be up to facing the seriousness of the situation. That is the least that can be said. What are the reasons for this? The dominant Western media repeat ad nauseam that Iraq is an artificial country and that the oppressive domination of Saddam’s “Sunni” regime over the Shia and Kurds is the origin of the inevitable civil war (which can only be suppressed, perhaps, by continuing the foreign occupation).The resistance, then, is limited to a few pro-Saddam hard-core Islamists from the Sunni triangle. It is surely difficult to string together so many falsehoods.
Following the First World War, the British had great difficulty in defeating the resistance of the Iraqi people. In complete harmony with their imperial tradition, the British imported a monarchy and created a class of large landowners to support their power, thereby giving a privileged position to the Sunnis. But, despite their systematic efforts, the British failed. The Communist Party and the Baath Party were the main organized political forces that defeated the power of the “Sunni” monarchy detested by everyone, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. The violent competition between these two forces, which occupied center stage between 1958 and 1963, ended with the victory of the Baath Party, welcomed at the time by the Western powers as a relief. The Communist project carried in itself the possibility for a democratic evolution; this was not true of the Baath. The latter was nationalist and pan-Arab in principle, admired the Prussian model for constructing German unity, and recruited its members from the secular, modernist petite bourgeoisie, hostile to obscurantist expressions of religion. In power, the Baath evolved, in predictable fashion, into a dictatorship that was only half anti-imperialist, in the sense that, depending on conjunctures and circumstances, a compromise could be accepted by the two partners (Baathist power in Iraq and U.S. imperialism, dominant in the region).
This deal encouraged the megalomaniacal excesses of the leader, who imagined that Washington would accept making him its main ally in the region. Washington’s support for Baghdad (the delivery of chemical weapons is proof of this) in the absurd and criminal war against Iran from 1980 to 1989 appeared to lend credence to this calculation. Saddam never imagined Washington’s deceit, that modernization of Iraq was unacceptable to imperialism and that the decision to destroy the country had already been made. Saddam fell into the open trap when the green light was given to annex Kuwait (in fact attached in Ottoman times to the provinces that constitute Iraq, and detached by the British imperialists in order to make it one of their petroleum colonies). Iraq was then subjected to ten years of sanctions intended to bleed the country dry so as to facilitate the glorious conquest of the resulting vacuum by the armed forces of the United States.
The successive Baathist regimes, including the last one in its declining phase under Saddam’s leadership, can be accused of everything, except for having stirred up the conflict between the Sunni and Shia. Who then is responsible for the bloody clashes between the two communities? One day, we will certainly learn how the CIA (and undoubtedly Mossad) organized many of these massacres. But, beyond that, it is true that the political desert created by the Saddam regime and the example that it provided of unprincipled opportunist methods encouraged succeeding aspirants to power of all kinds to follow this path, often protected by the occupier. Sometimes, perhaps, they were even naïve to the point of believing that they could be of service to the occupying power. The aspirants in question, be they religious leaders (Shia or Sunni), supposed (para-tribal) “notables,” or notoriously corrupt businessmen exported by the United States, never had any real political standing in the country. Even those religious leaders whom the believers respected had no political influence that was acceptable to the Iraqi people. Without the void created by Saddam, no one would know how to pronounce their names. Faced with the new political world created by the imperialism of liberal globalization, will other authentically popular and national, possibly even democratic, political forces have the means to reconstruct themselves?
There was a time when the Iraqi Communist Party was the focus for organizing the best of what Iraqi society could produce. The Communist Party was established in every region of the country and dominated the world of intellectuals, often of Shia origin (I note in passing that the Shia produced revolutionaries or religious leaders above all, rarely bureaucrats or compradors!). The Communist Party was authentically popular and anti-imperialist, little inclined to demagoguery and potentially democratic. After the massacre of thousands of its best militants by the Baathist dictatorships, the collapse of the Soviet Union (for which the Iraqi Communist Party was not prepared), and the behavior of those intellectuals who believed it acceptable to return from exile as camp followers of the armed forces of the United States, is the Iraqi Communist Party henceforth fated to disappear permanently from history? Unfortunately, this is all too possible, but not inevitable, far from it.
The Kurdish question is real, in Iraq as in Iran and Turkey. But on this subject also, it should be remembered that the Western powers have always practiced, with great cynicism, double standards. The repression of Kurdish demands has never attained in Iraq and Iran the level of police, military, political, and moral violence carried out by Ankara. Neither Iran nor Iraq has ever gone so far as to deny the very existence of the Kurds. However, Turkey must be pardoned for everything as a member of NATO, an organization of democratic nations, as the media remind us. Among the eminent democrats proclaimed by the West was Portugal’s Salazar, one of NATO’s founding members, and the no less ardent admirers of democracy, the Greek colonels and Turkish generals!
Each time that the Iraqi popular fronts, formed around the Communist Party and the Baath in the best moments of its turbulent history, exercised political power, they always found an area of agreement with the principal Kurdish parties. The latter, moreover, have always been their allies.The anti-Shia and anti-Kurd excesses of the Saddam regime were certainly real: for example, the bombing of the Basra region by Saddam’s army after its defeat in Kuwait in 1990 and the use of gas against the Kurds. These excesses came in response to the maneuvers of Washington’s armed diplomacy, which had mobilized sorcerer’s apprentices among Shia and Kurds. They remain no less criminal excesses, and stupid, moreover, since the success of Washington’s appeals was quite limited. But can anything else be expected from dictators like Saddam?
The force of the resistance to foreign occupation, unexpected under these conditions, might seem to bemiraculous. This is not the case, since the basic reality is that the Iraqi people as a whole (Arab and Kurd, Sunni and Shia) detest the occupiers and are familiar with its crimes on a daily basis (assassinations, bombings, massacres, torture). Given this a united front of national resistance (call it what you want) might even be imagined, proclaiming itself as such, posting the names, lists of organizations, and parties composing it and their common program. This, however, is not actually the case up to the present for all of the reasons described above, including the destruction of the social and political fabric caused by the Saddam dictatorship and the occupation. Regardless of the reasons, this weakness is a serious handicap, which makes it easier to divide the population, encourage opportunists, even so far as making them collaborators, and throw confusion over the objectives of the liberation.
Who will succeed in overcoming these handicaps? The communists should be well placed to do so. Already, militants who are present on the ground are separating themselves from the leaders of the Communist Party (the only ones known by the dominant media) who, confused and embarrassed, are attempting to give a semblance of legitimacy to their rallying to the collaborationist government, even pretending that they are adding to the effectiveness of armed resistance by such action! But, under the circumstances, many other political forces could make decisive initiatives in the direction of forming this front.It remains the case that, despite its weaknesses, the Iraqi people’s resistance has already defeated (politically if not yet militarily) Washington’s project. It is precisely this that worries the Atlanticists in the European Union, faithful allies of the United States. Today, they fear a U.S. defeat, because this would strengthen the capacity of the peoples of the South to force globalized transnational capital of the imperialist triad to respect the interests of the nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Iraqi resistance has offered proposals that would make it possible to get out of the impasse and aid the United States to withdraw from the trap. It proposes: (1) formation of a transitional administrative authority set up with the support of the UN Security Council; (2) the immediate cessation of resistance actions and military and police interventions by occupying forces; (3) the departure of all foreign military and civilian authorities within six months. The details of these proposals have been published in the prestigious Arab review Al Moustaqbal al Arabi (January 2006), published in Beirut.
The absolute silence with which the European media oppose the dissemination of this message is a testament to the solidarity of the imperialist partners. Democratic and progressive European forces have the duty to dissociate themselves from this policy of the imperialist triad and support the proposals of the Iraqi resistance. To leave the Iraqi people to confront its opponent alone is not an acceptable option: it reinforces the dangerous idea that nothing can be expected from the West and its peoples, and consequently encourages the unacceptable—even criminal—excesses in the activities of some of the resistance movements.
The sooner the foreign occupation troops leave the country and the stronger the support by democratic forces in the world and in Europe for the Iraqi people, the greater will be the possibilities for a better future for this martyred people. The longer the occupation lasts, the more dismal will be the aftermath of its inevitable end.
Palestine
The Palestinian people have, since the Balfour Declaration during the First World War, been the victim of a colonization project by a foreign population, who reserve for them the fate of the “redskins,” whether one acknowledges it or pretends to be ignorant of it. This project has always had the unconditional support of the dominant imperialist power in the region (yesterday Great Britain, today the United States), because the foreign state in the region formed by that project can only be the unconditional ally, in turn, of the interventions required to force the Arab Middle East to submit to the domination of imperialist capitalism.
This is an obvious fact for all the peoples of Africa and Asia. Consequently, on both continents, they are spontaneously united on the assertion and defense of the rights of the Palestinian people. In Europe, however, the “Palestinian question” causes division, produced by the confusions kept alive by Zionist ideology, which is frequently echoed favorably.
Today more than ever, in conjunction with the implementation of the U.S. “Greater Middle East project,” the rights of the Palestinian people have been abolished. All the same, the PLO accepted the Oslo and Madrid plans and the roadmap drafted by Washington. It is Israel that has openly gone back on its agreement, and implemented an even more ambitious expansion plan. The PLO has been undermined as a result: public opinion can justly reproach it with having naively believed in the sincerity of its adversaries. The support provided by the occupation authorities to its Islamist adversary (Hamas), in the beginning, at least, and the spread of corrupt practices in the Palestinian administration (on which the fund donors—the World Bank, Europe, and the NGOs—are silent, if they are not party to it) had to lead to the Hamas electoral victory (it was predictable). This then became an additional pretext immediately put forward to justify unconditional alignment with Israeli policies no matter what they may be.
The Zionist colonial project has always been a threat, beyond Palestine, for neighboring Arab peoples. Its ambitions to annex the Egyptian Sinai and its effective annexation of the Syrian Golan are testimony to that. In the Greater Middle East project, a particular place is granted to Israel, to its regional monopoly of nuclear military equipment and its role as “indispensable partner” (under the fallacious pretext that Israel has technological expertise of which the Arab people are incapable. What an indispensable racism!).
It is not the intention here to offer analyses concerning the complex interactions between the resistance struggles against Zionist colonial expansion and the political conflicts and choices in Lebanon and Syria. The Baathist regimes in Syria have resisted, in their own way, the demands of the imperialist powers and Israel. That this resistance has also served to legitimize more questionable ambitions (control of Lebanon) is certainly not debatable. Moreover, Syria has carefully chosen the least dangerous allies in Lebanon. It is well known that the Lebanese Communist Party had organized resistance to the Israeli incursions in South Lebanon (diversion of water included). The Syrian, Lebanese, and Iranian authorities closely cooperated to destroy this dangerous base and replace it with Hezbollah. The assassination of Rafiq al-Harriri (a still unresolved case) obviously gave the imperialist powers (the United States in front, France behind) the opportunity to intervene with two objectives in mind: (1) force Damascus to align itself permanently with the vassal Arab states (Egypt and Saudi Arabia)—or, failing that, eliminate the vestiges of a deteriorated Baathist power; and (2) demolish what remains of the capability to resist Israeli incursions (by demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah). Rhetoric about democracy can be invoked within this context, if useful.
Today to accept the implementation of the Israeli project in progress is to ratify the abolition of the primary right of peoples: the right to exist. This is the supreme crime against humanity. The accusation of “anti-Semitism” addressed to those who reject this crime is only a means for appalling blackmail.
Iran
It is not our intention here to develop the analyses called for by the Islamic Revolution. Was it, as it has been proclaimed to be among supporters of political Islam as well as among foreign observers, the declaration of and point of departure for a change that ultimately must seize the entire region, perhaps even the whole Muslim world, renamed for the occasion the umma (the “nation,” which has never been)? Or was it a singular event, particularly because it was a unique combination of the interpretations of Shia Islam and the expression of Iranian nationalism?
From the perspective of what interests us here, I will only make two observations. The first is that the regime of political Islam in Iran is not by nature incompatible with integration of the country into the globalized capitalist system such as it is, since the regime is based on liberal principles for managing the economy. The second is that the Iranian nation as such is a “strong nation,” one whose major components, if not all, of both popular classes and ruling classes, do not accept the integration of their country into the globalized system in a dominated position. There is, of course, a contradiction between these two dimensions of the Iranian reality. The second one accounts for Teheran’s foreign policy tendencies, which bear witness to the will to resist foreign diktats.
It is Iranian nationalism—powerful and, in my opinion, altogether historically positive—that explains the success of the modernization of scientific, industrial, technological, and military capabilities undertaken by the Shah’s regime and the Khomeinist regime that followed. Iran is one of the few states of the South (with China, India, Korea, Brazil, and maybe a few others, but not many!) to have a national bourgeois project. Whether it be possible in the long term to achieve this project or not (my opinion is that it is not) is not the focus of our discussion here. Today this project exists and is in place.
It is precisely because Iran forms a critical mass capable of attempting to assert itself as a respected partner that the United States has decided to destroy the country by a new preventive war. As is well known, the conflict is taking place around the nuclear capabilities that Iran is developing. Why should not this country, just like others, have the right to pursue these capabilities, up to and including becoming a nuclear military power? By what right can the imperialist powers and their Israeli accomplice boast about granting themselves a monopoly over weapons of mass destruction? Can one give any credit to the discourse that argues that “democratic” nations will never make use of such weapons like “rogue states” could, when it is common knowledge that the democratic nations in question are responsible for the greatest genocides of modern times, including the one against the Jews, and that the United States has already used atomic weapons and still today rejects an absolute and general ban on their use?
Conclusion
Today, political conflicts in the region find three groups of forces opposed to one another: those that proclaim their nationalist past (but are, in reality, nothing more than the degenerate and corrupt inheritors of the bureaucracies of the national-populist era); those that proclaim political Islam; and those that are attempting to organize around “democratic” demands that are compatible with economic liberalism. The consolidation of power by any of these forces is not acceptable to a left that is attentive to the interests of the popular classes.In fact, the interests of the comprador classes affiliated with the current imperialist system are expressed through these three tendencies. U.S. diplomacy keeps all three irons in the fire, since it is focused on using the conflicts among them for its exclusive benefit. For the left to attempt to become involved in these conflicts solely through alliances with one or another of the tendencies* (preferring the regimes in place to avoid the worst, i.e., political Islam, or else seeking to be allied with the latter in order to get rid of the regimes) is doomed to fail. The left must assert itself by undertaking struggles in areas where it finds its natural place: defense of the economic and social interests of the popular classes, democracy, and assertion of national sovereignty, all conceptualized together as inseparable.* Tactical alliances arising from the concrete situation are another matter, e.g., the joint action of the Lebanese Communist Party with Hezbollah in resisting the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006.—Ed.
The region of the Greater Middle East is today central in the conflict between the imperialist leader and the peoples of the entire world. To defeat the Washington establishment’s project is the condition for providing the possibility of success for advances in any region of the world. Failing that, all these advances will remain vulnerable in the extreme. That does not mean that the importance of struggles carried out in other regions of the world, in Europe or Latin America or elsewhere, should be underestimated. It means only that they should be part of a comprehensive perspective that contributes to defeating Washington in the region that it has chosen for its first criminal strike of this century.

Sunday, December 30, 2007


Bakan Güler anlattı: Asıl operasyon enerji alanında
Enerji Bakanı Güler: Irak'la ilişkilerin bugününe değil, yarınına bakıyoruz. Irak doğal gazı Nabucco üzerinden Avrupa'ya gidebilir
30/12/2007
Murat Yetkin - myetkin@radikal.com.tr
Enerji Bakanı Hilmi Güler, Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül ile Kazakistan seyahatinden yeni Ankara'ya dönmüştü. Bir telefon aldı. Aynı tarihlerde Kazakistan'da görüşmeler yapan İsrail Enerji Bakanı Fuad Ben Eliyezer, Türkiye üzerinden İsrail'e dönüyordu ve müsait ise İstanbul'da görüşmek istiyordu.
Güler, 17 Aralık Pazartesi sabah uçağıyla İstanbul'a gitti. Havaalanı yakınlarındaki bir lokantada hem yemek yediler, hem konuştular. Kazak Başbakanı Kerim Massimov ile görüşmeden dönen İsrailli bakan, Samsun-Ceyhan hattı başta olmak üzere Türkiye ile enerji işbirliğini bir an önce hayata geçirmek istediklerini söylüyordu. Rusların, Hazar Denizi'nin doğu kıyısı boyunca Türkmen ve Kazaklarla imzaladığı doğal gaz boru hattı anlaşması buna engel olmamalıydı. Rus, Kazak, Azeri petrol ve doğalgazını Uzakdoğu'da Hindistan ve Çin pazarına İsrail üzerinden aktaracak yeni bir rota açılmasının yolu Türkiye idi.
Güler, İsrailli ve Hintli meslektaşıyla zaten bu amaçla ccak ya da şubat aylarında, ya sembolik olarak Ceyhan ya da pratik olarak İstanbul'da bir görüşme planlıyordu. Ama İsrail'den gelen ısrar, en azından projenin finansmanı ve hattının içinin doldurulması konusundaki muhtemel sıkıntıların azalacağına işaretti.
Dün Enerji Bakanı Güler ile yaptığımız telefon görüşmesinde şu an mutfakta pişmekte olan projelerin Rusya-İsrail boyutunu aştığı ve kamuoyu açısından yeni özellikler kazanmaya başladığı ortaya çıktı.
"Bölgemizde şartlar hızla değişiyor" diye söze başladı ve şöyle sürdürdü: "Samsun-Ceyhan'ı İsraille bir proje değil, bölgesel bir kalkınma ve barış projesi olarak görmek daha doğru. Dengeler giderek yerine oturuyor, ama şartlar hızla değişiyor. Putin'in yeni stratejisi belli olmak üzere ABD ile ilginç işbirliği boyutları ortaya çıkıyor. İran ile görüşmelere ilaveten, özellikle Irak'taki muhtemel oyuncularla, ki buna firmalar dahil, yoğun görüşmelerimiz sürüyor. Türkiye enerji oyununda seyirci olmaktan çıkıp oyuncu haline geliyor. Enerji alanındaki etkinliğimiz giderek artacak."
Rusya, Nabucco'yu bitirdi mi?
Bakanın çizdiği bu tabloda sorulması gereken sorular var. Hazar havzasından Orta Avrupa'ya gaz iletmek üzere tasarlanan Nabucco boru hattı için, Azeri ve Kazak gazının yanı sıra Türkmen gazı öneriliyordu. Türkmen gazı, Amerikalıların önerdiği şekilde Hazar Denizi'ni aşarak hatta pompalanacaktı. Oysa Rusya'nın Hazar doğusu boyunca hat inşa etmek üzere Türkmen ve Kazaklarla yaptığı anlaşma ve bu anlaşmayla gaz fiyatını yükseltmesi bu durumu değiştirdi.
Güler, bu projenin Nabucco'yu bitirmeyeceğine çünkü yeni alternatiflerin ortaya çıktığına işaret ediyor:
"Nabucco için sadece Azeri gazı yok ki elde. Zaten başka mevcut kaynaklar var. Ama Irak gazının Nabucco'ya bağlanması için çalışmalarınız devam ediyor. Bu çalışmaları da kimseye bir tepki olarak yapmıyoruz. Biz kendi işimize bakıyoruz. Ne yaptığımızı biliyoruz. referanslarımız, fizibilitemiz farklı. Ama şunu söyleyeyim Irak'la başta enerji olmak üzere ilişkilerimizin artmasını öngörüyoruz."
Irak'ta enerji operasyonu
Ankara'nın Irak'a bakışının, kuzeydeki PKK varlığına karşı ABD ile işbirliği içinde sürmekte olan askeri harekâtla sınırlı olmadığını ve neden son MGK bildirisinde İstanbul'daki Irak'a Komşu Ülkeler Zirvesi'ndeki siyasi ve coğrafi birlik ilkesine özel vurgu yapıldığını Güler'in şu cümlelerinden anlamak mümkün: "Diplomatik ataklarımızın merkezinde enerji diplomasisi var. Modellememizi, şu anki istikrarsızlık durumu üzerine değil, yakında ortaya çıkacak, çıkması için Türkiye'nin aktif çaba harcadığı daha istikrarlı dönem üzerine kuruyoruz. Irak'taki son gelişmeler, izlenen önleyici diplomasi, Irak'la işbirliğimizi de, Irak'taki etkimizi de artıracak. Bölgenin rahatlaması, bizim de rahatlamamız demek. Ortak düşmanlarımız (Bu deyimin ABD Başkanı Bush ve Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan için PKK'ya karşı kullanıldığına dikkat çekmek lazım, yaygınlaştığı görülüyor-MY) ortadan kalkınca, sıra kalkınma projelerine gelecek.
'Kalkınma projeleri söz konusu olduğunda bu bölgede en avantajlı ülke Türkiye. Bunu zaten görenler vardı, şimdi diğerleri de görüyor. Irak'ta özellikle de kuzeyde petrol ve doğalgazın altyapısı bakımından coğrafyayı en iyi bilen biziz. Bölgede Türkiye'ye de, Türk Petrolleri'ne de çok iş düşeceğini umuyoruz. Çünkü Irak'la ilişkilerin bugününe değil, yarınına bakıyoruz."

Tuesday, December 25, 2007


Haberin adresi: /haber.php?haberno=235827
İşsizlik genç nüfusta hızlı arttı
Temmuz-ağustos döneminde istihdam edilenlerin yüzde 28.7'si tarım, yüzde 18.7'si sanayi sektöründe.Türkiye'de işsizlik oranı temmuz ayında değişmeyerek yüzde 8.8'de kaldı. Ancak zaten en yüksek işsizliğin yaşandığı genç nüfusta işsizlerin oranı yüzde 17.1'den yüzde 18.6'ya çıktı
16/10/2007
RADİKAL - ANKARA - Toplam işsiz sayısı temmuzda geçen yılın aynı ayına göre 45 bin kişi artarak 2 milyon 296 bine ulaşırken, işsizlik oranı yüzde 8.8'le değişmedi. Ancak en yüksek işsizliğin görüldüğü genç nüfusta işsizlik oranı ise hızlı artışını sürdürerek yüzde 17.1'den yüzde 18.6'ya çıktı.
Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TÜİK), Hanehalkı İşgücü Araştırması'nın haziran-temmuz-ağustos dönemine ilişkin sonuçlarını açıkladı. Buna göre, Türkiye'de kurumsal olmayan sivil nüfus bir önceki yılın aynı dönemine göre 922 bin kişilik bir artışla 73 milyon 567 bin kişiye, kurumsal olmayan çalışma çağındaki nüfus ise 880 bin kişi artarak 52 milyon 581 bin kişiye ulaştı. 2007 yılı temmuz döneminde istihdam edilenlerin sayısı, geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre 490 bin kişi artarak, 23 milyon 747 bin kişiye ulaştı. Bu dönemde tarım sektöründe çalışan sayısı 50 bin kişi azalırken, tarım dışı sektörlerde çalışan sayısı ise 540 bin kişi arttı.
Temmuz 2007 döneminde istihdam edilenlerin yüzde 28.7'sinin tarım, yüzde 18.7'sinin sanayi, yüzde 6.4'ünün inşaat, yüzde 46.2'sinin ise hizmetler sektöründe olduğu bildirildi. Önceki yılın aynı dönemiyle karşılaştırıldığında, tarım sektöründe istihdamın payının 0.8 puan, sanayi sektörünün payının ise 0.3 puan azaldığı, buna karşılık inşaat sektörünün payının 0.4 puan, hizmetler sektörünün payının ise 0.7 puan arttığı görüldü.
Büyütmek için tıklayınız
İşsizlik değişmedi
Türkiye genelinde işsiz sayısı geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre 45 bin kişi artarak 2 milyon 296 bin kişiye yükseldi. Geçen yılın aynı döneminde yüzde 8.8 olan işsizlik oranı bu yıl da aynı düzeyde çıktı.
Kentsel yerlerde işsizlik oranı 0.3 puanlık azalışla yüzde 11.2, kırsal yerlerde ise 0.3 puanlık artışla yüzde 5.4 oldu.
Türkiye'de tarım dışı işsizlik oranı geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre 0.1 puanlık azalışla yüzde 11.6 seviyesinde gerçekleşti. Bu oran erkeklerde geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre 0.1 puanlık düşüşle yüzde 10.1, kadınlarda ise 0.2 puanlık düşüşle yüzde 17.5 oldu. İşsizlerin yüzde 70.6'sını erkekler oluşturuyor. Yüzde 54.8'i lise altı eğitimli olan işsizlerin yüzde 30.5'i bir yıl ve daha uzun süredir iş arıyor. İşsizlerin yüzde 30.3'la en büyük bölümünün 'eş-dost' aracılığıyla iş aradığı belirlendi. İşsizlerin yüzde 79.7'sini oluşturan 1 milyon 831 bininin daha önce bir işte çalıştığı bildirildi. Daha önce bir işte çalışmış olan işsizlerin yüzde 51.5'inin 'hizmetler', yüzde 24.3'ünün 'sanayi', yüzde 16.4'ünün 'inşaat', yüzde 7.8'inin ise 'tarım' sektöründe çalıştığı saptandı. İstihdam edilenlerin; yüzde 73'ünü erkek nüfus oluşturuyor. Çalışanların yüzde 61.4'ü lise altı eğitimli.
Yüzde 57.2'si ücretli, maaşlı ve yevmiyeli, yüzde 27.1'i kendi hesabına ve işveren olan istihdamdaki nüfusun yüzde 15.7'sinin ise aile işçileri olduğu belirlendi. İstihdamdakilerin yüzde 63'ü 'bir-dokuz kişi arası' çalışanı olan işyerlerinde bulunuyor. Çalışanların yüzde 3'ü ek bir iş yapıyor, yüzde 3.7'si mevcut işini değiştirmek için veya buna ek bir iş arıyor. Ücretli çalışanların yüzde 85'i sürekli bir işte çalışıyor.
Yarısı kayıt dışı çalışıyor
Yaptığı işten ötürü herhangi bir sosyal güvenlik kuruluşuna kayıtlı olmadan çalışanların oranı, önceki yılın aynı dönemine göre 1.6 puanlık azalışla yüzde 48.9 olarak gerçekleşti. Geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre tarım sektöründe sosyal güvenlikten yoksun çalışanların oranı yüzde 88.5'ten yüzde 88.2'ye, tarım dışı sektörlerde de yüzde 34.7'den yüzde 33.2'ye düştü.
Türkiye'de işgücüne katılma oranı, geçen yılın aynı dönemine göre yüzde 49.5 olarak gerçekleşti. Erkeklerde işgücüne katılma oranı yüzde 72.9, kadınlarda ise 0.3 puanlık artışla yüzde 26.7 oldu. Kentsel yerlerde işgücüne katılma oranı yüzde 46.2, kırsal yerlerde ise 0.1 puanlık azalışla yüzde 55.4 düzeyinde oluştu.
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by Cigdem Cidamli

The July 2007 elections ended with results beyond the expectations of most observers. We will watch for possible coming earthquakes.
To explain the AKP's election victory, in addition to the AKP's own tactics and policies, exogenous factors should be taken into consideration. These include the large vacuum at the centre right and center left of Turkish politics resulting from the basic disabilities of the dominant Turkish political structure. The AKP's success is substantially due to this vacuum created at the center of Turkish politics and the inabilities of the party's rivals, which means that such a level of election support may not be sustained in a different conjuncture.
Aside from receiving unquestionable and efficient support from international capital, the US administration, the EU, and media monopolies, as well as benefiting from the aforementioned political vacuum, what has the AKP actually accomplished? Above all, the AKP succeeded in responding to the "fears of disorder and economic and political instability which might arise from internal tensions and conflicts" of the mass of the people, who never feel themselves secure and are always in fear of further deterioration of their material social conditions: i.e. the poor, a large section of the middle classes, shopkeepers, and the majority of Kurdish people.
AKP, at the beginning of this year, actually achieved a representative position in terms of society's political common sense just after the assassination of Hrant Dink, mainly because of the political weakness of the Turkish left. The army's declaration (the so-called e-coup d'etat) in April, thanks to its preferred tactic of tension about the presidential elections, helped AKP, which was just then beginning to lose this position as representative of the general common sense. During this process, Erdogan managed to re-grasp that representative position and started his attack against the other party: i.e. the nationalists' front headed by the army.
Erdogan has shown a certain skill in managing stagnant political conditions thanks to his "powerful" advisors, though he always makes mistakes in chaotic and agitated conditions. Therefore, it is a bit strange that the nationalist wing, which had carried on a severe tactic of tension sending masses into the streets, did not choose to make any big noise during the last month of the election campaign. Some of the reasons for this might be the narrow-mindedness of nationalist politics itself: their elitist orientation in terms of real problems of the vast majority of the people; their single-minded, semi-paranoiac attitudes; strict sectarianism of the leader (Deniz Baykal) of the so-called social democratic party (Republican People's Party) which has been for some time the main channel for the official "secularist-nationalist" reactions of the upper middle classes; Baykal's great effort to distance his party from the left along with his tactics of opening up to the right; etc. All these might explain the change in political position of the nationalist wing from agitation to stagnation.
However, in addition to these reasons, perhaps we should also look at the two-and-a half-hours-long unpublicized meeting between Prime Minister Erdogan and General Yasar Buyukanit, Chief of the General Staff, in Dolmabahce just before the elections. It is understood that during that meeting a consensus was reached between the two about a series of issues directly related to the elections. It seems that there was agreement on a framework in which their differences could be expressed within "reasonable limits" about the position of Turkey in regard to Northern Iraq; that the presidential elections system and the anticipated referenda for it will not be put under too much pressure; that no open operations will be organized against the secret nationalist junta organizations within and outside the army, about which the Chief of the General Staff too has certain concerns. After this meeting, the Turkish General Staff did not take any further steps beyond engaging in some polemics about Northern Iraq and agitating the Kurdish question a little with the help of its appeals for massive participation in the "demonstrations against terror" (which followed the nationalist rallies, on a much smaller scale). This last was obviously aimed to help the MHP (the fascist, racist Nationalist Movement Party) reach the minimum ten percent of the votes needed to enter the parliament. However this second series of demonstrations, while bolstering the MHP and agitating the Kurdish question, seems only to have contributed to the dissolution of the tense atmosphere that was created by the April nationalist mass demonstrations while pushing a large part of the Kurdish masses behind the AKP. In short, in this process, the army as the main engine of nationalism was unable to maintain a united and consistent position. The General Staff entered into some partial compromises and indeed at some point froze the tactic of tension that it had previously accelerated.
Putting these developments together, let us recall the provocative discussions concerning Turkey carried out at the Hudson Institute some two months ago and revealed by some sources close to the US administration. Is it not unreasonable to see a connection with the consensus between Erdogan and Buyukanit, reached during the peak of tension just after the operations against the nationalist junta organizations and the US administration's intervention, and the ensuing total stagnation of the nationalist offensive?
The historical lesson that should be drawn from this by those pro-army "nationalists" on the left is that, as was already seen in all Turkish coup d'états and especially just after the 12 March 1971 coup famous for its various leftist-rightist intra-junta games, it is never possible to produce patriotic politics based on relations with, and expectations for, such an Americanized institution. This is especially so today given the realities of our age and the global stakes at issue in the Middle East. The nationalist force today is one part ravings of the disintegrating middle classes and the other the reactions of ordinary people against religious fundamentalism, but it is now in large part ideologically merged with reactionary-racist concerns about the "internal conflicts and divisions." Such a political position cannot be led and transformed towards progressive results. Rather the inevitable point that such a political position will reach is to take a place in a wing of the nationalist forces, to adopt a racist position, and to be a dish on the bargaining table of the ruling forces.
When the election results are evaluated together with the tensions in the Middle East which are accelerating along with US pressures, there are two alternatives left for the army in the middle run: the first is to take a defensive position for a while and wait for a new big chance to come; and the second is to accept a real change of course (which can also be seen as accepting an internal liquidation) as a result of US pressures and of the owner-of-the-state pragmatism of the army. Until now the general tactic of the Turkish General Staff has been to merge these two and to choose a route according to the strength of US pressures. The only development that can change this would be a real shift in the axis of US politics.
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Looking at the comprehensive picture that the elections put in front of us, we have to emphasize two critical points for the near future. First, as MHP has now become the rising center of nationalism, the so-called social democratic party will lose ground and the merger of nationalism with right-wing racism will accelerate.
Second, neo-liberalism, which was the rising hegemonic ideology during the 1980-90s but which largely lost its ideological power worldwide after 1999 (and in our country especially after the 2001 crises), was able to partially repair itself during the July 2007 elections with the help of "identity politics" and once more consolidated a strong position. The main representative of the neo-liberal ideology and program in Turkey, AKP, grasped a representative commonsense position in-between the Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, managing this by creating a feeling that reasonable identity recognition would be granted to Kurds and by giving hope to the Kurdish bourgeoisie that it could enjoy a rent-sharing position if it is articulated with US policies. Together with its Islamist identity against secularism, it convinced the Islamist masses that a moderate neo-liberal Islamist process can weaken and change the official secularist regime. And it could even convince permanently depressed left identities that only the AKP would give them a chance to survive. Thus, community formations at all social levels and in all social spheres were encouraged, and communities were given a chance to survive as a way of extending its own (and indeed the World Bank's) brutal neo-liberal politics in the name of "social policy." As the sum total of all these, AKP now plays the role of a "freedom-lover" and even "equality-lover" party against the authoritarian ideological-political character of its nationalist rival, and it can hide the vacuums created by neo-liberalism with its peculiar identity politics.
These developments imply an important result for the left: with the defeat of the so-called social democratic nationalism, liberalism, once more and this time in a new neo-liberal framework, will act to repair its hegemony among some sections of the left, social democrats, and Kurdish people.
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When we evaluate the election results from the viewpoint of the Kurdish movement, first, it must be said that Kurds succeeded in entering parliament in a number sufficient to enable them to have an official political group. This opportunity, if wisely used, can enable a new center of initiative to be created in Kurdish politics. A Turkish-Kurdish movement can gain some strength in the Middle East and in the international arena.
Of course it should not be forgotten that votes for independent Kurdish candidates largely decreased in the Kurdish provinces of the East and densely Kurdish populated provinces of West Anatolia, and AKP undoubtedly became the only party taking the majority of Kurdish votes. The rise of AKP among Kurds will bring this party to a position where it no longer can avoid the Kurdish question. To be sure, Erdogan should not be expected to take steps for any "solution" in this area, unless he receives the strongest of guarantees from the US.
On the other hand, a crossroad will be reached where either the disintegration of PKK and the legal Kurdish movement would accelerate or a more positive direction would develop. The decisive factor will be how the Kurdish legal party, in terms of its relationship with the left opposition, takes a position against the neoliberal policies of AKP. It is possible that PKK would initiate a ceasefire because of the new conditions (unless, of course, Turkey were to enter into Northern Iraq). But it should always be remembered that the US, at a critical threshold in Iraq and in the entire Middle East, will be a very influential factor over the development of the Kurdish question in Turkey. In the coming months, the most critical element will be the US-Turkey-Iraq negotiations around the Kirkuk referendum and Northern Iraq. AKP politics about the Kurdish issue should be expected to take its shape accordingly.
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Meanwhile it is now evident that the so-called social democratic party leadership will not resign after its election defeat and there will be a long and deep fight between the different left-right fractions within both this party and the nationalist movement.
Left explorations and initiatives for alternative projects will accelerate in this atmosphere and various centers will try to gain strength and position, including the new "social democratic" centers supported by the fractions of monopoly capital and media monopolies against the traditional sectarian leadership. A prominent "social democratic" figure who last year was the colonialist administrator-governor of Afghanistan (Hikmet Cetin) on behalf of NATO is included in this game now, with a heavy pro-liberal, pro-US emphasis. It seems that the ruling classes aim to have a social democratic alternative as a hedge against any possibility of AKP's weakening or going out of control.
Left liberalism, which during the election process was represented by left independent candidates and which even considered the working class as a part of its own identity politics, of course will try to be part of these initiatives, including the only non-Kurdish left candidate who won a seat in the parliament. How the Kurdish deputies will merge nationalism with left liberalism, which positions they will take against AKP's neoliberal policies and US Middle East policies, and how they will merge this with a Kurdish nationalist-liberal framework all remain to be seen.
There is no strong possibility that in the coming few months the presidential elections will again turn into a major crisis. However, in a period when economy will be under much more pressure, AKP will start implementing a new course of neo-liberal assaults more recklessly and this time introduce much delayed privatizations in energy production and distribution and the remaining parts of the health, social security, and public system "reforms." These will accelerate social problems, and at least partially weaken identity politics patches over neo-liberal destruction, and create stronger pressure to fill the giant vacuum in the sphere of social left opposition.
The need for an independent and revolutionary left will become a much more burning issue in the coming days. At this point, in order to overcome the hopelessness and confusion among the left, ideological clarity as well as practical militancy will be more important than ever. In order to prevent the left from being taken entirely under the influence of a new neo-liberal wave, just as happened during the 1990s, a vivid line of ideological, political, and social struggle should be taken.
Under our concrete political and social conditions, the path of a real left renovation can be built only by organizing, uniting, and politicizing the mass struggles related to poor and working people's basic social rights against neo-liberalism with a revolutionary perspective. This is not mere agitation but a realistic political judgment and commitment that can determine the future of a left in search of various alternatives. One of the important problems for this line is to concretely shape this political perspective along the realities of AKP's assault program and to make it achieve political and organizational richness. Thus it is time for ideological and political clarification in order to overcome the confusion among the left by militant practice, step by step.