Yeni Soğuk Savaş'ın eli kulağında

Kosova'nın yaklaşan bağımsızlığına verilen Batı desteğine Rusya'nın nasıl tepki göstereceği, Soğuk Savaş'tan beri ne kadar ilerlediğimizi gösterecek. Batı, bağımsızlık sürecini iyi idare edip Rusya'yla ilişkileri geliştirme fırsatlarını kullanmazsa yeni Soğuk Savaş biraz daha buz kesebilir
31/01/2008
Morton Abramowitz

Kosova'yı resmen bağımsızlığa taşımaya yönelik uzun ve acılı çaba karşısında Rusya parmağını Batı'nın gözüne doğru sallamakta. Avrupa'da kurulacak Amerikan füze kalkanına dair velvelenin aksine bu sorun geçiştirilecek gibi görünmüyor ve Rusya'yla Batı arasındaki çalkantılı ilişkiyi daha da kötüleştirme tehlikesi arz ediyor.
Batı'nın Kosova'nın bağımsızlığını kolaylaştırma çabalarına Rusya her aşamada karşı çıktı. Sırbistan ve Kosova arasında bir yıl süren müzakerelerin ardından Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin, BM arabulucularının vesayet altında bağımsızlık tavsiye eden raporunu reddetti, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin bu raporu kabul etmesine engel oldu ve uzlaşma imkânsız hâle gelse bile Sırbistan'la Kosova arasında üç ay daha müzakerede bulunulmasında ısrar etti.
Batı karşıtlığı güçlenecek
BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nde üç hafta önce Rusya yine herhangi bir anlaşmanın hem Sırbistan hem de Kosova'nın onayını gerektirdiğini belirterek daha fazla müzakerenin şart olduğu ısrarında bulundu. Rusya bu tür müzakerelerin sonuçsuz olduğunu biliyor ama birkez daha görünüşte masumane görüşme çağrısında bulunarak AB'nin konuya ilişkin birlikteliğini çatlatabileceğine inanıyor, ki bunu başarmak Putin için hayati bir amaç gibi görünmekte. Bunun yanında yeni ertelemeler Kosova'da şiddet olaylarına yol açabilir ve bağımsızlığa ilişkin uluslararası desteği azaltabilir.
Selefi Yeltsin'in döneminde Batı karşısında izlenen 'itaatkâr' tavırdan nefret etmesi, Putin'in muhalefetini daha da güçlendiriyor. Batı'nın Kosova'nın statüsünü çözmekte gecikmesi Putin'in muhalefetinin ivme kazanmasına yol açtı. Aslında Batı, Rusya'nın Kosova'ya ilişkin niyetlerini hep yanlış anladı. Pek çok kişi Kremlin'in kaçınılmazı geciktirmeye çalıştığını ama son kertede Kosova'nın bağımsızlığını engellemeyeceğini öne sürüyordu. Oysa son anda bile Rusya engelleyici tavrından ödün vermediği gibi, mart ayında devlet başkanlığı seçimine gidiyor olması Batı karşıtı tutumunu muhtemelen iyice güçlendirecek.
O halde ABD ve AB üyelerinin çoğu planladıkları gibi BM onayı olmadan da bağımsız Kosova'yı gelecek aylarda tanıdığında Putin ne yapacak? Kremlin'in Kosova'ya yeniden askeri müdahalede bulunması pek muhtemel olmasa da (Priştine havaalanına 1999'da asker indirme girişimleri fiyaskoyla sonuçlanmıştı) Batı'nın duraksamasına yol açacak pek çok seçeneği mevcut.
Kremlin'in verdiği destek Sırbistan'ın Kosova'ya dair milliyetçi inadının etkili olmasını sağlıyor. Rusya, Sırbistan'a açık çek vermeyeceğini ama Belgrad hükümetinin bağımsız Kosova'yı yalıtma ve istikrarsızlaştırma çabalarını muhtemelen destekleyeceğini açıkladı.
Sırbistan Kosova'nın bölünmesine karşı koymuş olsa da bundan sonra Kosova'nın Sırp nüfuslu kuzeyinin bölgenin kalanından koparılması yönünde bir öneri getirdiği takdirde Rusya bunu destekleyecektir. Bu hamle de Sırbistan, Bosna ve Makedonya'da başka olası bölünmelere yol açabilecek şekilde Pandora'nın kutusunu açacaktır. Balkanlar'ı bir kez daha istikrarsızlaştıracak olmasına rağmen böylesi bir öneri Avrupa'da ve başka yerlerde uygun bir taviz olarak görülüp destek bulabilir.
Rusya ayrıca dünyayı sorunun tek çözümünün müzakerelerden geçtiğine ve BM dışında çözüm olamayacağına ikna etmeye yönelik diplomatik girişimlerini kesinlikle sürdürecek.
Bu tavır memnuniyetsizlik içindeki önemli etnik azınlıkları barındıranlar da dahil olmak üzere BM üyelerinin çoğundan destek görecektir.
Bunun yanında Rusya Balkanlar'ın ötesinde de harekete geçebilir; en bariz biçimde kendi ayrılıkçı bölgelerine sahip Kafkaslar'da, özellikle de Gürcistan'da. Kosova'nın bağımsızlık ilanı muhtemelen Gürcistan'ın ayrılıkçı Abhazya bölgesinde de benzer bir ilana yol açacaktır, ki bu durumda Rusya, Abhazya'yı pekâla tanır. Gürcistan bunu engellemek için askeri hamlelerde bulunursa, Rus ordusu buna güç kullanarak yanıt verir ve böylelikle kontrolden çıkabilecek bir durum oluşur.
ABD ve AB, Rusya'yla ilişkileri zedelemek istemeseler bile Rusların bu tavrı karşısında geri adım atamazlar, zira Avrupa'nın güvenliği mevzubahis. Ayrıca tüm cephelerde Rusya'yla yaşanacak çatışmayı boşa çıkarmaya çalışmaları gerekiyor.
Batı Sırbistan'a açıkça, Kosova'da şiddeti artırmaya ya da bölgeyi parçalamaya yönelik girişimlere sert yanıt vereceğini anlatmalı. Planlanan AB görevine ek olarak, fazladan NATO birliklerinin gönderilmesi Kosova'nın bağımsızlığının gözetilmesi konusunda yardımcı olur.
1244'ün amacı bağımsızlıktı
Hukukun üstünlüğüne pek itibar etmeyen Putin'in Rusyası diplomatik çabalarını uluslararası hukuka bağlılık kisvesiyle yürütüyor, özellikle de 1999'da Kosova savaşını bitiren 1244 sayılı BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararına dikkat çekiyor. Rusya'nın savlarını çürütmek ve dünyaya Kosova'da nelerin yaşandığını hatırlatmak için çok geciken diplomatik atağı başlatmak gerek.
1244 sayılı karar Sırbistan ve Rusya'nın iddia ettiğinin aksine Kosova'nın Sırp egemenliğinde kalması gerektiğini belirtmediği gibi bağımsızlığını da dışlamıyor. Özellikle son 20 yılda çatışmalarla çalkalanan Balkanlar'ın bağlamı dikkate alınarak yapılacak mantıklı bir okuma 1244 sayılı kararın ardındaki niyetin ve Kosova'nın geçtiğimiz sekiz yıl boyunca BM himayesinde tutulmasındaki amacın bağımsızlık olduğunu ortaya koyacaktır.
Abhazya vakasında Batı, Kosova'nın kendine özgü doğasını tekrar vurgulamalı ve 1999'dan beri sarf ettiği büyük çabanın altını çizmeli. Dünya açık biçimde Rusya'nın Abhazya'ya askeri müdahalesinin kabul edilemez olduğunu göstermeli, aynı zamanda Gürcistan hükümetini herhangi bir tahrike askeri yöntemlerle karşı koymaması için itidale sevk etmeli.
Rusya'nın, Kosova'nın yaklaşan bağımsızlık ilanına Batı'nın verdiği desteğe nasıl tepki göstereceği, Soğuk Savaş'tan beri ne kadar ilerlediğimizi gösteren bir sınav olacak. Kosova'nın bağımsızlık sürecini dikkatlice idare ederek ve Rusya'yla ilişkileri geliştirme yolundaki fırsatlara ihtimam göstererek, Batı buradaki çatışmanın en kötü sonuçlarını yumuşatabilir. Aksi halde yeni Soğuk Savaş biraz daha buz kesebilir. (ABD'nin eski Türkiye Büyükelçisi, The Century Vakfı'nın kıdemli üyesi, 28 Ocak 2008)

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Küreselleşen piyasalarda krizler ve Türkiye ekonomisi

Dünyada ekonomik güç dengesinde değişmeler var. Çin var, Hindistan var, en önemlisi petrol gelirleri ile güçlenen Körfez ülkeleri var. 1970'lerde petro dolarlar nasıl geridönüşüme sokulur diye konuşurduk; 30 kusur yıl sonra bunların adı 'Sovereign Wealth Funds' denilen, resmi rezerv dışı birikimler oldu
31/01/2008

SEMA KALAYCIOĞLU Dünya ekonomisi 1970'li yıllardan bu yana sürekli krizlerle yaşıyor. Bu krizlerin kimi reel, kimi finansal. Kimi finansal başlayıp reel devam eden; kimi yerel, kimi bölgesel. Ama giderek serbestleşen bir dünyada çoğu kez sınır tanımayıp, kürenin tümünü etkileyen nitelikte. 1970 ve 1980'lerin başında petrol krizini ve yarattığı durgunluğu yaşadı dünya.
1987 ve 1988'de konu, yıkıcı gücü büyük iki borsa ve kredi kriziydi.
1990'lara AB para krizi ile başladık.
12'ler 1993 krizinden alnının akı ile çıktı. 1999'da para piyasalarına ECB gibi yeni bir kaleyi de getirip oturttu. Fevkalede denetimli bir çizgiyi, liberal ekonomi çığırtkanlığıyla sürdürdü, sürdürmekte.
Meksika, Arjantin ve Brezilya da Peso krizlerinden usturupla çıktılar. Yepyeni bir enflasyonsuz dünya ile tanıştılar. Asya krizi, Çin gribinden beterdi. Patladığı ülkede çabuk söndü sönmesine de o koskoca ekonomi Japonya'yı bir 10 yıl boyunca sarstı durdu. Asya krizini, Rusya krizi izledi. Bu krizlerde çoğu zaman IMF yangın hortumuyla su getirdi. Ödeyemeyenlerin borcunu ödedi. Bedava akıl ve reçete dağıttı. 2000'li yılların ikinci yarısında, Japonya tamamen krizden çıktı mı, çıkacak mı? Önce durgunluğun pençesine kim düşecek derken bakın 2008'le birlikte neler oldu!
En büyük ekonomi
Bütün bu yıllarda dünyanın en büyük ekonomisi ABD ne yaptı? 1971'de dünyanın yükünü omzundan silkeleyip attıktan sonra, petrol krizleri, 1980'li yılların sonunda borsa krizi, 1990'lı yılların ilk yarısında ise bütçe krizi ile yüzleşti. 1990'lı yılları Clinton ve kurmaylarının yarattığı güvenli ortamda, Greenspan gibi usta bir para kaptanı sayesinde başarıyla aştı ama önce hedge fonları denilen ucubelerin sonra da dot com denilen yeni zaman işlerinin arasında epey debelendi.
Kâbus gibi kulelere çarpan uçaklar ile yaşanan 11 Eylül yetmiyormuş gibi, yolsuzluk skandalları devin gövdesindeki devleri sarstı. Enron krizi ile ipliği pazara çıkan ABD, Irak ile dünyaya ateş ve kan kusturdu. Savaş ile işsizine iş ve kötü bir uğraş buldu. Uzun yıllar onca zenginliğine, onca savurgan tüketimine rağmen unuttuğu evsizine ev bulmak için yaptığı işler de ayağına dolandı ve işte bunun adı sub-prime morgage krizi. Beklenen misafir durgunluk ve enflasyon tehlikesi, ABD nin kapısında. Artık bu yeni bir kriz mi, değil mi?
Geçici mi kalıcı mı onunla uğraşıyoruz.
Evet geçtiğimiz hafta başında dünya borsalarında yaşanan bir panikti. Ancak 1987'deki 'Kara Pazartesi' değildi. Bence çalkalandıkça daha fazla yerine oturuyor küresel ekonomi. ABD kesenin ağzını açtı ki ekonomi siesta'ya çekilmesin. Bu arada birileri hisseleri borsalara boşalttı. Ama alan oldu ki satıldı hisseler. Sadece kotasyonlar aşağıya indi, çıktı, iniyor, çıkıyor. Bir yerde başlayan güven kırılması, hemen başka yerlere sirayet ediyor. Piyasalar tetiklenen faylar gibi. Hareketliliğin merkez üssü bu defa Türkiye ve Akdeniz'in doğusunu içine alan tektonik bölgenin dışında kaldı. Ama dalgaların boyu buralara erişecek kadar uzun.
Bana kalırsa bu iş kısa bir süre daha devam edecek. Piyasalar Nisan-Mayıs ayı gibi tamamen kendine gelebilir. Eğer, Societe General gibi birkaç yolsuzluk ve birkaç siyasi olay daha patlamazsa, kriz yaz aylarında tamamen tatile çıkabilir. Ama bu fon yönetimi vs. gibi işlerde bal tutan parmak yaladığı, hedge fonları ise hiçbir kayıta sığmadığı için, birileri, bazı kurumlar, hatta bazı ülkeler, bu toz dumandan kârlı, bazıları ise zararlı çıkacak. Eminim yine en güçlü en kârlı çıkacak. Ancak, dünyada ekonomik güç dengesinde değişmeler var. Çin var, Hindistan var, en önemlisi bir kez daha petrol gelirleri ile güçlenen Körfez ülkeleri var. 1970'li yıllarda, petro dolarların nasıl geridönüşüme sokulması mümkün olur diye konuşurduk. 30 küsur yıl sonra bunların adı 'Sovereign Wealth Funds' denilen, resmi rezerv dışı birikimler oldu. Demek ki bir kez daha petrol gelirlerinin geridönüşümü düzeltici mekanizmayı harekete geçirebilir. Bu arada Davos zirvesinin sarsıntılarla eşanlılaşması çok iyi oldu. Zirvenin katılımcıları, sorunları birlikte değerlendirdi. Küresel sıkıntılar çok daha çabuk yayıldığı için, ülkeler işbirliği yapmaya daha fazla gönüllü. En azından birbirlerinin önünü kesmeyecekler ve kriz yönetimini birlikte gözetecekler. Üstelik artık yeni sanayileşen ülkeler de bu işbirliği ve gözetimde aktif taraf.
Türkiye, ister dış, ister iç kaynaklı olsun 30 yılı aşkın bir zamandır boğuşa boğuşa krizlerle yaşamayı ve onların altından kalkmayı, Türk ekonomi bürokrasisi kriz yönetimini öğrendi. İhtiyatlı politikaları içeren ve toplumsal uzlaşmayı ihmal etmeyen şok kararlardan fayda gördük. İşbirliğinin ve sorgulamayı ihmal etmediğimiz reçeteleri disiplinle uygulamanın önemini gördük. Türkiye, son 25 yılda, küresel ekonominin bir parçası oldu. Onun için küresel piyasalarda olandan bitenden elbette etkilenecektir. Ancak bu etkilenmeyi en aza indirmek, hatta kârlı çıkmak söz konusu olabilir. İstikrarlı piyasalar, sermaye kaçışlarını doğal olarak önler, hatta başka yerlerden kaçan sermayenin sığınacak limanı olur.
O halde istikrarı bozmayalım. Özellikte Körfez'in petrol kaynaklı fonları, bizim piyasaya akarsa elbette ekonomik olarak kazanırız. Ama o akılcı bir sermaye; bizden istediği, laik düzeni, 85 yılın kazanımlarını, teslim almak değil. Bizden istenmeyeni vermek gibi bir çaba içine girmeyelim. Kaldı ki istenen eğer bu ise, onu da biz vermeyelim. Yapmamız gereken en önemli şey, para otoritesini, politikaları ile baş başa ve alışık olduğu Ankara'da rahat bırakmak ve toplumu germemek. Gerilen ortamlarda güven kalmazsa bundan toplum olarak zararlı çıkarız.

Prof. Dr. Sema Kalaycıoğlu: Işık Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi

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'Türkiye ikinci dünyanın öncü gücü'

Yeni Amerika Vakfı araştırmacısı Khanna, dünyanın 2016 falına baktı: ABD ancak AB ve Çin'le işbirliği yaparsa süpergüç kalacak. Üç büyüklerden hangisinin öne çıkacağını Türkiye de dahil 'ikinci dünya ülkeleri' belirleyecek. Türkiye şimdiden Avrupa süpergücünün parçası. Kürt devleti kurulacak
29/01/2008
AA - ANKARA - New York Times gazetesinin hafta sonu dergisi, 2016 için dünya tahmini yayımladı. Buna göre '2016'da eski gücünü kaybedecek ABD, ancak AB ve Çin ile birlikte süper güç olmaya devam edecek. Türkiye Avrupa süper gücünün bir parçası haline geliyor. Bağımsız Kürt devleti kurulacak. Irak'tan çekilecek ABD, Kürt devletinde 20 bin asker bulunduracak.' Yeni Amerika Vakfı'nın Amerikan Strateji Programı'nda üst düzey araştırmacı Parag Khanna'nın, martta piyasaya çıkacak 'İkinci Dünya: Yeni Küresel Düzende İmparatorluklar ve Etki' adlı kitabından derlenen 'Hegemonyaya Elveda' başlıklı tahmininde, ikinci dünya ülkeleri, 'ne küresel ekonominin birinci merkez bölgesinde ne de çevredeki üçüncü dünyada, büyük üçlünün etrafında ya da arasında, gelecek kuşakta hangi süper gücün üstün olduğunu belirleyecek arada salınan ülkeler' diye niteliyor. Türkiye bölümü şöyle:
'Saldırgan yeni Osmanlı gururu'
'Türkiye'nin durumu, ikinci dünya ülkeleri açısından örnek. Türkiye, saldırgan bir yeni-Osmanlıcılık içeren gurura sahip. Bu bazı AB standartlarıyla gerginlik yaratsa da, sonuçta Avrupa'nın Suriye, Irak ve İran'da istikrar sağlamasına hizmet etme imkânı sunuyor. İstanbul'a bir kere bakmak, Türkiye'nin AB üyesi olamasa da, daha fazla Avrupalı olduğunu anlamaya yetiyor. Yabancı ülkelerde yaşayan Türklerin yılda yolladığı 1 milyar dolar, kalkınmayı ülkenin doğusuna yayıyor. Türkiye'nin, Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nın da üye olmasıyla AB'ye Yunanistan sınırı dışında daha geniş bir sınırla bağlanması, nasıl Avrupa süper gücünün bir parçası haline geldiğini gösteriyor.'
AB'nin üye sayısını 30'a çıkarıp Kuzey Afrika, Rusya ve Hazar Denizi'nden petrol ve doğalgaz alacağını, nükleer enerji tedarik edeceğini öngören makalenin Ortadoğu tahminleri şöyle: 'ABD Irak'tan çekilecek, ancak 20 bin askerini bağımsız Kürt devletinde konuşlandıracak. Bahreyn açıklarında savaş gemisi, Katar'da da hava gücü bulunduracak. Afganistan'da istikrar sağlanacak. İran, nükleer güç sahibi ülkelere katılacak.'
"Dünyadaki güç dengesi Bush'un iki başkanlık döneminde kökten değişti. Hem
onun politikaları nedeniyle hem de daha da önemlisi bu politikalara rağmen" diyen Khanna, dünyada etkisini yitirmemek için çabalaması gereken ABD'nin AB ile Çin'in büyümesini engelleyemeyeceğini, güç dağılımında farklılığı önlemek için BM ile tam işbirliği, ortak güvenlik ve huzurun sağlanmasında liderlik yapması gerektiğini kaydetti. ABD'nin tek kutupluluğunun Washington'un hegemonyasına karşı diplomatik-finansal karşı hareketleri ve yeni dünya düzenini canlandırdığı, ABD başkan aday
adayları Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama veya John McCain'in bu büyümeye karşı koyma şanslarının çok az olduğunu belirtti.
Khanna'nın Rusya, Hindistan ve savaşlarla boğuşan İslam ülkelerinin büyüme sürecinde geride kalacağı tahmini de öne çıkıyor. Çin'in Tayvan'ı topraklarına katarak Büyük Okyanus kıyılarından Pakistan'ın Gvadar limanına kadar deniz hâkimiyetini artıracağı da öngörüldü.
'Latinlerin lideri Brezilya'
Güney Amerika'da Venezüella lideri Hugo Chavez'in ABD'ye meydan okuması ideolojik, ikinci dünyanın meydan okumasının yapısal olduğu kaydedilerek, "Chavez hâlâ iktidarda, ama Güney Amerika'nın doğal lideri Brezilya görünüyor" denildi.
Khanna şu analizi yaptı: "Küreselleşme ağının üç örümceği var. Amerika'yı benzersiz yapan şey liberal demokratik idealleri değil, aksine coğrafi konumu. Çin ve Avrupa Avrasya karasının iki ucundayken, Amerika tecrit bir yerdedir. ABD dünyanın bir köşesinden bütün dünyayı yönetmeyi becerdi. Ama şimdi AB ve Türkiye'nin uzak durduğu ABD'nin Avrasya'daki varlığının temelleri zayıf, Ortadoğu'nun büyük kısmında varlığı istenmiyor ve Doğu Asya'nın güvenini büyük ölçüde kaybetmiş durumda. 'Tesadüfi imparatorluk' olsun olmasın, ABD bu durumu hızla kabul edip bu gerçekliğe uyum sağlamak zorunda. ABD imparatorluğunu devam ettirmek hem kan hem de maliyet olarak daha da pahalı hale gelir ve buna değmez. Ayrıca, tarih bu çabanın başarısızlığa uğrayacağını gösteriyor. Nitekim oldu da. Ne Çin ne de AB, dünyanın tek lideri olarak ABD'nin yerini alamaz. Dünyanın büyük sorunlarıysa ABD, Çin ve AB'den oluşan üç büyükler arasında çözülecek."ABD başkanlarına "Siz başkansınız, imparator değil" tavsiyesi veren Khanna, AB ve Çin'le uzlaşma gerektiren sorunları 'iklim değişikliği, enerji güvenliği, silahların yayılması ve isyancı devletler' olarak sıralıyor.

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Russia may dump weakening U.S. dollar in its energy deals
13.12.2007
Source: Pravda.Ru
URL: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/102797-dollar-0
It seems that the rejection of the U.S. dollar has become a fashion trend in modern-day business relations. Several major oil and gas exporters have recently announced their plans to use a different currency in their deals with other countries. The heads of Iran, Venezuela and Ecuador expressed such an opinion at the OPEC summit in November. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad particularly stated that Iran needs to replace the dollar because of its ongoing setback. His Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez, expanded on the idea and put forward a suggestion to change the dollar for the basket of currencies (apart from the dollar it includes the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the Chinese yuan and the Venezuelan bolivar) to recalculated world prices on oil. Ahmadinejad continued with an idea to set up the OPEC Oil Exchange and the OPEC Bank.
Rafael Correa, the president of Ecuador, supported the proposal and noted that the dollar fall eats up a considerable part of oil exporters’ income: “In spite of the fact that oil prices have reached the level of about $100 per barrel, in fact they are lower than in the 1980s,” Correa said. However, these ideas received no support from OPEC. The dollar peg issue was put off till the next OPEC summit.
Officials of Russia’s natural gas giant, Gazprom, voiced an idea to use rubles in gas trade. “We consider the idea of selling our resources for rubles to be quite possible,” Gazprom’s Vice President Alexander Medvedev said at a recent conference in New York.
Meanwhile, Iran has already renounced the dollar. “Our country has completely ceased to export liquid hydrocarbons for the U.S. currency. Taking into consideration the dollar setback and the damage that it causes to oil exporters, we can not trust this currency any more,” said IRI Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari on December 8.
Experts say that it is not the first time when the issue of the dollar peg comes into fashion on the world’s market of energy. These transition-to-another-currency talks are quite usual in oil trade when the dollar loses its value considerably. The situation was the same in the late 1970s, in the second half of the 1980s and from 1993 to 1995.
However, nothing has changed in the oil industry since then. This fact is quite understandable: the U.S. dollar will stay on its place as long as Texan Light Sweet along with English Brent set oil quality standards, and New York together with London host major oil auctions. Furthermore, the national currency of Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest oil exporter, is pegged to the dollar. Alternative oil exchanges, where other currencies would be used, could change the situation. But the USA and their allies strictly control this issue. Saddam Hussein tried to organize such an oil exchange, but it was just on the eve of the U.S. intrusion.
As for Iran, its dollar-rejecting policy looks more like farce. The USA triggered the sanction system to isolate Teheran economically and financially. Many European partners (including major banks) cease their relations with Iran under the influence of Washington. Big dollar deals are under the strict control. Thus, Teheran’s transition to other currencies in the oil industry looks more like a defensive rather than offensive initiative.
As for Gazprom, its intention to sell gas for rubles is based on different motives. Unlike oil, natural gas is a resource of regional, but not global character. Its prices are established in the range of a certain distribution network. Payments are made in any currency available in the range of a regional market. Thus, the transition to rubles in Russian-European gas sales is possible in theory, though it would be much more logical to sell gas to Europe for euros.
On the other hand, Russia’s use of rubles in international deals would create a demand on the national currency abroad and that, in its turn, would have two favourable consequences. First, the inflation pressure would decrease. Secondly, ruble could become a freely convertible currency (officially it already is, but there is no demand on it abroad).
Anyway, gas rubles exist only in theory for the time being. All long-term Gazprom contracts should be revised to realize this idea, since they do not stipulate payment in rubles. It is a big issue whether Russia’s European partners would agree to such terms. In any case, it would have no effect on the dollar. Nowadays, Gazprom’s long-term export contracts are evaluated in dollars (55 percent) and euros (45 percent), so the leading world currencies would suffer from the ruble attack equally.

Does a U.S. recession mean lower oil prices? Not necessarily
By Jad Mouawad
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
NEW YORK: As fears of a U.S. recession ripple across the globe this week, analysts and energy experts are wondering whether the great oil boom of the past five years is finally coming to an end - or whether it is merely taking a break.
While an economic slowdown might lead to lower oil demand, as consumers scale back their gasoline consumption and businesses cut down on air travel, economists say this might not necessarily lead to much lower energy prices.
Oil supplies are tight, geopolitical tensions remain high, and oil companies still need higher prices to bring badly needed and more costly oil to the market.
After briefly touching $100-a-barrel twice this year, oil prices have shed over 12 percent in a few days. Crude oil for March delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange was down $2.44, or 2.7 percent, at $86.77 a barrel in late trading Wednesday.
Despite the ominous clouds hanging over the economy, and the recent stock market losses, energy analysts say they believe oil prices will average $80 a barrel this year, $8 a barrel higher than last year's average - and nearly double that of 2004. Even as the economic growth slows, the world might still find itself confronted with high energy costs, a situation that bears uncomfortable parallels to the mid-1970s or the early 1990s.
The prospect of an oil-price collapse, like the one that followed the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, is a remote one in the minds of energy investors who bet on historically high prices. The crude oil futures contract for delivery in two years currently trades at around $83 a barrel.
"The rally of the past few years seems like it is coming to an end," said Antoine Halff, the head of commodities research at Newedge, a brokerage firm. "But does it mean we're reverting to the lows we had previously, I don't think so. There are other factors that are providing a floor to prices."
Oil production is constrained by shortages in materials and labor, cost increases and widespread delays. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions in Iraq, Iran, and Nigeria, and tougher political stances by Russia and Venezuela, have hampered production growth from some of the world's most promising suppliers.
"I don't think we will have a day of reckoning for oil prices because I don't think we have a bubble," Halff said. "This is more like an easing of the upward trend."
For analysts at Barclays Capital in London, "The ongoing deterioration in the economic environment is taking its toll on prices, but with constraints on the supply-side giving no sign of easing, the scope for downside is limited in our view."
The concern now among economists and policy makers is that high energy prices could weigh more heavily now that economies are confronted with the prospect of lower growth. On a visit to Cairo on Wednesday, Samuel Bodman, the U.S. energy secretary, told reporters that high prices were starting to affect the American economy.
"The economy has been able to withstand it until now," Bodman said. "I believe the $100 price of oil is starting to have an impact."
Energy analysts point to a series of factors that have pushed up prices in recent years: commercial oil inventories in industrial countries are lower than their five-year averages; new production growth from non-OPEC producers is weak; and slower economic growth means that members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries have little incentive to increase production.
For the moment, the apparent slowdown has yet to translate into softer oil demand. In China, for example, Barclays analysts noted that refineries were increasing diesel imports to address severe supply shortages. Diesel imports in December amounted to nearly half the level recorded for the whole of 2007, Barclays said.
Global demand for oil is still projected to increase this year by about 1.5 million barrels a day, according to most analysts. In 2007, demand for oil jumped by one million barrels a day, mostly because of growth in Asia and the Middle East.
But some experts warn that lower economic growth will drive down demand, and therefore prices. Lawrence Goldstein, an economist at the Energy Policy Research Foundation, said that from 2005 to 2007, higher prices had driven down oil demand in the United States, Europe and Japan by 700,000 barrels a day.
As marginal demand weakens, Goldstein said, the tensions on the global energy system that contributed to the market's volatility will likely slacken as well.
"The three pressure points of the market - the lack of crude oil, the lack of spare refining capacity and the lack of product inventories - are all going to be improving this year," Goldstein said. "The problem is what is going to be the real demand growth this year. No one knows for sure, but it clearly will be south of one million barrels a day."
Adam Robinson, an energy analyst at Lehman Brothers, said the declines in oil prices in recent days came as investors gave up on the idea that the world could somehow be immune to a slowdown in the United States.
"You could see prices go down now that this view no longer being subscribed to," Robinson said. According to Lehman's "base case" outlook, oil prices are expected to average $84 a barrel this year. In the investment bank's downside case, oil could fall as low as $65 a barrel this year, the lowest level needed to bring about new investments in oil supplies, Robinson said.
New oil supplies, which have lagged behind demand growth in recent years, are expected to grow by as much as 2.5 million barrels a day, mostly because of investments by OPEC members, and partly because of increases in Russia. While these increases could help rebuild a cushion of spare capacity that has been lacking recently, energy analysts still forecast a tight energy system.
"The market is still fundamentally well supported," Robinson said. "You do have some significant new capacity coming over the next few years. But once Saudi Arabia increases capacity, who then steps up to the plate? Iraq, Venezuela, Russia, Iran, Nigeria? The political situation has to improve significantly in at least one of them. For the moment, no one wants to bet on the politics in these places."

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/business/oil.php

Turkey And The Middle East: An Updated Assessment

Barry Rubin January 20, 2008

In a sense, no country has tried harder to get out ofthe Middle East than Turkey--by way of achievingmembership in the European Union--yet Turkey does havean important role to play in the region. At the sametime, though, this situation is complicated bydivergences over Turkey's identity, interests, andinternal politics. Turkish interests and perceptionsTurkey is still very much the product of theremarkable reforms launched by Kemal Ataturk in the1920s. He sought a Western-oriented, secular,modernizing state which avoided foreign adventures orterritorial claims. The Turkey he sought was oneunited around Turkish peoplehood, a unitary and highlycentralized state.While some of Ataturk's legacy is very much underchallenge today, Turks cannot for one moment forgetthe impact of his policies. In addition, even when thecountry is diverging from Ataturk's vision, thesedevelopments are often the result of the relativesuccess of the system he established.For example, Turkey's relative stability and economicdevelopment, following the liberalizing economicreforms of the 1970s and 1980s, raised up a new middleclass in central Anatolia which was more religious andtraditional- minded. Then, too, the role of the armyas the ultimate protector of the republic was acreation of Ataturk which has frequently acted as aninsurance policy against the failure of electoralpolitics.From the late 1940s into the 1990s, Turkey's strategicpriorities were fairly consistent. Seeing the primarythreat as emanating from the USSR and Soviet bloc,Turkey emphasized its alliance with the West(symbolized by its NATO membership) and especiallywith the United States. It was thus opposed to radicalArab regimes which were allied with Moscow.The other key aspect of Turkish policy was theconflict with Greece over the Aegean Sea borders,Cyprus, and other issues. Since both countries werepart of the Western alliance, however, this frictionwas usually restrained.With the Cold War's end in the 1990s, however, Turkishleaders were very much aware that they needed to finda new orientation. The Soviet Union and its blocdisappeared, removing the threat from the north.Instead, ethnically Turkish states emerged with whichTurkey could have good relations. But Turks also knewthey had to figure out how to reconfigure theiralliance with the West in a situation where Turkeymight be considered less of an asset.The earlier part of this process involved the virtualend of the conflict with Greece. There was also animportant Middle Eastern component. The new threat wasdefined as emanating from radical neighbors like Iran,Iraq, and Syria.While already underway, the rapprochement with Israelwas also intensified by this rethinking. Bothcountries were non-Arab, Western-oriented democracieswhich had the same enemies in the region.This approach also coincided with the Kurdishquestion. The radical PKK, which was carrying on abloody terrorist war against Turkey, was a client ofSyria. Turkey, too, had to be very much concerned withthe internal situation in Iraq, with its Kurdishmajority in the north. Equally, Iran's support forIslamism, a threat to Turkey's secularist republic,made it seem almost as much an enemy in Ankara as itwas perceived as being in Jerusalem.The armed forces, which respected Israel's militaryachievements as well as seeking to buy itstechnological know-how, were a particularly avidadvocate for the alliance. Yet there were alsoimpressive economic factors. For Turkey, Israel was avery good market and trade between the two countriessoared. A telling symbol is the resemblance betweenIsrael's new international airport with itscounterpart in Istanbul--both were built by the sameTurkish company.The Coming of the Ak RegimeWith the formation of a government by the Justice andDevelopment (widely known by the first two letters ofits Turkish name, as the Ak) party in 2002, Turkeyentered a new era. A key, and unanswerable, questionhere is whether this is a short-term change or afundamental shift in the country's direction.The Ak party emerged out of the frustration andrethinking by younger members in the country'straditionally radical Islamist party. Out of a blendbetween sincerity and pragmatic calculation, theconclusion was reached that any such group could onlyhave an appeal if it moved toward the center and shedits more explicitly Islamist intentions.Thus, the new party's leaders identified the Ak as acenter-to-right, conservative, traditional valuesgrouping that strongly favored EU membership. In the2002 election, it won 34 percent of the vote and, dueto the vagaries of Turkish election law, gainedtwo-thirds of the seats in parliament. The party'sreign has been deemed so successful that it raisedthat figure to 48 percent in the 2007 elections.The success of the party was not due exclusively- -oreven largely--to its Islamist orientation. Two otherkey factors included the demonstrable incompetence andfragmentation of the opposition, the country'seconomic slump and the Ak government's success inovercoming it. Also worth mentioning is that the partyappealed to Kurds, offering them a solution throughcommon Muslim identity rather than Kurdishnationalism.A deeper current was the long rivalry between centerand periphery that has characterized Turkish societyand politics. The more Westernized and modernized westof the country had dominated the Anatolian heartland,just as the centralized government bureaucracy ranroughshod over the private sector. With thedevelopment and growing wealth of the interior, plusmassive immigration to cities, the Ak represented achallenge to the old order.And once the Ak proved that it was not being run bywild-eyed Islamists, a growing respect for the partybecame fashionable even in highly secular andWesternized circles.How should one assess the Ak? It cannot be put eitherinto an Islamist or a moderate box. Both elements arepresent. There are many elements in the party,including the current president, Abdullah Gul, whichwould like to see an Islamist Turkey. There areothers, probably including Prime Minister Recep TayyipErdogan, who seem sincere about following a morecentrist path. An additional element, however, is thelong-term effect of the Ak regime in moving Turkey inan Islamist direction. How long the party will be inpower is going to be a critical factor here.The Effect on Turkish Foreign PolicyThis domestic upheaval had less effect on Turkishforeign policy than one might have expected. Ofcritical importance is the fact that the newleadership very much wanted to prove that it was notextremist. Thus, the party was very avid on strivingfor EU membership. This was popular with its importantconstituency among newly rising manufacturers, who sawmembership as being in their personal interest. Inaddition, many of the reforms pressed for by the EU,notably those weakening the power of the army andstatist bureaucracy, were also welcomed by the Ak.Relations with Israel were also relatively insulated.For one thing, the army wanted them to continue on awarm level, and letting this happen was a relativelycheap way to avoid friction with the military and useas proof that the Ak was not an Islamist party, not tomention the trade benefits. There is tremendoushostility toward Israel in the Ak regime, stokedfurther by a harshly anti-Israel media, but thepolicymakers follow their interests, not theirpreferences.More change, however, happened regarding Turkey'srelations with other Middle Eastern countries and theUnited States, though some of this was due todevelopments in the region. After Turkey successfullyintimidated Syria away from supporting the PKK,relations with Damascus eased considerably. OnceSaddam Hussein was overthrown, Iraq was no longer athreat in the same way. The mutual Islamic/Islamistorientation between Turkey and Iran also brought themtogether.With the United States, relations underwent a seriouscrisis. The background of this was the Islamicorientation of the Ak government and its 180-degreeturnaround regarding attitude toward Middle Easternradical movements and states. But the foreground wasthe Iraq issue.Not everything was preordained. Turkey did come closeto supporting the offensive against Saddam Hussein in2003. But nationalist, Islamic, and anti-Americanfactors came together ultimately to escalate hostilitytoward Washington. Specifically, Turkey feltthreatened by the relative anarchy in Iraq coupledwith the rise of Kurdish power there. The old fear ofa Kurdish state across the border underminingsoutheastern Turkey's ethnic Kurdish population is amajor strategic and psychological factor in Turkey.The fact that the U.S. presence did not crack downenough on the PKK presence in northern Iraq was aspecial irritant.The United States has been restrained in its treatmentof Turkey and the Ak government, so much so as to drawcomplaints from the opposition and even claims thatWashington wants the Ak in power. Tensions have easedof late. Still, it should be a matter of concern thatTurkey's current rulers feel more comfortable withIran than the United States.Turkey and Middle East DiplomacyWhile Turkey can play a constructive role in theregion, one myth should be put to rest. Turkey is not,in any meaningful way, a model for Arabic-speakingcountries. For historical, nationalistic, and otherreasons, Arabs do not look to Turkey. This was truefor the Ataturk system and it is equally so for the"moderate Muslim" regime of the present.As a state and regional power, however, Turkey can behelpful. This aspect was symbolized in November 2007when Israeli President Shimon Peres and PalestinianAuthority leader Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Turkishparliament. The duo also signed an agreement withTurkey for two industrial zones in the West Bank.Turkey wants to play a part on Arab-Israelipeacemaking for several reasons. One of them isprestige and showing the value of good relations withTurkey; another is to burnish the Ak's moderatecredentials. The idea that more stability in theregion is good for Turkey, along with strongsympathies for the Palestinians, are additionalfactors pushing in this direction.Yet there are also limits to what can be accomplished.Turkey's regime does not want to go so far as toantagonize its new friends, Syria and Iran. And the Akparty's Palestinian sympathies run as much or more toHamas than to the forces of Abbas. In terms ofproviding a channel for secret communications, anassistor of economic development, and a peacesupporter to balance the rejectionists in the Arabworld, however, Turkey has some real value.An indirect advantage of a Turkish role is tostrengthen Europe-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey links. Whilethe Ak regime should be treated with caution, it isalso important to keep it from going too far in thedirection of the region's radical forces. It is betterto have Turkey's government in the middle--taking someresponsibility for easing the conflict; needing tomaintain good relations with Israel--than for it to becheering on Tehran, Damascus, Hizballah, and Hamas whowant to sabotage any progress.An even more complex, but in some ways even moreurgent, diplomatic role for Turkey is toward Iraq. Incontrast to Iraq's other neighbors, who seek solutionsantipathetic to Western interests, Turkey does want astable, moderate Iraq. Its specific demands are thatthere be no independent Kurdish state, thatanti-Turkish terrorists are not allowed to operate innorthern Iraq, and that the ethnic Turkish populationthere be treated fairly. These are demands that couldbe met.The relative stability of northern Iraq, compared tothe violent disorder in the rest of the country, hasdepended on Turkish cooperation, especiallyfacilitating cross-border commerce. Turkey's role inIraq can either be a tremendous problem or anindispensable asset depending on how it is handled.And this is the dual bottom line of Turkey's MiddleEast role. It should be used to move forward apositive agenda in dealing with regional issues. And,at the same time, dong so could help ensure thatTurkey itself remain more moderate and oriented towardthe West as is possible under its current government. Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research inInternational Affairs (GLORIA) Center,Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book,The Truth about Syria was published byPalgrave-Macmillan in May 2007. Prof. Rubin's columnscan be read online at: http://www.gloriace nter.org/index.asp? pname=submenus/ articles/ index.asp. The Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA)CenterInterdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya P.O. Box 167 Herzliya, 46150 IsraelEmail: info@gloriacenter. org Phone: +972-9-960-2736Fax: +972-9-956-8605To unsubscribe click here © 2008 All rights reserved

Turkey's Justice and Development Party: A Model for Democratic Islam?

by Thomas Patrick Carroll

In November 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP) captured a majority of parliamentary seats in Turkey's national elections - a political feat that had not been achieved by any party in fifteen years. With a genealogy that clearly places it in the tradition of Turkey's Islamist political trend, the rise of the AKP was at first greeted with trepidation by the country's Kemalist military and political elite.[1]
The AKP's victory also caused concern in the capitals of many of Turkey's Western allies. When Erdogan's political godfather, Necmettin Erbakan, unexpectedly won the premiership in the mid-1990s, he promptly made official state visits to Libya and Iran, then proceeded to lobby vigorously for the establishment of a new Muslim economic bloc. Erbakan soon alienated the military and was ousted. Since then, conventional wisdom in the West held that an Islamist government would either "succeed" by staying in power and eroding the country's secular political tradition and pro-Western foreign policy, or fail and prompt the military to intervene - either of which would be a setback for Turkish democracy.
However, much to the surprise of its critics, Erdogan's administration has pushed harder (and more successfully) for liberal and democratic reforms than any previous Turkish government. Moreover, it has strengthened Turkey's relations with both Europe and the United States.
The rise of the AKP and its performance in governing Turkey is an encouraging story. Under some circumstances, at least, religious political movements in the Muslim world can take the lead in introducing greater social, political, and economic freedom to their societies. And in Turkey's case, the evolution of a modernizing Islamist political force was facilitated by external pressures for reform. If Western governments hope to see this evolution take place across the Middle East, they would do well to study closely what is happening in Ankara.
Turkish 'Secularism'
It was long believed that the secret of Turkey's democratic success over the past half century lay in its forcible exclusion of Islam from political life. After the founding of the Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk insisted that Turkey's future security and prosperity required that "backward" Ottoman customs and institutions be shed in favor of modern, European ones. Sharia (Islamic law) was effectively repealed and replaced with nonreligious civil and criminal codes.
At the political level, Kemalism was enshrined in the principal of laiklik. This term is often translated into English as 'laicism' or, more commonly, 'secularism,' which implies the separation of religion and state into two distinct and autonomous realms. But laiklik, as practiced in Turkey, is not so much the separation of religion and the state, as it is the subordination of religion to the state. As one prominent expert notes,
This is a crucial difference in the Turkish context. The state controls the education of religious professionals and their assignment to mosques and approves the content of their sermons. It also controls religious schools and the content of religious education and enforces laws about the wearing of religious symbols and clothing in public spaces and institutions.[2]
With the military firmly entrenched as guardian of laiklik, Turkey's democratic era began in 1950, when the ruling party lost a general election and yielded power to the opposition - a process that has repeated itself again and again in the last half century. Although there have been three military coups in the last half century, as historian Bernard Lewis notes, "what is remarkable is not that these interventions took place" but that each time "the military withdrew to its barracks, and allowed, even facilitated, the resumption of the democratic process."[3]
The Persistence of Islam
Although Turkey's achieved considerable social and economic progress in the twentieth century, strong Islamic beliefs, customs, and social structures persisted among the bulk of the Turkish populace. Notwithstanding official laiklik, Islam was allowed limited political expression. It started in 1950, when the Democrat Party defeated the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP) in national elections and and its leader, Adnan Menderes, became prime minister.
Menderes adopted a more tolerant stance toward Islam, which worried his Kemalist opponents, who feared the prime minister was endangering Ataturk's legacy. Moreover, Menderes adopted policies that led to economic stagnation and, toward the end of his tenure, took repressive measures against his critics and political opponents. A military coup (Turkey's first) in May 1960 removed Menderes (who was later hanged) and dissolved the Democrat Party.
The next serious Islamic venture into party politics came in 1970, when Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, or MNP). The MNP advocated the restoration of conservative morals and the reduction of economic ties with Western countries, while championing small businesses, local merchants, independent craftsmen, and traditional economic interests.
The MNP was banned after the 1971 military coup (Turkey's second), with the generals accusing it of mixing politics and religion. However, it was reincarnated in 1973 as the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, or MSP), again headed by Erbakan and offering much the same platform. For a time, the Kemalists encouraged Erbakan's movement as a counterweight to the radical left - National Salvation even joined three coalition governments in the 1970s. But by the end of the decade Turkish society was verging on anarchy and another military coup was inevitable. In September 1980, the generals stepped in, declaring martial law and banning all of Turkey's political parties, including National Salvation.
After the coup, the generals supervised the writing of a new constitution, considerably less liberal than its predecessor. Not surprisingly, it included explicit restrictions on religion. Article 24, for example, stated that "no one shall be allowed to exploit religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of personal or political influence."
On the other hand, the generals also recognized that religion was a stabilizing social force and barrier to Communist influence. In an effort to avoid a replay of the massive violence and civil disorder that plagued Turkey in the late 1970s, the junta introduced mandatory religious studies in the public school system. If young people had a foundation of religious values, the generals reasoned, perhaps they wouldn't gravitate into political radicalism that had so shredded the social fabric in the previous decade. The time was ripe for a rethinking of the place of Islam in public life.
The first stirrings came with the rise of Turgut Ozal, leader of the conservative Motherland Party (ANAP) and Turkey's first prime minister after the 1980 coup. Both Turgut and his brother, Korkut, were struck by the American model of church/state separation, in which religion is free of government control. Korkut lived for a time in Utah and was especially impressed with the Mormons. He saw them as modern, wealthy, and successful, while at the same time drawing strength and social cohesion from their strong religious faith. In an interesting tribute to his Mormon inspiration, Ozal chose the beehive (a prominent fixture in the Utah state flag) as the symbol for his Motherland Party.
Meanwhile, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) as a successor to the banned National Salvation. Its political impact was initially modest. Welfare was disqualified by the junta from participating in the 1983 parliamentary elections. Four years later, it received only 7% of the vote in parliamentary elections, short of the 10% threshold required to win seats.
However, Welfare's emphasis on economic fairness, social justice, small business, and a public ethic of common provision began to attract more support as the public grew weary of government incompetence, graft, and political deadlock. Its attempt to bring humane religious traditions to bear on contemporary economic and social problems was not unlike the Christian Socialist Movement in Great Britain, or the 'distributivist' economic philosophy of Catholics like G.K. Chesterton. During the early 1990s, the party became the breeding ground for a new generation of competent and pragmatic activists and began to make inroads into territory traditionally held by the Turkish left, such as the urban lower class. Moreover, Welfare's emphasis on the people's common religious beliefs (rather than nationalism) appealed to Kurds who had grown disillusioned with the radical separatists.
In 1991, Welfare captured 17% of the national vote and sixty-two parliamentary seats. In the 1994 local elections, Welfare candidates for mayor won in 28 out of 76 provincial capitals, including Istanbul and Ankara, with 19% of the popular vote. In the 1995 general elections, Welfare won 158 out of 500 parliamentary seats, giving it a plurality. Erbakan then became prime minister in a coalition government.
However, Erbakan's tenure was short-lived. His efforts to establish warmer relations with Iran, Libya and Iraq; open encouragement of women to wear veils, and opposition to Turkish membership in the EU steadily alienated secular political elites and his coalition government crumbled in June 1997. The following year, Turkey's Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party. Although Erbakan quickly organized its reincarnation as the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), his political star had fallen. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Virtue placed third behind the Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Bulent Ecevit and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) of Devlet Bahceli.
When the Virtue Party was banned in 2001, Erbakan formed yet another reincarnation, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), but this time the aging politician faced a revolt against his leadership by a modernist faction of younger Islamist activists, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. This "new guard" had long pushed for a more democratic, decentralized, and transparent party structure, but encountered stiff opposition from Erbakan and his cohorts. They also objected to Erbakan's anti-Western policies. While the old guard talked about international Muslim solidarity, Erdogan and his allies were enthusiastic about accelerating Turkey's economic integration with the West. Following Erbakan's political humiliation, the reformers broke away and formed the AKP.
Something New Under the Sun
Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to national prominence in 1994 when he won the race for mayor of Istanbul. Like most of his fellow Welfare mayors around the country, Erdogan earned a reputation for clean, effective, and competent management of the city's affairs. In contrast to Erbakan, he developed a keen understanding of when not to push his agenda. He banned alcohol from municipal establishments, but wisely took no steps to ban drinking in restaurants (as a number of other Welfare mayors attempted to do). After initially endorsing a project to build a large Mosque complex in the heart of the city, he quickly abandoned the idea when his constituents organized protests. Even hardcore Kemalists, who feared that Erdogan and his colleagues were the thin end of the wedge for a more radical Islamist takeover of Turkey's political life, had to admit that Istanbul was well administered.
Erdogan nevertheless got into trouble in 1997 by publicly reading a passage from a well-known poem written by Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924), sociologist, writer, and theoretician of Turkish nationalism: "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers."[4] Charged with crimes against laiklik, Erdogan was jailed for 10 months and banned from politics for the rest of his life - an experience which led him to appreciate the futility of confronting Kemalist political traditions head on.
While Erdogan and other AKP leaders unabashedly affirm their private religious convictions, they advocate secularism in the conventional Western sense of the term. "Before anything else, I'm a Muslim . . . I have a responsibility to God, who created me, and I try to fulfill that responsibility, but I try now very much to keep this away from my political life, to keep it private," Erdogan told the New York Times last year. "A political party cannot have a religion, only individuals can . . . religion is so supreme that it cannot be [politically] exploited or taken advantage of," he explained.[5]
But the AKP also rejects the illiberal repression of Islam that the Kemalists practiced for so many decades. For example, while Erdogan opposes state enforcement of Islamic dress codes, he maintains that female university students should be free to wear Islamic headscarves in class. Under the current Turkish law, they are not. Erdogan is fond of pointing out that his two daughters chose to attend college in the United States (both at the University of Indiana), where they are free to wear their headscarves. Indeed, Erdogan has called his view of secularism 'American-style laiklik.'
The AKP also adopted a platform of staunch support for Turkish integration into the global economy, membership in the EU, and overall alignment with the West. The AKP's explicit pro-Western agenda not only reflected the modernizing ideals of Erdogan and other younger generation Islamists, but made perfect sense politically and helped the party attract middle class support. Another consideration may also have been at work. After Erbakan was ousted from office and the judiciary moved to dismantle his Welfare party, he repeatedly called upon Western governments for help, but was completely ignored. The septuagenarian may have had friends in high places in the Islamic world, but they were politically useless when push came to shove in Turkey. The AKP's pro-Western platform would prove to be a much more effective hedge against the Kemalists.
The AKP in Power
The AKP scored a remarkable landslide victory in the November 2002 parliamentary elections, garnering 34% of the national vote and capturing a commanding 363-seat majority. Aside from the CHP, led by Deniz Baykal, no other party broke through the 10% vote threshold constitutionally required to win a place in the 550-seat Parliament. The AKP's triumph ejected an entire class of established politicians from government. Leading figures who were denied parliamentary seats included former prime ministers Tansu Ciller, who heads the True Path Party (DYP); Mesut Yilmaz, who heads ANAP; and Bulent Ecevit, the head of DSP.
Because Erdogan had been banned from political office in 1998, his deputy, Abdullah Gul, initially assumed the premiership. But it was clear from the beginning that Erdogan was calling the shots. In December 2002, US President George W. Bush stunned the Turkish political establishment in Ankara by inviting Erdogan to the White House. "You believe in the Almighty, and I believe in the Almighty. That's why we'll be great partners," the American president is said to have told his counterpart.[6] Proceeding on to Europe, Erdogan received assurances that the EU would commence accession negotiations with Ankara in December 2004 if Turkey undertook sufficient political and economic reforms.
In part because of American and European de facto recognition of Erdogan's authority, the Turkish military accepted the new administration's amendment of the constitution to lift the ban on Erdogan's political activity and holding of a by-election to allow for his entry into parliament (a requirement to be prime minister). In March 2004, Erdogan formally assumed the premiership.
Over the past year and half, the AKP has introduced a remarkable array of political and economic reforms. Most of them, not coincidentally, closely reflect the so-called "Copenhagen criteria" required for Turkish accession to the EU - a consolidated market economy, stable democratic institutions, rule of law, respect for internationally recognized human rights, and protection of minorities. Decades-old restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression have been eased, the death penalty has been revoked, and legislation designed to curtail torture has been passed. The government has abolished the notorious state security courts and removed military representation from the higher education board. The AKP has brought Turkish legislation into conformity with the Copenhagen criteria on a host of other issues, such as press freedom, civilian control of the military, and transparency in public finance.
The AKP has striven to bolster Turkey's relations with the United States and Europe. In sharp contrast to Erbakan, Erdogan has expressed unequivocal opposition to the idea of an Islamic economic bloc.[7] The AKP government was able to deliver complete Turkish and Turkish Cypriot agreement on a United Nations plan to reunify the divided island of Cyprus, thereby alleviating the single greatest source of tension between Turkey and Europe.
Ironically, the old line Kemalists, who for 80 years preached about the need to modernize and Westernize Turkey, have in many ways become the reactionaries in Turkey, while the "Islamists" have taken the lead in promoting Western-style reforms. In spite of the dismal electoral fortunes of nationalist political parties in 2002, the Kemalist elite continues to dominate not only Turkey's military, but also its civilian bureaucracy, judiciary, and media. The so-called "deep state" in Turkey has resisted many of the changes introduced by the AKP.
That Erdogan has nevertheless managed to score impressive victories against these entrenched interests is due in no small part to the support he enjoys in the United States and Europe. "What we are seeing are the demands of the EU and pro-Islamic groups overlapping for the first time in Turkish history, with Islamic groups finding in the West an ally that can protect them against the excesses of the Kemalist state," notes Ihsan Dagi, a professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University in Ankara.[8] According to David L. Phillips, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Erdogan wouldn't have been able to change Turkish policy on Cyprus had it not been for the clear-cut support he enjoys from the Bush administration. "Turkey's security establishment would never have tolerated concessions [on Cyprus] if it still enjoyed Washington's unwavering support."[e]
Reasons for Hope in the Middle East
Turkey, a country of about 70 million Muslims, most of whom are religious, is ruled today by a conservative party with an Islamic pedigree and a humane, tolerant, and democratic track record. Can we generalize from the AKP's experience? Not without some care. Turkey is quite different from the rest of the Middle East, whether Arab or Persian. What works in Ankara will not necessarily work in Tehran, Damascus or Baghdad. Nonetheless, there are definitely lessons to be learned.
The most important one is that external pressure for political reform can achieve results. Unlike other Muslim countries in the region, Turkey has been cajoled, pressured, and encouraged by the West in its journey toward full and mature democracy. The political and economic conditions attached to Turkish membership in the EU have greatly reinforced domestic pressure for reforms, while Western support for the AKP has clearly bolstered its ability to overcome entrenched bureaucratic and military interests. Secondly, the Turkish experience suggests that Western support for moderate Islamist political parties can strengthen their commitment to political and economic liberalization. If the United States is serious about promoting human rights and democratic values in the Middle East, it should take note of all that Erdogan has accomplished.
Notes [1] Kemalists are followers of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic. Among other characteristics, Kemalists take a dim view of Islam in politics, fearing a rollback of Ataturk's Westernizing reforms. [2] Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 35. [3] Bernard Lewis, Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy, Middle East Quarterly, March 1994. [4] Turkey bars Islamic leader from poll, BBC News Europe, 20 September 2002. [5] Deborah Sontag, "The Erdogan Experiment," The New York Times, 11 May 2003. [6] Deborah Sontag, "The Erdogan Experiment," The New York Times, 11 May 2003. [7] "I disapprove of the concept of an Islamic common market," Erdogan flatly declared in January 2004 at the fifth Jeddah Economic Forum in Saudi Arabia. "We will not base [economic] relations on ethnic or religious roots or geography." See "Turkish Premier Rejects Idea of Islamic Common Market," Anatolia news agency (Ankara), 18 January 2004. [8] Helena Smith, "New Breed of Islamic Politicians Start to Find Their Feet," The Guardian (London), 10 March 2003. [9] David L. Phillips, "Turkey's Generals in Retreat," Radikal, 10 April 2004.

Bush of Arabia

By FOUAD AJAMI
January 8, 2008; Page A21

It was fated, or "written," as the Arabs would say, that George W. Bush,
reared in Midland, Texas, so far away from the complications of the
foreign world, would be the leader to take America so deep into Arab and
Islamic affairs.

This is not a victory lap that President Bush is embarking upon this
week, a journey set to take him to Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian
territories, the Saudi Kingdom, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab
Emirates. Mr. Bush by now knows the heartbreak and guile of that region.
After seven years and two big wars in that "Greater Middle East," after
a campaign against the terror and the malignancies of the Arab world,
there will be no American swagger or stridency.


But Mr. Bush is traveling into the landscape and setting of his own
legacy. He is arguably the most consequential leader in the long history
of America's encounter with those lands.

Baghdad isn't on Mr. Bush's itinerary, but it hangs over, and propels,
his passage. A year ago, this kind of journey would have been
unthinkable. The American project in Iraq was reeling, and there was
talk of America casting the Iraqis adrift. It was then that Mr. Bush
doubled down -- and, by all appearances, his brave wager has been
vindicated.

His war has given birth to a new Iraq. The shape of this new Iraq is
easy to discern, and it can be said with reasonable confidence that the
new order of things in Baghdad is irreversible. There is Shiite primacy,
Kurdish autonomy in the north, and a cushion for the Sunni Arabs -- in
fact a role for that community slightly bigger than its demographic
weight. It wasn't "regional diplomacy" that gave life to this new Iraq.
The neighboring Arabs had fought it all the way.

But there is a deep streak of Arab pragmatism, a grudging respect for
historical verdicts, and for the right of conquest. How else did the
ruling class in Arabia, in the Gulf and in Jordan beget their kingdoms?






In their animus toward the new order in Iraq, the purveyors of Arab
truth -- rulers and pundits alike -- said that they opposed this new
Iraq because it had been delivered by American power, and is now in the
American orbit. But from Egypt to Kuwait and Bahrain, a Pax Americana
anchors the order of the region. In Iraq, the Pax Americana, hitherto
based in Sunni Arab lands, has acquired a new footing in a Shiite-led
country, and this is the true source of Arab agitation.

To hear the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, the Iraqis have sinned against the
order of the universe for the American military presence in their midst.
But a vast American air base, Al Udeid, is a stone's throw away from Al
Jazeera's base in Qatar.

There is a standoff of sorts between the American project in Iraq on the
one side, and the order of Arab power on the other. The Arabs could not
thwart or overturn this new Iraq, but the autocrats -- battered,
unnerved by the fall of Saddam Hussein, worried about the whole
spectacle of free elections in Iraq -- survived Iraq's moment of
enthusiasm.

They hunkered down, they waited out the early euphoria of the Iraq war,
they played up the anarchy and violence of Iraq and fed that violence as
well. In every way they could they manipulated the nervousness of their
own people in the face of this new, alien wave of liberty. Better 60
years of tyranny than one day of anarchy, goes a (Sunni) Arab maxim.

Hosni Mubarak takes America's coin while second-guessing Washington at
every turn. He is the cop on the beat, suspicious of liberty. He faced a
fragile, democratic opposition in the Kifaya (Enough!) movement a few
years back. But the autocracy held on. Pharaoh made it clear that the
distant, foreign power was compelled to play on his terms. There was
never a serious proposal to cut off American aid to the Mubarak regime.

In the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, a new oil windfall has rewritten
the terms of engagement between Pax Americana and the ruling regimes. It
is a supreme, and cruel, irony that Mr. Bush travels into countries now
awash with money: From 9/11 onwards, America has come to assume the
burden of a great military struggle -- and the financial costs of it all
-- while the oil lands were to experience a staggering transfusion of
wealth.






Saudi Arabia has taken in nearly $900 billion in oil revenues the last
six years; the sparsely populated emirate of Abu Dhabi is said to
dispose of a sovereign wealth fund approximating a trillion dollars. The
oil states have drawn down the public debt that had been a matter of no
small consequence to the disaffection of their populations. There had
been a time, in the lean 1990s, when debt had reached 120% of Saudi GDP;
today it is 5%. There is swagger in that desert world, a sly sense of
deliverance from the furies.


The battle against jihadism has been joined by the official religious
establishment, stripping the radicals of their religious cover. Consider
the following fatwa issued by Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdallah al-Sheikh,
the Mufti of the Kingdom -- the highest religious jurist in Saudi Arabia
-- last October. There is evasion in the fatwa, but a reckoning as well:

"It has been noted that over the last several years some of our sons
have left Saudi lands with the aim of pursuing jihad abroad in the path
of God. But these young men do not have enough knowledge to distinguish
between truth and falsehood, and this was one reason why they fell into
the trap of suspicious elements and organizations abroad that toyed with
them in the name of jihad."

Traditional Wahhabism has always stipulated obedience to the ruler, and
this Wahhabi jurist was to re-assert it in the face of freelance
preachers: "The men of religion are in agreement that there can be no
jihad, except under the banner of wali al-amr [the monarch] and under
his command. The journey abroad without his permission is a violation,
and a disobedience, of the faith."

Iraq is not directly mentioned in this fatwa, but it stalks it: This is
the new destination of the jihadists, and the jurist wanted to cap the
volcano.

The reform of Arabia is not a courtesy owed an American leader on a
quick passage, and one worried about the turmoil in the oil markets at
that. It is an imperative of the realm, something owed Arabia's young
people clamoring for a more "normal" world. The brave bloggers, and the
women and young professionals of the realm, have taken up the cause of
reform. What American power owes them is the message given them over the
last few years -- that they don't dwell alone.





True to the promise, and to the integrity, of his campaign against
terror, Mr. Bush will not lay a wreath at the burial place of Yasser
Arafat in Ramallah. This is as it should be. Little more than five years
ago, Mr. Bush held out to the Palestinians the promise of statehood, and
of American support for that goal, but he made that support contingent
on a Palestinian break with the cult of violence. He would not grant
Arafat any of the indulgence that Bill Clinton had given him for eight
long years. It was the morally and strategically correct call.

The cult of the gun had wrecked the political life of the Palestinians.
They desperately needed an accommodation with Israel, but voted, in
early 2006, for Hamas.


The promise of Palestinian statehood still stood, but the force, and the
ambition, of Mr. Bush's project in Iraq, and the concern over Iran's bid
for power, had shifted the balance of things in the Arab world toward
the Persian Gulf, and away from the Palestinians. The Palestinians had
been reduced to their proper scale in the Arab constellation. It was
then, and when the American position in Iraq had been repaired, that Mr.
Bush picked up the question of Palestine again, perhaps as a courtesy to
his secretary of state.

The Annapolis Conference should be seen in that light: There was some
authority to spare. It is to Mr. Bush's singular credit that he was the
first American president to recognize that Palestine was not the central
concern of the Arabs, or the principal source of the political maladies.

The realists have always doubted this Bush campaign for freedom in Arab
and Muslim lands. It was like ploughing the sea, they insisted. Natan
Sharansky may be right that in battling for that freedom, Mr. Bush was a
man alone, even within the councils of his own administration.

He had taken up the cause of Lebanon. The Cedar Revolution that erupted
in 2005 was a child of his campaign for freedom. A Syrian dominion built
methodically over three decades was abandoned in a hurry, so worried
were the Syrians that American power might target their regime as well.
In the intervening three years, Lebanon and its fractious ways were to
test America's patience, with the Syrians doing their best to return
Lebanon to its old captivity.






But for all the debilitating ways of Lebanon's sectarianism, Mr. Bush
was right to back democracy. For decades, politically conscious Arabs
had lamented America's tolerance for the ways of Arab autocracy, its
resigned acceptance that such are the ways of "the East." There would
come their way, in the Bush decade, an American leader willing to bet on
their freedom.



"Those thankless deserts" was the way Winston Churchill, who knew a
thing or two about this region, described those difficult lands. This is
a region that aches for the foreigner's protection while feigning horror
at the presence of strangers.

As is their habit, the holders of Arab power will speak behind closed
doors to their American guest about the menace of the Persian power next
door. But the Arabs have the demography, and the wealth, to balance the
power of the Persians. If their world is now a battleground between Pax
Americana and Iran, that is a stark statement on their weakness, and on
the defects of the social contract between the Sunnis and the Shiites of
the Arab world. America can provide the order that underpins the
security of the Arabs, but there are questions of political and cultural
reform which are tasks for the Arabs themselves.

Suffice it for them that George W. Bush was at the helm of the dominant
imperial power when the world of Islam and of the Arabs was in the wind,
played upon by ruinous temptations, and when the regimes in the saddle
were ducking for cover, and the broad middle classes in the Arab world
were in the grip of historical denial of what their radical children had
wrought. His was the gift of moral and political clarity.

In America and elsewhere, those given reprieve by that clarity, and
single-mindedness, have been taking this protection while complaining
all the same of his zeal and solitude. In his stoic acceptance of the
burdens after 9/11, we were offered a reminder of how nations shelter
behind leaders willing to take on great challenges.

We scoffed, in polite, jaded company when George W. Bush spoke of the
"axis of evil" several years back. The people he now journeys amidst
didn't: It is precisely through those categories of good and evil that
they describe their world, and their condition. Mr. Bush could not
redeem the modern culture of the Arabs, and of Islam, but he held the
line when it truly mattered. He gave them a chance to reclaim their
world from zealots and enemies of order who would have otherwise run
away with it.


Mr. Ajami teaches at Johns Hopkins University. He is author of "The
Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq,"
(Free Press, 2006), and a recipient of the Bradley Prize.